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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Livestock Marketing Institutions in America: 
An Historical Perspective 
Perhaps no word more accurately depicts the history of American live-
stock marketing institutions and price determination mechanisms than 
"change." Largely responsible for this on- going phenomenon has been the 
interaction of economic development forces with technological advancements. 
Since 1920, this interaction has been illustrated by producer dissatisfac-
tion with termina l marketing and the advent of the motor truck, which has 
resulted in a continual shift to decentralized modes of livestock market-
ing. Despite this s t eadfast trend towards decentralized livestock market-
ing, one should not be disillusioned into believing that the future will 
be without continued institutional and price-mechanism change. Upon com-
pletion of a review of the historical changes in the structure of markets 
and marketing institutions, Wilcox et al . [31, p . 115] concluded that recent 
structure and institution developments represent onl y one point on the con-
tinuum of marketing change. Accordingly, Wilcox predicted economic and 
technological developments would provide the impetus for even oore rapid 
and dramatic changes during the remainder of the Twentieth Century. [31, 
p. 115] To enable the reader to understand the potential for further 
c hanges in the institutions and mechanisms of price determination, it is 
necessary to review the highlights of livestock marketing development in 
America. 
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1. Pre-Twentieth Century livestock marketing institutions 
At the time of Columbus's discovery of the New World in 1492, domes-
tic meat animals did not inhabit the North American continent. Within a 
few years after the first permanent introduction of domestic meat-type 
livestock to the Eastern Coast of the North American continent at James-
town in 1611 and at Plymouth Colony in 1624 [32, p . 4], domenstic supplies 
of livestock were more than adequate [32, p . 5] for self-support. While 
the major livestock trade during the early stages of colonial development 
was in breeding stock, an abundant beef and pork supply in the Quaker 
Colony of Pennsylvania gave rise to an early export trade in beef and pork 
products. [32, p. 5] 
Sale of livestock by auction in the pre-Revolutionary War Colonies was 
reported as early as 1676. [8, p. 3; 32, p. 6] 
Developmental progress during the Eighteenth Century was highlighted 
by the establishment of the Brighton Market, near Boston, in 1756 . [32, 
p. 6] Thi~ landmark achievement was the first public market of record in 
the Colonies. After the American Revolution, territorial expansion, demo-
graphic growth, industrial development, the advent of the steam engine, the 
consequential growth of the railroad, and the passage of the Homestead Act, 
were significant factors leading to the development of terminal markets . 
Being strategically located, Chicago became the nation's leading hog 
packing center during the Civil War. [32, p. 18) While some cattle were 
killed in Chicago, a large portion of the Chicago receipts were shipped on-
ward to slaughter points in the East. Typically, each railroad company 
with track converging in the Chicago vicinity operated its own stockyards 
for cattle shipped to Chicago on the railroad's tracks . [32, p. 19) Con-
3 
sequently, cormnunication of the prevailing price and supply conditions 
among the scattered yard locations in the Chicago area was nearly impossi-
ble. This problem was apparently resolved when the nine railroads serving 
Chicago consolidated their stockyard efforts with the opening of the Chi-
cago Union Stockyards on Christmas Day, 1865. [32, p. 19] This success-
1 
ful venture marked the beginning of modern terminal livestock markets. 
The Chicago opening was followed by the formation of terminal livestock 
2 
markets in other U. S. cities. 
Despite the wide appeal of terminal markets, some producers soon real-
ized that the system was not ideally suited for their needs. Prompted by 
prohibitive less-than-carload freight rates, concern over low livestock 
prices, and suspicion of unjustifiably wide dealer operating margins f 32, 
p. 22], farmers began to search for new marketing methods . This search led 
to the establishment of the first l ocal livestock-buying market on record 
at McGregor, Iowa in 1892. [10 , p. 12; 32, p. 23] Although fur ther local 
livestock-buying operations followed, the numbers remained small until 
the 1920's. (32, p. 23 ] 
2 . Twentieth Century livestock marketing institutions 
During the Twentieth Century, the three major slaught er livestock mar-
keting institutions and price determination mechanisms have been the ter-
minal markets, the auction markets, and direct and country buying. [13, p . 2] 
1
0peration of the Chicago Union Stockyards continued until the stock-
yards were closed in August 1971. [16, p. 121] 
2 
Kansas City in 1871, St. Louis in 1873, Cincinnait in 1874, Indian-
apolis in 1877, Omaha in 1884, Denver in 1886, St. Paul in 1888, Ft. Worth 
in 1893, Sioux City in 1894, and St . Joseph in 1896. [JO, p . 2: J2, p . 191 
4 
The predominant Twentieth Century trend towards decentralized livestock 
marketing has been the result of the continued decline in terminal 
marketing and the steady rise in the use of direct and country buying chan-
nels. [9, p. 2; 13, p. 2] At the same time, the portion of the slaugh-
ter livestock sold through local auction markets has remained fairly stable 
since about 1940. [13, p . 3] 
The trend towards decentralized livestock marketing has been in part 
caused by the development of hard-surfaced roads and the increased reliance 
on motor trucks for transporting livestock. [30, p. 2] Other contributing 
factors have included the federal governments's intervention resulting in 
the establishment of a system of official grades and standards and a reli-
able market news service. [32, p. 24) 
Some of the more apparent reasons for the popularity of direct and 
country buying among producers have been listed by Holder . [13, p. 8] 
These reasons include: 
1. A price per hundredweight is established before the live-
stock leaves the feedlot. This enables the producer to 
refuse to sell if after partial negotiations the apparent 
exchange price is extremely low and thus not acceptable. 
2. The determined exchange price is specifically established 
in terms of the producer ' s livestock and the producer's 
reputation for cattle quality. That is, because the pro-
ducer's identity is known by the packer, direct and country 
marketing facilitates product differentiation to the ex-
tent a producer can establish a reputation for the produc-
tion of quality cattle. 
3. Direct sales and country buying eliminates most of the un-
necessary shipping and handling costs associated with 
central assembly of cattle either before or after their 
sale. 
Although the utilization of direct and country marketing methods have 
resulted in a reduction in livestock shrink and out-of-pocket producer ex-
5 
penditures for commission fees, yardage , and livestock transportation, 
these marketing channels are not without defects. Among the most objec-
tionable are the lack of competitive bidding on each producer's livestock 
and the producer's informational disadvantage which arises from shortage of 
pertinent marketing information available to the individual producer en-
gaged in one-to-one negotiations with the packer representatives. [2la, 
p.5] In addition to a lack of negotiating power and market information, 
the producer's own personal negotiating skills may impair his attempts to 
receive the optimal exchange price for his cattle. Inadequate negotiating 
skills may in part be evidenced by a producer's failure to make several 
contacts with packer-buyers prior to sale of his cattle. 
In recognition of the direct and country marketing method shortcomings, 
agricultural marketing economists and producers have drawn upon the recent 
advancements in electronic technology in an attempt to design new price de-
termination mechanisms which enable centralized price determination in an 
attempt to eliminate the deficiencies inherent in country marketing while 
retaining the marketing cost savings of direct and country buying. The re-
sult has been numerous innovative electronic marketing system proposals and 
several operational exchanges which utilize teleconnnunication networks to 
link buyers and sellers with computers and other electronic devices in es-
tablishing transaction prices. 
Several of the potential advantages of electronic trading in commodi-
ties over alternative modes have been identified by Forker. 
These advantages include: 
1. Cost of management time and transportation in finding 
buyers is lessened; 
9, p . 8 ] 
6 
2. Need for central assemply of livestock, especially 
before sale, can be eliminated; 
3. Number of potential buyers contacted or having an 
opportunity to bid on a lot is increased. 
Thus, due to the shortcomings in the country and direct marketing 
methods and the developments in electronic technology which have made pos-
sible the advantages offered by electronic marketing systems, it appears 
that livestock marketing institutions are on the verge of further change. 
B. The Problem: Need For An Improved 
Electronic Marketing System 
The electronic marketing systems which have been proposed during the 
past seventeen years can be placed into one of three cat egories on the 
basis of the type of electronic exchange mechanism utilized . The three 
categories of electronic exchanges are as follows: tel ephone auctions, 
teletype auctions, and computerized exchanges. 
Telephone auctions utilize the telephone conference call to establish 
communication among geographically separated bidders and the centralized 
auctioneer for the successive sale of consigned lots during the course of 
an ascending price auction. Telephone auctions have been successfully 
utilized in the sale of feeder pigs (22, p. 34] and slaughter lambs (24]. 
Attempts have also been made to utilize telephone auctions for the sale of 
slaughter hogs [ 22, p. 34] and eggs [23, p . 9]. 
Teletype auctions employ a teletype network to cotnmunicat e between t he 
geographically separated bidders and the electronic a uctioneer i n the s ue-
cessive sale of consigned lots during the course of a descending price auc-
tion. The Canadian provinces of Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta have sue-
cessfully utilized the teletype auction in the sale of slaughter hogs. 
7 
Furthermore, a proposal has been made for the es tablishment of a slaughter 
cattle teletype auction in the United States. [15) 
The computerized exchanges utilize high-speed electronic computers to 
match producer offers with buyer bids. These exchanges permit producers 
and packers to enter bids and offers, as well as receive price information, 
through touch-tone telephones connected with the exchange computer ' s audio-
response unit. Computerized exchanges have been proposed for use in the 
sale of shell eggs [23), slaughter hogs [12), and feeder cattle [11). 
While several of these electronic exchange proposals offer imaginative 
price determination mechanisms which permit centralized price determination 
without centralized livestock assembly, all such proposals have been char-
acterized by imperfections. The major weaknesses in the prior proposals 
include erratic price fluctuations between lots, lack of market-determined 
premium-discount schedules for carcass weight and grades , and the failure 
to provide for more than one trading basis . In addition, the exchanges in 
each of the three prior proposal categories make it difficult for individual 
bidders to perceive the willingness of buyers to buy a particular lot and 
their willingness to buy comparable lots. This deficiency not only makes 
development of bidding strategies difficult, but also causes unwarranted 
interlot price fluctuation and inefficient exchange outcomes. 
Furthermore, some telephone and teletype auction proposals have un-
desirably required that producers deliver their livestock to an assembly 
yard. Required presale livestock assembly may cause unnecessary facility 
and handling costs, cross-hauling of livestock, uneven delivery of cattle 
at packer plants, and increased costs of refusing low packer bids. 
8 
A further defect in electronic exchange proposals, compulsory producer 
participation, has arisen from concern over obtaining and maintaining suf-
ficient trading volume to make the exchange financially successful and to 
avoid the free-rider problem. 
After a study of the weaknesses in prior electronic marketing system 
proposals, Forker concluded that the previous electronic marketing system 
proposals have not fully nor adequately exploited modern electronic and 
computer technology. [9, p. 2] In view of this conc lusion and the afore-
mentioned imperfections in previous electronic exchange designs, it is ap-
parent that further research and development in the area of electronic 
livestock marketing systems is needed. 
C. Objectives and Scope of This Study 
After a preliminary investigation into the weaknesses in previous 
electronic exchange proposals and the unutilized electronic and computer 
technology , the following two objectives for this study were formulated: 
1. To design an electronic slaughter cattle exchange for mar-
keting cattle fed in Iowa which eliminates the deficien-
cies existent in previous electronic exchange proposals. 
2. To develop a method for conducting a comparative evaluation 
of the proposed exchange relative to previous exchange pro-
posals . 
Admittedly, the electronic exchange is just one possible marketing 
mode which might be proposed as a remedy for the disadvantages of direct 
cattle marketing. Forker, for example, has recently examined group nego-
tiations and bargaining, formula pricing, and couunittee pricing, and con-
eluded that they are price determination mechanisms which could s e rve as 
alternatives to electronic exchanges. [9] Eac h of these alternative 
marketing modes studied by Forker retain the inherent advantages of direct 
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marketing while utilizing centralized price determination in an attempt 
to avoid the information shortages and lack of competitive bidding inherent 
in direct livestock marketing. Despite the potential offered by these mar-
keting alternatives, the scope of this study has been limited solely to a 
consideration of electronic commodity exchanges. 
The livestock marketing process has sometimes been temporally defined 
to encompass all intervening steps taken from the time cattle in the feed-
lot approach market weight until the resulting meat reaches the consumer's 
table. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study only that segment of 
the cattle marketing process which begins where cattle in the feedlot ap-
proach market weight and continues until they arrive at the place of 
slaughter will be considered. 
From a geographical standpoint the scope of this study is limited in 
that the proposed electronic exchange system is designed for deployment on 
a statewide, rather than a regional or national level. 
The emphasis of this thesis is on the proposed exchange's design 
rather than the development of a plan for complete implementation. Thus, 
while recognized to be important, issues such as selection of a host market 
agency, initial promotion and attainment of sufficient trading volume, and 
legal problems, such as the steps necessary to make exchange participation 
compulsory or the drafting of marketing agreements, are not discussed. 
While efforts have been made to develop a complete set of evaluative 
criteria, it is likely that the list of market criteria presented is not 
exhaustive. 
And finally, this study does not report the results of any empirical 
analysis. 
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D. Overview of the Proposed Electronic Simultaneous 
Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction 
The Electronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction 
(ESPSCA), the electronic cattle marketing system proposed by this study, 
combines the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system and a com-
puter-monitored network of cathode-ray tubes to produce an improved elec-
tronic livestock exchange system. The specific advantages of the ESPSCA 
over previous electronic exchange proposals include: 1) market- determined 
quality price differential schedules and optional trading bases; 2) reduced 
interlot random price fluctuations; and 3) increased disclosure of bids on 
consigned lots, as well as consignor identification, which facilitates 
the formulation of bidding strategies. 
To assist the reader in gaining an understanding of the ESPSCA, I now 
present a preliminary overview of the proposed exchange. Because thisover-
view is intended to be a sunnnary rather than a comprehensive description of 
the ESPSCA, definitions and technical explanations will be left until later 
in this thesis. The emphasis in this overview is on two aspects of the 
ESPSCA: 1) the distinguishing features of the ESPSCA; and 2) the conduct 
of the ESPSCA. 
1. Distinguishing features of the ESPSCA 
From a descriptive standpoint the distinguishing features of the 
ESPSCA are: 1) its use of the simultaneous progressive auction transaction 
system; 2) its multiple price determination, and 3) its use of computerized 
electronic equipment to conduct and monitor the auction. 
The simultaneous progressive auction transaction system is utilized by 
the ESPSCA. Unlike the successive progressive auction transaction sys tem 
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utilized by ordinary ascending price auctions which are characterized by 
incremental bids on lots offered for sale simultaneously, the simultaneous 
progressive auction transaction system is characterized by concurrent bid-
ding on more than one lot, incremental bids on each lot, and when no bidder 
is willing to enter another bid on any lot, each lot is sold simultaneously 
to the last bidder on each lot. 
Due to the "progressive" attribute of the simultaneous progressive 
auction transaction system it is possible to allow multiple price determina-
tion, or in other words, the entry of bids on more than one price for each 
lot. This feature makes it possible to offer a lot on several different 
trading bases and give either buyers or sellers the option of selecting 
which price or subset of prices is to be the basis for exchange. Multiple 
price determination also allows bidders to determine a base price and a 
quality price differential schedule for each lot. , 
While a simultaneous progressive slaughter cattle auction conceivably 
could be conducted without the use of electronic equipment, the exchange 
system presented below has been designed such that all five major auction 
functions are performed by or with the aid of electronic equipment. The 
first auction function, auction control, involves the coordination and mon-
itoring of all other electronic systems and is performed by a high-speed 
electronic digital computer. The second auction function, consignment, 
involves the receipt of producer sale orders. The consignment function 
could be performed by a touch-tone telephone, a card-dialing telephone, a 
punched-card computer terminal, or a teletypewriter. The third auction 
function, sale bill connnunication, involves the transformation of elec-
tronic transmissions into a printed listing of consigned lot descriptions 
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and could be performed by a teletypewriter terminal or line printer ter-
minal located at the packer's buying office or broker's office . The fourth 
auction function, remote data transmission, involves the electronic trans-
mission of consignments and bidding data between geographically remote lo-
cations. This function could be performed by a series of WATS lines, 
leased voice-grade telephone channels, and leased teletype channels. The 
fifth auction function, bidding, involves the determinat ion of each con-
signed lot's exchange price. To perform the bidding function, each bidding 
station would be equipped with one or more cathode-ray tube (CRT) display 
stations. Each such station would be comprised of a cathode-ray tube, an 
alphameric keyboard, and a fiber-optic light pen. 
2. Conduct of the ESPSCA 
The ESPSCA would be conducted as follows. In the preparatory stage of 
the auction session any cattle feeder interested in consigning a lot of 
cattle for sale on the ESPSCA would use his touch-tone telephone to contact 
the ESPSCA headquarters . The cattle feeder would be greeted by the central 
processing unit's (CPU's) audio-response unit. By using a pre-established 
code, the cattle feeder could enter his identification number and request 
market information. Upon receipt of these transmissions , the CPU would 
verify that the requesting producer is a bona fide member of the exchange 
and verbally report the average, high, and low sale prices for cattle for 
specified trading methods during the current and previous auction sessions. 
If the cattle feeder decides to consign one or more lots, he would 
transmit to the CPU the following consignment information: a) the number 
of lots to be consigned; b) the desired bases for each lot; c) the 
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number of head of each sex in each l ot; d) the location of the cattle 
at the time of sale; e) the auction session for which consignment is being 
made; f) the desired delivery interval; g) the desired grading option; h) 
whether his identity is to be revealed to bidders; and i) his reserve bids. 
The CPU would verbally repeat the consignment details for consignor verifi-
cation, assign each lot a Lot Identification Number, and record the data in 
the lot's consignment file. If the consignor so requested, a grader would 
be dispatched and the grader's report would be included in the particular 
lot's consignment file. 
As the auction session approaches, the ESPSCA computer would prepare 
an auction sale bill by compiling a list of lots consigned for sale during 
this auction session. Subsequently, the computer would categorize these 
lots by trading method, sex composition, and delivery interval. The com-
puter would then compile a lot description from the data in the con-
signment file for each lot. When completed, the sale bill would be trans-
mitted to each packer-buyer station. 
Each participating packer-buyer is notified that the auction starting 
time is approaching. Upon receiving the starting signal, each packer-
buyer operating a CRT display station could use his programmed-function and 
alphameric keyboards to enter command messages. These commands would per-
mit the buyer to view one or more lot bid arrays on his CRT display screen . 
If the buyer desires to enter a bid on a particular lot displayed on his 
screen, he would select the desired bid increment and depress the appro-
priate key on his programmed-function keyboard. The packer-buyer would 
then enter the bid by pointing his display stations's fiber-optic light pen 
at the last illuminated character in the previous bid for the desired lot 
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and lot component . Immediately after receipt and registry of the individ-
ual bid increment, the display would reflect the new incremental bid and 
an "X" at the bottom of the appropriate bid array, indicating that the par-
ticular buyer is now the high bidder on the lot. In addition , the new in-
cremental bid is regis tered on the CRT display screen of any o t her buyer 
who also is viewing the bid array for that particular lot. 
As the auction progresses, the number of bids enter ed per minute will 
decrease. When bid ent rance drops to a predetermined rate per minute, the 
CPU would alert buyers that the end of the session is approaching. The 
cessation of bidding would be followed by the computerized identification 
of winning bidders. The final bid array on each lot would irmnediately be 
transmitted to the consignor, and the consignor would be asked to indicate, 
when appropriate, his choice of trading basis and the number of animals to 
be supplied, Each buyer would then receive a list of lots purchased, the 
trading basis for each lot, and number to be supplied from each lot . 
Finally, consignors would be given the name and telephone number of the 
buyer of each lot they had consigned . 
E. Outline of the Following Chapters 
The content of the remaining five chapters of this thesis is briefly 
outlined below. 
Chapter II contains a review of the previously published proposals and 
attempts to operate electronic commodity exchanges. Review of these pro-
posals exposes the strong and weak features of each, indicates those re-
finements which should be incorporated in a new electronic exchange pro-
posal, and provides a basis for identifying the significant improvements in 
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my exchange proposal. 
In Chapter III a set of twenty potential flaws in the design , opera-
tion, structure, and exchange outcomes of previous and future electronic 
exchange proposals are identified. 
Chapter IV contains a detailed development of the proposed Elec-
tronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction (ESPSCA). This 
development begins with the selection of an auction transaction system. 
The development then progresses through descriptions of a simple simul-
taneous progressive cattle auction and a nonelectronic multiple-price 
simultaneous progressive slaughter cattle auction, before finally present-
ing the electronic version of the auction. 
In Chapter V the set of market flaws presented in Chapter III are used 
as a basis for developing evaluative market criteria. Once stated , each 
criterion is then applied to the previous electronic exchange proposals and 
the ESPSCA in conducting a comparative evaluation of the proposals. 
The final chapter, Chapter VI, summarizes the conclusions which can be 
drawn from this research, identifies the advantages offered by the simul-
taneous progressive auction transaction system and the ESPSCA over previous 
electronic exchange proposals, and outlines the issues which need further 
research before an attempt is made to implement the ESPSCA. 
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II. REVIEW OF LITERATURE: PREVIOUS 
ELECTRONIC COMMODITY EXCHANGE 
SYSTEM PROPOSALS 
A. Introduction 
In recent years marketing economists have made various proposals for 
electronic agricultural conunodity exchange systems. Several of these pro-
posals have actually been implemented by producer organizations and some 
have operated for as long as seventeen years. This chapter presents a sur-
vey of prior proposals which will provide a basis for comparing these ear-
lier proposals with the proposal presented in this study . 
The previously proposed electronic exchanges may be grouped into three 
classes: 1) telephone auctions; 2) teletype auctions; and 3) computerized 
exchanges. This classification scheme separates the proposal s on the basis 
of the type of electr onic equipment used to conduct the exchange transac-
tions and the type of transaction system used to determine the exchange 
price. 
While not all of the exchanges discussed were designed to acconnnodate 
the sale of slaughter cattle, an examination of the organization and elec-
tronic hardware utilized by each of these proposals will reveal the design 
characteristics and components needing further research and refinements. 
In those cases where the proposal has been made operational , the dis-
cussion will focus on the operational exchange and factors attributing to 
its success or failure. In all other cases, the discussion will focus on 
the proposal itself. 
In the discussion associated with each of the three classes , I will in-
itially provide an introductory overview which covers the elements common 
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to each proposal in the class. Included in this overview will be a discus-
sion of the type of connnodity assembly system employed, pertinent transac-
tions rules and procedures, and the type of electronic equipment character-
istic of the particular class of electronic exchanges. The discussion of 
each exchange system class will then turn to an examination of the unique 
characteristics of each exchange proposal. 
B. Telephone Auctions 
1. Basic auction organization 
The least sophisticated type of electronic exchange proposal utilizes 
a telephone conference call to communicate among up to fifteen geographi-
cally separated bidding points and the central auction headquarters in the 
conduct of a conventional (ascending price) auction. 
Preparation for the telephone conference call auction begins with the 
producer ' s delivery of commodities to his regional assembly point. In the 
case of livestock, the assembly point normally consists of loading and un-
loading facilities, livestock scales, animal holding pens, and a communica-
tion device, usually either a telephone or teletypewriter, linking the 
assembly point with the auction headquarters. Once unloaded at the assem-
bly yard, a producer ' s animals are inspected by a veterinarian, eartagged 
or tattooed to identify the producer, graded on a live basis, weighed, and 
penned into lots of similar weight and grade. [22, p . 34; 23, p. 8) When 
this handling has been completed, the yardman at each assembly yard commun-
icates, either by telephone or teletypewriter, the description of each lot 
consigned at his assembly yard to the central auction headquarters. Upon 
the receipt of all lot descriptions from the assembly yards, the headquar-
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ters staff compiles a master sale order and makes it available for examina-
tion by all potential bidders prior to the bidding. 
At a prearranged time potential bidders assemble at each bidding sta-
tion and establish counnunication with the central auction headquarters via 
the telephone conference call. The bidding stations may be geographically 
removed from the regional assembly yards and the central auction headquar-
ters. At the central auction headquarters, an auctioneer begins the auc-
tion by seeking bids on the first lot scheduled for sale. By means of the 
telephone conference call bidders at their spatially remote bidding sta-
tions are able to hear the auctioneer's solicitations for bids and the bids 
as made by competing bidders at their own and other bidding stations. When 
an individual bidder at a particular bidding s tation wishes to enter a bid, 
either his bidder number or name is transmitted to all other bidders and 
the auctioneer. Just as in an ordinary auction barn situation, the auc-
tioneer senses when the bids have probably reached their high point and 
sells the lot by knocking it down to the highest bidder. The auction then 
progresses in a similar and successive manner in the sale of each lot on 
the master sale order. When all lots have been sold, the auction is re-
cessed until the next session. 
All of the livestock telephone auctions have required that consigned 
livestock be graded prior to sale and that the livestock be sold on a live-
weight basis. Because none of the telephone auctions permit livestock trad-
ing on a carcass merit basis, no attempt has been made to utilize a market-
determined quality price differential schedule. 
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2. Operational experiences with the telephone auctions 
In the past fifteen years a number of producer groups in various 
states have organized producers and connnodity buyers to establish and con-
duct telephone auctions. In the paragraphs below, I will briefly summarize 
the distinctive characteristics of several operational telephone auctions. 
a. Missouri Farmers Association feeder pig telephone auctions One 
of the most successful telephone auctions is the Missouri Farmers Associa-
tion (MFA) feeder pig telephone auction. The auction was organized by the 
MFA Livestock Association, a farmer cooperative headquartered in Marshall, 
Missouri. (22, p. 34] Annual trading volume on this auction in 1971 was 
approximately 416,000 head. [22, p. 34] 
Since the first MFA feeder pig auction was held in December 1965, the 
Association has held auctions on one or two evenings each week. Before 
each auction session pigs are assembled at either two or three of the ten 
assembly yards operated by the Association s uch that each assembly yard is 
used only once every two weeks. (22, p. 34) 
The MFA feeder pig auction utilizes a fifteen-hookup conference call 
[15, p. 23) to permit communication between the auctioneer and fifteen re-
mote bidding stations. At each bidding station potential bidders assemble 
to hear the conversation on the conference call network . Before being ad-
mitted to the bidding station premises, the "ringman" in attendance veri-
fies that each purported bidder is in fact a bona fide buyer. [23, p. 8] 
To enter a bid during the auction, a bidder notifies the ringman at his 
bidding station of his intentions. The ringman in turn enters the bid by 
announcing the bidding station's number to the auctioneer over the tele-
phone network. The ringman's announcement signifies that he has received 
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a bid at his bidding station pursuant to the auctioneer ' s solicitations. 
Accordingly, the identity of the individual bidder may be known by those com-
peting bidders assembled at the individual's bidding station . However, the 
individual bidder's identity remains anonymous to all bidders assembled at 
the fourteen other bidding stations. [22, p. 34] 
The MFA experience shows that it takes approximately one minute to 
sell each lot and approximately thirty minutes to conduct the entire auc-
tion session. [22 , p . 34] In 1971, the volume of trading during each auc-
tion session averaged slightly less than 3,000 pigs . [22, p. 34) 
All feeder pigs are sold subject to the terms: payment - cash on de-
livery; and shipment - F.O . B. assembly yard. Buyers are also required to 
pay a 25 cents per head charge for eartagging and the cost of vaccination. 
The MFA Livestock Association in turn provides the buyer with a 98- 100 per-
cent "livability" guarantee . [ 22, p. 34] 
For use of the telephone auction service, which includes the cost of 
periodic on-the-farm inspection, handling (sorting, grading, and weighing) 
at the assembly yard, connnunications, and the auctioneer, [23, p . 8) pro-
ducers in 1971 were charged between $1.25 and $1.50 per head, depending on 
the average weight of the pigs consigned. [22, p . 34] 
b. Missouri Farmers Association slaughter hog telephone auction 
Apparently encouraged by the initial success of their feeder pig auction, 
the MFA Livestock Association started a weekly telephone auction for slaugh-
ter hogs in March 1968, which was conducted in much the same manner as the 
Association's feeder pig auction. Slaughter hogs received at one of t wo 
assembly yards on Monday of each week were sold via telephone auction on 
Tuesday. [23, p. 9] Upon arrival at an assembly yard, each producer's 
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hogs were unloaded, identified by owner, grades, and penned into uniform 
1 saleable lots. [22, p. 34] 
Each auction session normally included the participation of from ten 
to fourteen packer-buyers. (23, p. 9] The MFA slaughter hog auction dif-
fered from the Association's feeder pig telephone auction in that with the 
slaughter hog auction, each of the packer-buyers was given his own phone 
and identified only by number in an effort to preserve bidder anonymity . 
[22, p. 34; 23, p. 9] The weekly volume of trading during the auction's 
brief period of operation averaged about 1000 head. [23, p. 9] 
Terms of sale were the same as for the MFA feeder pig telephone auc-
tion. [23, p. 9] For the auction services, the participating producers 
were charged 80 cents per head sold, and the buyers were charged 12 1/2 
cents per hundredweight. [22, p. 34; 23, p . 9] 
Operation of the MFA s laughter hog telephone auction was discontinued 
af ter only fifteen months. [22, p. 35] According to MFA officials, cessa-
tion of auction operations was the result of high operating costs and com-
petition with MFA-operated local slaughter hog markets. [22, p. 35] 
c . Maine egg auction Another t elephone auction with a brief opera-
tional history was organized by Maine egg producers in late 1961 in an at-
tempt to improve the egg pricing process. Promoters hoped that the organ-
ized auction marketing system would build confidence in the quality of 
their product, as well as serve as a major source of pricing information. 
Prior to each auction session, producers graded and cartoned their 
1
The penning arrangement in essence resulted in a pooling of animals 
such that the animals in each pen might be the product of several producers. 
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eggs, and then delivered them to one grading plant in Portland, Maine, 
where they were inspected by a federal-state grader. (23, p. 10] After 
delivery, the weekly auction, involving seven or eight buyers, was conduct-
ed on Tuesday morning. During the conduc t of the Maine telephone auction, 
participating bidders were identified by name. [23, p. 10] 
It should be recognized that telephone auction exchange systems which 
require sales by description are better adapted to selling eggs than live-
stock. This superior adaptability of eggs to telephone auction trading 
arises from the fact that eggs are readily and accurately graded in an ob-
jective manner; whereas, livestock grading requires reliance on a subjec-
tive, and often inaccurate, visual appraisal method. Consequently, a newly 
established egg telephone auction should more readily receive the confi-
dence of bidders than a comparable telephone auction for livestock. 
Two reasons cited by participants for the egg auction's lack of suc-
cess were: 1) the auction was started in a period of a general egg surplus 
with consequential low prices; and 2) that promoters moved so rapidly from 
the proposal to operational stages that potential buyers simply did not 
have time to make a decision to participate. [23, p. 10) 
d. Iowa Sheep Producers' tele-auction On March 3, 1976, the board 
of directors of the Iowa Sheep Producers' Association voted to enter an 
agreement with the Interstate Producers' Livestock Association (IPLA) of 
Peoria, Illinois, to conduct a tele-auction (telephone auction) for market 
lambs, ewes, and rams in Iowa. [24) Under the agreement, IPLA will fur-
nish the personnel necessary to conduct the tele-auction and will serve as 
the producer's sales agent . (24] In addition, IPLA will grade all con-
signed sheep prior to each auction by sending a qualified grader to the pro-
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ducer's farm . (24) By participating in the tele-auction, producers give 
the IPLA sales agency the authority to accept or refuse all bids in their 
behalf. After a sale has been consummated, the producer will be required 
within seven days to transport his sheep, at his own expense, to a design-
ated assembly point operated by IPLA . (24) Additionally, IPLA guarantees 
the payment for all sheep sold through the tele-auction once IPLA's Peoria 
office has received weight tickets from the assembly point manager . (24) 
To participate in the tele-auction a sheep producer must be a member 
of the Sheep Producers' Association and sign a marketing agreement desig-
nating IPLA as the marketing agency for his sheep. The marketing agreement 
runs from April 1st to March 31st and is automatically renewed unless IPLA 
receives a written termination notice from the producer. In addition, pro-
ducers must pay IPLA a $1.00 per head fee for each head sold thr ough the 
tele- auction. (24) 
IPLA officials have reported that 36 packers have indicated interest 
in participating in the new sheep tele-auction. (24] The officials have 
expressed their hopes that after a series of spring informational meetings 
with sheep producers, the required minimum conunitment of 50,000 sheep will 
be achieved. If the minimum producer connnitment is attained, officials 
plan to hold the first auction in June 1976. (24] 
e. Other telephone auctions In 1970 telephone auctions were also 
operational in Virginia and Wisconsin. 
The Virginia Tel-0-Auction was initiated in 1962 by the Virg i nia De-
partment of Agriculture, Division of Markets, and the Chesapeake and Poto-
mac Telephone Company. (15, p. 22] Although originally designed to market 
feeder pigs, it was subsequently expanded to also handle slaughter cattle 
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and hogs. [15, p. 22] 
In 1970 two telephone auction organizations, dealing primarily in 
feeder pigs, remained operational in Wisconsin. Although both Wisconsin 
telephone auction groups had at one time sold butcher hogs via t elephone , 
only the Midwest Livestock Producers ' Association of Wisconsin was still 
selling butcher hogs by telephone in 1970. [15, p. 23) As with the Vir-
ginia slaughter hog telephone auction, the Wisconsin slaughter hog auction 
was hampered by low selling volume. [15, p. 23) 
C. Teletype Auctions 
A second and more sophisticated type of exchange proposal employs a 
teletype network to communicate between geographically separated bidders 
and the auc t ioneer in the conduct of a successive regressive (declining 
price or "Dutch") auction. The successive regressive a uction framework 
utilized by the teletype auctions is similar to the successive progressive 
auction format used by the telephone auctions in that individual lots are 
sold "successively," or one after another. However, the s uccessive regres-
sive auction differs from the successive progressive auction in that each 
2 solicited bid on a lot is decrementally lower during the regressive auc-
tion and incrementally higher during the progressive auction. 
1. Basic teletype auction organization 
The three standard electronic components in each of the teletype auc-
tion proposals are 1) the master teletype, which serves as the central sell-
2 
This regressive or dec lining price attribute appears to be responsi-
ble for the random lot-to-lot price fluctuation between lots s uccessively 
sold on the operational tele t ype commodity auctions. 
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ing unit; 2) the electronic broadcast repeater; and 3) the teletype buying 
machines. 
When the sale of a lot appears to be favorable, the master teletype 
operator is given a written sale order by a member of the headquarters 
sales staff. [23, p. 6] The operator then types the assembly yard iden-
tification number or feedlot location, the lot number, and the number of 
animals in the lot, from the sale order, as well as the present data and 
time, on the master teletype 's keyboard. (23, p. 6] The operator of the 
master teletype then causes the machine to start broadcasting from a pre-
punched price tape . The particular tape has been preselected for use in 
selling the particular livestock lot by the market agency sales staff and 
represents a certain price spread . The tape is prepunched in uniform price 
decrements, such as five cents per hundredweight, beginning with the higher 
priced end of the price spread. Each price on the tape represents a price 
in dollars per hundredweight, at which the selling agency is soliciting 
bids. 
The electronic broadcast repeater, which is assigned the job of moni-
toring electronic impulse transmissions, is a specially designed unit con-
nected to the master teletype to form a part of the centralized selling 
unit . (7, p. 90] The electronic broadcast repeater appears as a panel dis-
playing a series of letters, each serving as the identification code for a 
particular buying machine. Above each identification letter is a white 
light which flickers when the system is in operation, indicating that the 
particular machine is receiving the bid transmission from the master tele-
type. [7, p. 90] Below each identification number on the panel is a r ed 
light which flashes when the particular buyer was the first to bid on the 
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lot currently being auctioned. [7, p. 90) 
When the operator of the master teletype types the descriptive details 
on his keyboard, each of the geographically removed bidding machines simul-
taneously receives this transmission and prints it on the machine's record-
ing paper. As the broadcast from the prepunched tape begins, each of the 
buying machines simultaneously receives and prints the first bid solicita-
tion. A few seconds later, the buying machines receive the transmission of 
a decremental bid solicitation and print this amount. This process is r e-
peated until either a buyer observes a solicitation for a price he is will-
ing to pay and depresses the bidding button on his buying machine, or the 
last bid solicitation on the prepunched tape is transmitted with an accom-
panying warning without a bid being entered. The first packer-buyer to en-
ter a bid on the lot will be the successful purchaser of the lot. The lot 
purchase price will be the one most recently printed by the buying machine 
at the time the buyer entered his bid. 
When the first bid on a lot is entered, the red light under the bid-
der's identification letter on the electronic broadcast repeater panel 
flashes. (7, p . 91] Immediately thereafter, the teletype broadcasting cir-
cuit is broken, leaving only the successful bidder's machine and the master 
teletype in contact. The master teletype then automatically prints the 
identification code letter of the successful bidder on the machine's record-
ing sheet. (7, p. 91] Subsequently, the successful bidder confirms the 
transaction by typing the letters "OK" on his buying machine's keyboard. 
The master teletype then broadcasts the lot's selling price to all buying 
machines, but does not reveal the identity of the successful bidder. [7, 
p. 91] 
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When the transmission of prices from the prepunched tape is completed 
without a bid having been entered for a particular lot, another attempt may 
be made to sell the lot later i n the auction session. [7, p. 91] The tim-
ing and price of the resolic itation is at the discretion o f the sales 
agency s taff. [23, p. 6] 
2. Operational experiences with the teletype auction 
Discussed in this section are four different attempts to establish 
teletype livestock auctions. The success of the first three eff orts, all 
of which arose in various Canadian provinces, can be reflected in part by 
the fact that the resulting auctions remain operational at the time of this 
writing. By contr ast, the fourth attempt, which was staged by ca ttle pro-
ducers in the state of California, was rather unsuccessful. In the follow-
ing discussion most of the attention will be focused on the Ontario auction 
which was the first known attempt to establish an operational tele t ype live-
stock auction. Following this discuss ion will be a brief conunent on the 
organizational differences in the teletype auctions es tablished in Manitoba, 
Alberta, and California. 
a. Ontario teletype auction The Ontario teletype auction, which 
first became operational on May 8, 1961, was established by a producers 
organization, the Ontario Pork Producers ' Marketing Board . 3 The success of 
the Ontario teletype a uction has allowed the concept t o gain widespread pro-
ducer and packer approval, thereby encouraging the establishment of tele-
3 
At the time of the auc tion's origin, this organization was called the 
Ontario Hog Produc er s Marketing Board. However, the name was subsequently 
changed. Accordingly , all r eference to the organization her einafter will 
be made as "Ontario Pork Producers Marketing Board." 
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type auctions under modified organizational plans in the Canadian provinces 
of Manitoba and Alberta. 
The Ontario teletype auction utilizes eighteen buying machines, seven-
teen of which are located in the offices of various packers around the prov-
ince . The eighteenth buying machine i s located at the headquarters office 
of the sales division of the Ontario Pork Producers Marketing Board in Tor-
onto, Ontario, and is used by the sales division's staff to enter the bids 
of small packers in the province not having their own buying machines.
4 
(22, p. 30) 
The prepunched tapes used by the master teletype each represent a one 
dollar spread, divided into five cent graduations. The tapes are punched 
such that the highest price is first transmitted and printed by all buying 
machines, followed by each of the lower prices in declining order. 5 In 
those instances where the entire one dollar price spread represented by a 
tape is broadcast without a bid being entered, the Ontario teletype system 
is set up such that the last price is reprinted three times, with a bell 
being sounded on each buying machine between the three repetitions~ [7, p. 
91) If still no bid is registered, the words "NO SALE" are transmitted and 
printed by each buying machine. 
In the Ontario teletype slaughter hog auction the sales staff of the 
4 
Approximately one percent of the hogs sold through the Ontario tele-
type auction are purchased by the sales division for the small packers. 
(23, p. 5] 
5 
The tape for the $48.00 to $47.00 per hundredweight spread would be 
punched such that it would result in the following transmission if not 
stopped by the entry of a bid: 
48.00 47 .95 47.90 47.85 47.20 47.15 47.10 47 . 05 47.00 
47.00 47 . 00 NO SALE. 
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sales division of the Ontario Pork Producers' Marketing Board plays a key 
role in the price determination. Not only does the sales staff decide the 
sale order and timing, but it also makes the determination of the price 
range, and thus the prepunched t ape to be used in soliciting bids . In 
reaching this decision, the sales staff takes into consideration 1) the com-
position of the particular lot; and 2) the current market conditions . [22, 
p. 31) 
The teletype system used by the Ontario hog auction is sensitive 
enough to distinguish between bids entered l/lOOOth of a second apart. [22, 
p. 31; 23, p. 6) Ontario auction officials state that it generally takes 
between 30 to 60 seconds to sell a lot of hogs on the teletype auction. 
(22, p. 31) 
1) Influence of national legislation The implementation and 
success of the Ontario teletype auction stems largely from two pieces of 
national legislation. [22, p . 29) One of the national laws allows provin-
cial governments to pass legislation enabling agricultural producers to es-
tablish organizations designed to control specific marketing operations re-
lated to a product produced within the province. [22, p. 29) While the 
powers granted to producer boards by provincial legislation varies from pro-
vince to province, producer marketing boards in Ontario have been granted 
power to establish and control a sales agency with total authority over the 
trading of a particular farm product. [22, p. 29 ] Furthermore, Ontario 
law enables its marketing boards to compel resident producers to comply with 
any marketing plan adopted by the board. (22, p . 29) This piece of na-
tional legislation has been significant in the organization and success of 
the Ontario auction because it has enabled Ontario to enact legislation 
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allowing the Ontario Pork Producers' Ma.rketing Board to compel all resident 
6 
pork producers to market their hogs through the Board's teletype auction. 
The effect of the compulsory marketing requirement was to assure that a 
large volume of hogs would utilize the teletype auction. 
The second Canadian law having great influence on the success of the 
Ontario hog auction is that requiring all slaughter hogs to be purchased on 
a carcass grade and weight basis. (22, p . 31) Under this law all hog car-
casses are graded according to a Canadian national grading system which in-
eludes the quality price differentials established by the Canadian Parlia-
7 ment. This legislation has greatly facilitated the establishment of a 
marketing system where buyers do not make visual inspection of the live-
stock prior to entering their bids. The required carcass grade and weight 
provisions assured packers that despite their lack of visual inspection, 
they would be able to sufficiently dock carcasses not conforming with t op 
quality. In addition , the provisions denied producers the chance to shy 
away f r om carcass grade and weight sale provisions in lieu of a seemingly 
more certain live basis sales arrangement . Furthermore, this legislation 
has eliminated the need for live grading of the hogs by the sales agency 
6 
In 1973, direct sales by producers to local butchers slaughtering 
less than 50 hogs per week were exempt from the compulsory marketing laws . 
[22, p. 30] 
7 
Under the Canadian grading system, a separate grade category is des-
ignated for each possible combination of carcass weight and backfat . (22, 
p. 31) In addition, the national legislation has assigned a specific index 
value to each grade category. Since in computing the price per hundred-
weight to be paid for an individual hog carcass, the index value is multi-
plied by the base price determined by the regressive auct i on , the price 
differentials for different quality hogs under the Canadian system, are in-
corporated in the grading system through the value indexes. !22, p . 31] 
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prior to their sale on the teletype auction. 
2) Assembly of hogs prior to each auc tion session Before 
sale procedures may be commenced, the Ontario pork producer must deliver 
his animals to one of the 45 hog assembly yards located throughout the prov·-
ince. [22, p. 30; 23, p . 5] Upon arrival at an assembly yard, the pro-
ducer's hogs ate unloaded, tatooed for carcass identification, and penned 
into lots containing the number of animals specified by the headquarters 
sales staff. [22, p. 30] However, the hogs are not graded. [22, p. 30] 
Once a lot of hogs is ready for sale, the manager of the assembly yard noti-
fies the sales agency headquarters in Toronto. Nine of the 45 assembly 
yards are equipped such that this notification and other pertinent communi-
cation with the headquarters can be made by teletype. [7, p. 91] For the 
remainder of the assembly yards, this communication is made by telephone. 
[7, p. 91] 
3) Charges for use of the Ontario teletype auction facilities 
The levy of fees for use of the Ontario teletype auction is divided between 
the utilizing producers and packers. In 1973, producers were assessed a 
fee amounting to 1 . 25 percent of the sale price of hogs sold through the 
auction. [22, p . 31] Producers were also required to pay the cost of 
transporting the hogs from the farm to the assembly yard. To cover the 
cost of operating the teletype system, utilizing packers are assessed a per 
head fee. Furthermore, the packers are required to pay the cost of trans-
porting the animals purchased from the assembly yard to their processing 
facilities. [ 22, p. 31] 
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b. Manitoba teletype hog auction Although patterned after and 
operated in much the same manner as the Ontario teletype hog auction, t he 
Manitoba version, established in February 1965, varies in several fundamen-
tal aspects. First, marketing of hogs through the Manitoba teletype auc-
tion is not compulsory. [22, p . 30] Nevertheless, the producer's decision 
to avoid utilization of the teletype auction is subject to the following re-
quirements: 1) the producer must submit a written request to the marketing 
commission, requesting permission that he might sell his hogs directly to a 
packer; and 2) the nonutilizing producer must pay the same fee he would 
have had he utilized the teletype auction. [22, p. 30] Secondly, the Mani-
toba teletype auction is operated under the auspices of a marketing commis-
sion, 8 rather than a marketing board. [22, p. 30) A third distinguishing 
feature of the Manitoba teletype auction relates to hog assembly . In Mani-
toba, only two hog assembly yards are utilized and neither of these is 
owned by the Manitoba Hog Marketing Commission . [22, p. 31] Instead, many 
hogs are sold on the Manitoba teletype auction while en route from the farm, 
and delivered directly to the successful packer-buyer, thereby eliminating 
interim handling associated with preauction assembly of hogs. [22, p. 31) 
The sale of hogs en route is made possible by the fact that almost all of 
the packing plants in Manitoba are located at Winnipeg, thus necessitating 
shipment to that city, regardless of the ultimate packer-buyer. [7, p . 
169] A final distinctive feature of the Manitoba auction is that it allows 
8
A "market commission" may be distinguished from a "marketing board," 
in that commission members, who need not be producers, are appointed by the 
government, while board members are producers elected to serve fellow pro-
ducers. [22 , p. 30] 
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each producer the option of having his name transmitted to each potential 
bidder along with the description of his lot of hogs . (22, p. 31) 
In 1973, both the producers and packers were charged 30 cents per head 
for hogs marketed through the Manitoba teletype auction. (22, p. 31) 
c. Alberta teletype hog auction In Alberta, Canada, a teletype 
auction system similar to the Ontario system became operational in October 
1969. [22, p . 30) The Alberta teletype hog auction operates in much the 
same manner as the Ontario auction; however, in Alberta the mode of hog 
assembly in the auction system deviates from that employed in Ontario. (22, 
p. 31) The Alberta auction's controlling body, the Alberta Hog Marketing 
Board has designated six hog delivery points, although the board does not 
operate assembly yards at these points. [22, p. 31) In addition, the 
board has licensed more than 500 hog assemblers at more than 300 locations, 
to receive hogs from producers and sell them through the teletype auction. 
(22, p. 31) Another assembly feature of the Alberta auction permits sale 
of a producer's hogs while they are still in his feedlot. [22 , p. 31) 
This feature enables direct shipment to the purchasing packer without in-
terim handling. 
The Alberta auction has followed Manitoba in permitting producers to 
have their name included with the lot description transmitted to each poten-
tial bidder and in the 30 cents per head fee assessment to both utilizing 
producers and packers. 
d. California Integrated Data Auction One attempt to employ a 
teletype auction system in the United States similar to that used in Canada 
was initiated by the California Farm Bureau Marketing Association. (7, p. 
114] Trading on the California Integrated Data Auction (I.D.A.) consisted 
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primarily of slaughter and stocker and feeder cattle . [7, p. 114) Partic-
ipating in the I .D.A. were eighteen feedlots and six packer s. Rather than 
require preauction assembly at a centralized assembly yar ds, the I.D .A. was 
organized to allow two different types of sales services , each of which re-
quir ed sales of cattle while still in the feedlot (slaughter cattle) or on 
the range (stocker and feeder cattle). One of the I.D . A. sales services 
allowed an I.D.A. representative to visit the ranch or feedlot prior to an 
auction session, inspect and grade the cattle to be sold, and report his 
lot description to the I .D.A. sales staff, for relay to all potential bid-
ders. [7, p. 114) The alternative I . D. A. sales service permitted feedlot 
owners to describe their own cattle, with this description being made avail-
able to all potential bidders. [7, p. 114) Cattle lot descriptions were 
made available to potential bidders several days in advance of sale in 
order to allow the bidders to visit the feedlots and personally inspect the 
animals, if they so desired. [7, p. 114-15) 
The conduct of the auction itself was very similar to that in Ontario, 
except that the I.D.A . utilized ten cents per hundredweight price solicita-
tion decrements every two seconds [77, p. 115), as compared t o the five 
cents per hundredweight decrement every three seconds used in the Ontario 
auction. 
To further the dispersement of economic information, the I .D.A. tele-
type network was used to broadcast reports of the U.S . Department of Agri-
cultur e Market News Service. [7, p. 115] 
Due to what auction officials cited as "the unwillingness of sellers 
to offer feeder or fat cattle at realistic prices, " the California Farm 
Bureau Marketing Association terminated operation of the I .D .A. in 1963 . 
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[7, p. 115) Auction officials also stated that participants had been 
critical of the regressive auction format , stating that it was "perhaps 
ahead of its time in California." [7, p . 115) 
3 . Johnson's recent proposal for a national slaughter cattle teletype auc-
tion 
After making an extensive study and evaluation of the marketing effi-
ciency, 9 bargaining position, 10 and industry applicability
11 
of eight al-
ternative methods12 of marketing fed cattle, Johnson concluded that sub-
stantial gains would accrue to the beef industry if the present fed cattle 
marketing modes were abandoned in lieu of a nationwide teletype auction 
system similar to that employed in Ontario, Canada, for the sale of slaugh-
ter hogs. Johnson's conclusion that the teletype auction was the most de-
sirable method of marketing fed cattle was based on comparative rankings of 
the eight marketing methods examined as to the three criteria. Johnson's 
rankings indicated that the teletype auction ranked first among the eight 
9Johnson defined "marketing efficiency" to include both operational or 
physical efficiency , which he said was measured by the total marketing cost 
per head, and pricing efficiency. [15, p. 31) 
lOJohnson defines "bargaining position" as the "protection or lack 
thereof that a particular selling method offers the producer against short-
run price declines due to local and/or temporary market disturbances." [15, 
p. 51) Johnson notes that this protection is to a large degree "inversely 
related to selling flexibility cost, which is defined as the cost associated 
with refusing to accept the offered price and not selling until some later 
time .... " [ 15 , p . 51] 
11 "Industry applicability" is defined as "the physical or operational 
capability of a selling method to simultaneously service the entire indus-
try ., • • II [ 15 > P • 5 4 ] 
12 
Terminal marketing, auction market, direct, countr y commission firm , 
telephone auction, telephone direct, a nd teletype auction . [15, p. 15] 
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methods in pricing efficiency [15, pp. 6 and 50] and industry applicability 
[15, pp. 6 and 54], while being tied for first in the bargaining position 
criterion. [15, pp. 6 and 51] In addition, the teletype auction method 
ranked second with respect to the least total marketing cost criterion. 
[15, p. 39]
13 
While the teletype auction advocated by Johnson in his 1972 proposal 
would be conducted in a manner similar to the Ontario Pork Producers slaugh-
ter hog teletype auction, certain modifications were envisioned. One modi-
fication involves expansion of the auction from a provincewide to a nation-
wide scale. As viewed by Johnson the nationwide auction would utilize up 
to 164 teletype buying machines [15, p. 71], whereas only eighteen buying 
machines were operative in the Ontario auction. Another modification made 
by the Johnson proposal eliminates the need for assembly because all cattle 
would be sold while still in the feedlot. [15, pp. 8 and 65] This modifi-
cation is advantageous because it enabled Johnson to include in his proposal 
provisions allowing the purchasing packer to specify the desired date of 
delivery, up to fourteen days after the date of purchase. [15, pp. 8, 62, 
and 66] 
Some of the other distinctive differences in the Johnson proposal from 
the Ontario auction include the following. First, due to the comparatively 
large number of buying machines and the expected large volumes, Johnson rec-
ognized the need to add a fourth electronic component to the teletype auc-
tion system - a small computer which controls and monitors the auction sys-
13
rn his study, Johnson concluded that consignment selling was the 
least cos t method of marketing cattle. [15, p. 39] 
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tern. (15, p . 63) A second distinctive feature of the Johnson proposal is 
the provision for nine regional order buyers, each equipped with a teletype 
buying machine. (15, p . 71) The order buyers would operate out of the 
market agency ' s central headquarters and would be employed by packers in 
their assigned region who slaughter less than 25,000 fed cattle annually. 
According to Johnson, these packers can not economically afford to be 
14 equipped with their own teletype buying machine. Third, the Johnson pro-
posal would utilize a nationwide Wide Area Tele collllilunications Service 
(WATS) communication network to facilitate consignment and confirmation 
communications between the approximately 200,000 cattle feeders and the 
market agency sales headquarters. (15, p. 69) Fourth, in order for the 
market agency sales headquarters to communicate with the 164 buyers equipped 
with buying machines, Johnson proposed the use of a teletype communication 
network as being the most expedient and economical method of providing two-
way communication as well as providing the recipient with a printed copy of 
any message received. (15, p. 71] Fifth, because the use of a relatively 
small number of assembly yards having known locations as in the Ontario hog 
auction has been deleted from his proposal and replaced by about 200,000 
feedlot locations, Johnson included in his proposal a plan to utilize a 
cattle production zone system. This production zone system is based on a 
national map which divides the country into 1200 squentially numbered 
squares, each representing 50 miles on a side. (15, p. 66] By use of this 
system, the location of any of the approximately 200,000 U.S. cattle feeding 
14 . 
Johnson notes that it would be operationally and technically possible 
to equip each of the more than 500 firms nationwide slaughtering cattle 
with their own buying machine. (15, p. 69] 
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locations could readily be identified and communicated with sufficient ac-
15 
curacy. [15> p. 66] 
On the issue of compulsory marketing systems, Johnson's discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages seems to indicate that he would favor hav-
ing his teletype auction operated as a producer-imposed compulsory market-
ing system similar to the one in existence in the Canadian province of 
Ontario. [15, p. 58-59) 
Among the responsibilities of the market agency sales staff under the 
\ 
Johnson proposal is the establishment of quality and y ield grade price dif-
ferentials. (15, p. 62) This differs from the situation in Canada where 
price differentials for different carcasses were incorporated into index 
values in the Canadian grading system established as part of national leg-
islation . 
D. Computerized Bid-Offer Matching Exchange Systems 
1. Basic computerized exchange format 
At least three recent proposals (11, 12, 23) have further developed 
the concept of centralized electronic price determination from that employed 
in the teletype auctions. The most significant advancement in these recent 
proposals is their utilization of high-speed electronic computers as the 
central component of the exchange system. Through the use of computers, 
the electronic exchanges will be better able to handle the higher volumes 
15 
Knowledge of the location of the cattle at the time of the sale is 
essential in enabling the potential buyers to estimate feedlot to plant 
transportation costs and to assist the market agency sales staff in select-
ing the appropriate price range from which to solicit bids. The latter de-
termination is crucial in the staff's selection of prepunched tapes. 
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of trading incurred by an exchange operating on a nationwide scale. The 
three computerized exchange proposals were designed to accommodate the 
wholesale marketing of shell eggs [23], the marketing of slaughter hogs [12], 
and the marketing of feeder cattle [11). Each proposal calls for voluntary 
producer marketing through a nationwide exchange. 
The exchanges designed to handle eggs and hogs were intended as "for-
ward contract" exchanges meaning that the unit of commodity could be sold 
with deferred delivery from one up to more than 60 days after the date of 
sale. [12, p. 17; 23, p. 18) This is s i gnificant in that it allows the 
processor-purchaser to schedule his weekly commodity receipts and adjust 
his labor force accordingly . Furthermore, a "forward contract" exchange 
enables a producer to sell his product at the present price if he foresees 
a lower price at the time his product will be ready for sale and delivery. 
Thus, these are two advantages associated with sales through a forward con-
tract market as compared to sales through a conventional "spot" market . 
In order to acconunodate computerization the three exchange designers 
have chosen to abandon the auction-type transaction system in lieu of a 
computerized procedure which matches processor bids and producer offers on 
the basis of price, delivery period, and delivery point. The basic format 
of this computerized matching transaction system is now discussed . 
Producers and processors would have access to the exchange via touch-
tone telephone [12, pp. 13-14), by merely depressing the phone keys corres-
ponding to the exchange 's telephone number and the producer's or processor's 
identification code . Large volume processors may find it economically 
feasible t o substitute teletype communication in lieu of the touch-tone 
telephone. [12, p . 53; 23, p. 17) Through the medium of his touch-tone 
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telephone, the trader will be able to hear audio replies made by the ex-
change's computer in response to the numerical entries the trader makes by 
depressing certain numbers on his phone. Once the computer has identified 
the trader as a bona fid e member of the exchange, the trader will be able to 
request certain market information pertaining to specified delivery periods, 
production zones, and delivery zones. The normal computer audio response 
to a trader request for market information concerning a specified trading 
zone and delivery period would make the following data available to the in-
quiring trader: 1) highest current bid by buyers; 2) lowest current price 
offer by sellers; and 3) price at which the last transaction was consum-
mated. (23, p. 18) 
If after hearing the requested market information the trader decides 
to enter a bid or sales offer, this may be accomplished by depressing16 the 
touch-tone phone buttons corresponding to the appropriate coded consignment 
message. 
Normally, the producer-seller has the option of entering either a 
simple or complex sales order. A simple sales order is used when the seller 
is unwilling to deliver his produce to a delivery zone other than the one 
in which the commodity was produced. The simple sales order consists of a 
single offering price and the request that the c omputer match it with a bid 
from a buyer located in the producer's zone. A complex sales order con-
sists of a single base offering price, similar to that which would be given 
16 
Due to the potential for error in depressing buttons, Schrader en-
visioned the need for devising a computerized s ystem of decoding, audibly 
repeating the trader's message, and requesting the trader's confirmation, 
in an effort to prevent unwanted transactions. (23, p. 28) 
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in using a simple sales order, and a transportation adjustment schedule. 
The transportation adjustment schedule consists of a list of zones other 
than the zone of production, to which the producer would be willing to de-
liver his commodity, and the incremental price per unit by which the price 
bid by a processor in a distant zone would have to exceed the base price in 
h f . 
17 h di order to compensate the seller for t e cost o transportation to t e s-
tant zone. Upon receipt of a complex sales order, the computer automati-
cally adds the per unit offering price to the incremental per unit trans-
portation cost to each zone listed on the schedule, to derive a set of 
transportation adjusted offering prices. These adjusted prices are then 
automatically compared with bid prices for the appropriate delivery data in 
the respective delivery zones. A bid price in any of the specified delivery 
zones which equals or exceeds the adjusted offering price would be s uffi-
cient to consummate a sale. 
Because a buyer is not required to pay for the cost of transporting 
the cotmn0dity, his only concern is the per uni t price he must pay for the 
commodity when delivered to his facilities. Thus, the bidder will merely 
submit a simple purchase order which specified the per unit price he is 
willing t o pay for a stated quantity of the commodity when delivered to his 
plant. 
Upon the receipt of a trading order, the computer automatically makes 
any necessary transportation cost adjustments and searches its memory files 
in an attempt to find a bid or offer which corresponds as to grade (when 
17 
A per unit charge for additional shrinkage associated with longer 
shipping distances may also be incorporated into this transportation ad-
justment schedule. 
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applicable), delivery date, and price, such that a trade can immediately be 
18 consummated . If a sale can immediately be consummated , t he computer ' s 
audio-response unit automatically reports the transaction price , as well as 
the name and telephone number of the trader with whom he has been matched, 
to the trader via his touch-tone telephone call. If a sale can not be 
immediately consummated, the bid or offer is stored in the computer's 
memory files until either a sale can be consummated, the time of the trad-
ing order's expiration, or the trader cancels his bid or offer . Once a de-
layed sale is consummated the computer can use its audio-response unit to 
place a confirmation telephone call to the trader. In addition to confirm-
ing the sale, the audio-response unit can give the trader the name and 
telephone number of the trader at the other side of the transaction. Using 
this telephone number the trader can contact the other party to the trans-
action and make a delivery appointment . 
One of the major computerized exchange design considerations was the 
amount of telephone communication capacity required. The exchange design-
ers estimated that each transaction on the exchange would require more than 
three telephone calls . Necessary telephone calls were expected to include 
those by the seller in entering his bid and the confirmation call to the 
seller . In addition, telephone calls likely would be made in seeking price 
quotations and in modifying bids or offers. [23, p. 25) Where trading 
volume makes it economically feasible, Holder [12) suggested that the ex-
change make available an ample number of inward and outward WATS lines for 
18 
The adjusted offer and bid price need not always be equal for a sale 
to be consummated . When the offer price is less than the bid price, a sale 
is consummated at a price midway between the bid and adjusted offer price . 
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use in making these telephone calls. 
Under each of these proposals, the names of both the buyers and sell-
ers would be withheld from the other party until after a sale was consum-
mated. In addition, the proposals designed to handle shell eggs and slaugh-
ter hogs included plans for a fixed premium-discount schedule in dealing 
with commodity quality which deviates from that specified by the standard 
contract. 
In light of this basic overview of the computerized exchanges, I shall 
now individually examine the three exchange proposals and the main charac-
teristics or features which vary from those described above in the over-
view. 
2. Recently proposed computerized exchanges 
a. Schrader's electronic egg exchange The first proposal utiliz-
ing the computerized bid-offer matching format was that made by Schrader, 
Heifner, and Larzelere, in 1968 [23], to accommodate nationwide wholesale 
trading in shell eggs. The Schrader proposal envisioned the use of touch-
tone telephones by member traders in gaining direct access to the exchange . 
Small-volume or nonmember traders would be allowed to access the exchange 
indirectly through commodity brokers much as is done in trading on a commod-
ity futures market. Participating commodity brokers would be members of 
the exchange and have a teletype connection with exchange headquarters. 
One of the distinctive features of the Schrader proposal was its two 
provisions for consideration of the transportation costs between trading 
zones. First, the individual could enter a transportation cost adjustments 
schedule which would designate alternative zones where he would be willing 
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tomakethe alternative zone acceptable. [23, p. 22] While this mode of 
compensating for transportation costs was included by itself in other pro-
posals, only the Schrader proposal combined it with a second mode. The 
second proposed mode would permit carriers to offer their transportation 
services on the exchange. [23 , p . 22] The trucking firm could enter a 
transportation of fer by contacting their broker and specifying the desired 
origin, destination, number of lots that could be hauled, possible delivery 
date, and the per unit transportation charge. [23, p. 22] Upon the bro-
ker's entry of this data into the exchange computer, a new offer for each 
outstanding offer in the origin zone would be made in the destination zone 
at a price equal to the sum of the base offering price per unit plus the 
per unit transportation cost . [23, p. 35] In addition, for each egg bid 
at the specified destination zone, there would be a new bid in the carrier ' s 
origin zone equal to the destination zone bid price less the per unit trans-
portation cost. [23, p. 34] In addition, for each egg bid at the speci-
fied destination zone, there would be a new bid in the carrier's origin 
zone equal to the destination zone bid price less the per unit transporta-
tion cost. [23, p. 35] In essence, the result of permitting the transpor-
tation service offers is to establish a file of standing transportation 
service offers between zones . One effect of this double transportation 
feature is to lessen the likelihood that the difference between the prices 
offered in two zones will exceed the cost of transportation between the two 
zones. 
Rather than require federal grade certification on all lots traded, 
Shrader's proposal would give buyers the option to call for inspection of 
any lot delivered . [23, p. 21] The cost of such inspection would be borne 
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by the buyer if the eggs meet the represented grade, and by the seller if 
the product failed to meet the represented grade requirements. [23, p. 21] 
When a lot did not meet the specified grade, sellers would also have the 
option of rejecting the lot or negotiating an appropriate discount. [23, 
p. 21] 
b. Holder's computerized forward contract market for slaughter hogs 
In 1972, Holder [12) published a proposal for a nationwide computerized 
slaughter hog exchange which also utilized the computerized bid-off er 
matching format. The Holder proposal called for the forward trading of 
standardized contracts. While iounediate delivery contracts would be traded 
on the exchange making it in effect a " spot" market [12, p. 17], Holder en-
visioned trading in contracts for delivery up to two or three months after 
the date of sale. To allow for a producer's uncertainty as to the exact 
date his hogs would be at the most profitable slaughter weight, Holder pro-
posed the specification of one, two, and four week delivery intervals, 
which would correspond to forward contracts sold one, two, three, or more 
than three months in advance of anticipated delivery. As the delivery in-
terval approached and the exact date of delivery became more apparent, the 
producer would then be allowed to contact the purchasing packer and make an 
exact "delivery appointment," on a first-come-first-served basis. [12, p. 
26] The contracts traded would be standardized in that the only variable 
terms of sale would be the number of head19 and the base price , which would 
be determined by the bidding on the exchange. [12, p. 33] To allow for 
19 
Holder said the number of head should be allowed to vary between 30 
and 500 head. [12, p . 24] 
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death loss or other uncertainties, Holder's standardized contract would per-
mit a five percent deviation in the number of hefld actually delivered from 
the number specl(ied in the contract. [12, p. 24-25] 
Because this electronic exchange will preclude visual inspection and 
force the buyer to rely on a written description and carcass evaluation of 
the hogs [12, p. 19], a premium-discount schedule was felt necessary to 
account for carcasses not meeting or exceeding the contract specifications. 
After talking to packers, Holder found much interest in having the premium-
discount schedule reflect the carcass ' s value . However, due to the need for 
standardization in the contracts traded, Holder concluded that the schedule 
would have to be standardized. [12, p. 23] In order to satisfy packer de-
sires that quality price differentials reflect changing market conditions, 
Holder found that it would be necessary to allow the premium-discount sched-
ule to be changed between four and twelve times per year . [12, p. 23] 
Holder further proposed that the premium-discount schedule for a particular 
delivery interval not be fixed at the time of sale, but rather remain un-
determined until the time of delivery. [12, p. 32] In an attempt to elim-
inate the subjective evaluation which arises when car casses are evaluated 
on a carcass grade and weight basis, Holder's proposal also called for 
evaluating carcasses solely on the basis of measurable carcass characteris-
tics. [12, p. 31] 
As in Schrader's egg exchange, the centralized trading computer in 
Holder's proposal would make automatic transportation adjustments by calcu-
lating the transportation and shrinkage costs associated with hauling hogs 
between trading zones. Thus, before attempting t o match a producer's 
offers with bids, all bids would be adjusted for transportation and shrink-
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age costs so that bids in more distant zones would be on a comparable basis 
with the bids from packers in zones nearer the producer's zone . (12, p. 29) 
The Holder proposal would leave the decision of the actual sharing of 
delivery costs to the purchasing packer and the selling producer. (12, p. 
28] Holder's proposal would also allow for the operation of one central 
assembly yard in each of the 100-400 trading zones in the thirteen North 
Central states. (12, p. 23] A packer could use the assembly yard by 
directing producers within the trading zone to deliver their hogs to the 
yard. Approximately 175- 200 hogs purchased by one packer from several pro-
ducers could be assembled at the yard and loaded on a three-tier semi-
trailer. (12, p. 29) While this plan would require the additional expense 
of operating the assembly yards and the extra handling associated with un-
loading and reloading, Holder felt that this expense might be off set by 
savings arising from the economies to scale associated with larger trucks 
and long-distance transportation. Unlike the situation with the Ontario 
teletype auctions, redundant transportation under Holder's proposal would 
be unlikely because hogs would not be transported to the assembly yard until 
after a sale was consummated and the animals ' ultimate destination known. 
c. Henderson's electronic feeder calf exchange In 1974, Henderson 
proposed a computerized bid-offer matching exchange for the marketing of 
feeder cattle raised in the United States. (11] The Henderson proposal 
grew out of concern over three problems : 1) the problems of price coordi-
nation between feede r calf producers and feedlot operators and the accuracy 
of signals cormnunicated to feeder calf producers as to the quality and 
timing of their production; 2) the inefficiencies in the physical assembly 
and transportation between the feeder calf producer and the feedlot; and 3) 
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the lack of competitive bidding in the Ohio decentralized feeder cattle 
auction markets. [11, pp. 1-2] In Ohio, Henderson notes that these prob-
lems were enhanced by the characteristics of the Southeastern Ohio feeder 
calf production area, which is dominated by comparativel y small, geographi-
call y dispersed production units. [11, p. 2] By linking feeder cattle 
producers (sellers) and feedlot operators (buyers) through the use of a 
telephone and computer network substantially similar to that employed by 
Shrader and Holder, Henderson hoped that his proposed exchange would re-
solve all three of these problems. For example, the price coordination and 
clarity of signals could be enhanced by improving the flow of marketing in-
formation in the industry. By utilizing the electronic computer to monitor 
all trading, the computer could readily be programmed to compile and report 
price summaries on trades occurring in recent periods . [11, pp . 4 and 13] 
Then, by connecting the computer to the network of producer touch-tone 
telephones the communication system could readily disseminate continuously 
updated information on the supply and demand situation to all feeder calf 
buyers and sellers. [11, p . 3] 
Henderson ' s proposal also allowed for the making of adjustments in the 
bid and offer prices for necessary transportation costs to reach what he 
called "freight equalized prices." [11, p. 7] Under this proposed system, 
all buyers would receive price quotations on a "delivered basis," meaning 
that the seller ' s offer was adjusted to reflect the cos t of delivery to the 
potential buyer's feedlot . [11, p. 8] In a somewhat similar fashion all 
prices quoted to sellers would be on the basis of "calves delivered to their 
local zone assembly point.'' This reflects Henderson's plan which would 
utilize a designated assembly point in each geographical production zone t o 
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which the seller-producer could deliver his calves after receiving confir-
mation of their sale . [11, pp. 7-8] Henderson included the assembly func-
tion in his proposal to enable the organization of calves into efficient-
sized shipping units. [11, p. 8] In addition, all calf weights could be 
verified at the zone assembly points. [11, p. 8] However, Henderson's 
proposal apparently does not allow participants to submit their own trans-
portation cost figures for use in making the freight adjustment, but in-
s tead uses one standarized set of cost figures representing the transporta-
tion cos t between every assembly point and every possible delivery zone . 
[11, p. 8] Once a trade is consummated under Henderson's proposal, the 
computer would automatically determine the most efficient method of assembly 
and accordingly issue delivery instructions to each party to the trade. 
[11, p. 14] 
In the previously discussed computerized bid-offer matching exchanges 
the quality of the saleable commodities (i.e. eggs and slaughter hogs) was 
readily determinable as part of the buyer's processing activities. Hender-
son's proposed feeder cattle exchange differs from Shrader's egg exchange 
and Holder's hog exchange in that feeder cattle are not slaughtered upon 
delivery to their buyer . [11, p . 5] Thus, some means of evaluation be-
sides post-sale grading was necessarily incorporated into Henderson's pro-
posal to allow for deviations in commodity quality. Henderson furthermore 
recognized that feedlot operations are often organized for feeding a certain 
quality of calf. He thus concluded that there would be a need for presale 
grading of the calves on the farm where produced, by an impartial grader 
from either the United States Department of Agriculture or the state agri-
cultural department. [11, p. 10] The calf grader would report the results 
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of his evaluation to the exchange's market agency headquarters, where it 
would be included in the lot description given to each potential bidder. 
(11, pp . 9-10] 
E. Summary 
Having now completed an overview of three types of electronic commod-
ity exchange systems and various attempts to put the systems into operation, 
certain weaknesses in the various exchange systems should now be readily 
apparent. Perhaps the most evident weaknesses in the prior proposals in-
clude the erratic interlot price fluctuations characteristic of the teletype 
auctions, the lack of market-determined quality price differentials between 
carcass grade and weight categories, and the failure of the exchanges to 
provide for more than one trading basis . Furthermore, it should now be 
evident that while one exchange system may be superior in several ways, it 
may be grossly inferior to another exchange system in other aspects . The 
issue then arises: How can one electronic exchange system objectively be 
compared with another? In an effort to resolve this issue, I have attempted 
to develop a set of evaluative criteria suitable for analyzing the desira-
bility of the previous and future electronic exchange system proposals . 
The initial step in the criteria formulation, the identification of market -
i ng system flaws, is presented in the following chapter. 
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III. FLAWS IN PRODUCER-PACKER EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 
A. Introduction 
Introduced in this chapter are twenty potential f laws in the present 
and proposed producer-packer slaughter cattle exchange systems under con-
sideration in this study. These flaws or undesirable at tributes have been 
identified because their existence prevents an exchange system from becoming 
effectively competitive. It is intended that these flaws serve as guidelines 
in the design of my proposed Electronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter 
Cattle Auction (ESPSCA) in Chapter IV and as the basis for the development 
of twenty evaluative criteria in Chapter V. Because these flaws are to be 
eventually used in developing a set of market criteria, my identification 
of flaws has drawn heavily from Sosnick's [26] ideas for the development of 
market criteria . 
1 . Portion of the cattle marketing process examined 
The total cattle marketing process may be considered to entail those 
operations performed between the time cattle in the feedlot approach market 
weight and the time the resulting meat reaches the consumer's table. By 
necessity, I have limited the scope of my study to a portion of the total 
process which I refer to as the "producer-packer slaughter cattle exchange 
system. " This "system" and thus the scope of this examination is defined 
by constraints on two dimensions of the marketing process: the physical 
dimension and the pricing dimension. 
The physical dimension of the producer-packer slaughter cattle exchange 
system focuses on the physical transportation and handling of cattle from 
the time they attain market weight in the feedlot until they arrive at the 
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place of slaughter . 
The pricing dimension of the producer-packer slaughter cattle exchange 
system concentrates on the determination of the exchange price which is re-
1 
ceived by the selling feeder and paid by the purcha sing packer. 
2. A desirable market format 
I think that a desirable market in a free enterprise economy should 
provide producers and packers the choice of utilizing numerous alternative 
marketing methods. While the inherent flexibility of this market format 
should give producers and packers the opportunity to select the lowest-cost 
marketing method, required utilization of an allegedly efficient, lowest-
cost method should be avoided. Furthermore, I think that the cost savings 
associated with selection of the lowest-cost method should be reflected in 
the marketing charges paid by those producer s and packers utilizing it. 
Given this flexible market format, the interaction of rational market par-
ticipants with the incurrence of profits and losses should eventually result 
in the utilization of the most efficient marketing method. 
As presented by other economists (3, pp. 13-15; 26, p. 827), I believe 
that this flexible market format is most fully embodied in the concept of 
"effective competition." Effective competition is defined as the socially 
desirable and realistically attainable market system. Although primarily 
based on the concepts of the theoretical ideal - "perfect competition, 11 
effective competition attempts to avoid the realistic infeasibilities of 
1
This definition of the pricing dimension carefully excludes from the 
scope a determination of "net" price received by the producer and the "net" 
cost of the cattle to the packer, which could become an issue in the event 
that either or both of the traders have hedged the cattle . 
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perfect competition. Thus, effective competition recognizes the potential 
offsetting advantage of econom.ies of scale and restricted entry, and the im-
possibility of attaining a state of "perfect" information . Due to its 
realism, it is proposed as an improved standard of comparison against 
actual functioning markets. 
Effective competition is attained when a particular market maxi-
mizes the collective gains from exchange incurred by the buyer and seller. 
Alternatively, effective competition may be defined as being attained when 
"for a set of perspective buyers and sellers at an assembly point, the 
ratio of actual to potential gains from trade are maximized." (25, p. 114] 
3 . Objective of flaw identification 
As a marketing economist, it is my job to identify and propose the re-
moval of barriers to efficient trade such as factors which cause price ri-
gidities, price dis tortions, was te of valuable resources, or reduced pro-
ducer marketing alternatives. Thus, the objective of my set of flaws is to 
identify undesirable attributes which prevent the attainment of effective 
competition by slaughter cattle exchange systems. 
B. Standards for Market Criteria 
In my identification of flaws, as well as my development of market 
criteria in Chapter V, I will attempt to conform to the standards for market 
criteria suggested by Sosnick. (26] That is, I will be "specific about the 
issues, definite about my own views, explicit about whether desirable con-
ditions are attainable, discriminating in judging between a condition and 
its effects, comprehensive in listing market deficiencies, and stringent in 
describing my ideal." [ 26, p. 827] 
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1. Necessary and sufficient conditions 
Pursuant to Sosnick's explicitness standard [26, pp . 830), I have form-
ulated necessary and sufficient conditions for effective competition. Nee-
essary conditions relate required specifications, while sufficient conditions 
indicate the cir cumstances that will merely suffice in creating an effec-
tively competitive market. 
Under my standards, the necessary conditions for effective competition 
are that each flaw be absent from the market. Accordingly, the market sat-
isfies my sufficient condition for effective competition only if it is de-
void of all the listed flaws. 
2. Realistic criteria 2 
In an attempt to attain what Stigler has called "operational criter ia 
capable of being applied concretely ... " [27, p. 504), I have restricted 
my necessary conditions for effective competition to those which I believe 
a slaughter cattle market can fulfill and whose achievement can be objec-
tively ascertained . Satisfaction of many of the criteria require r emedial 
adjustments or the elimination of ineffective condit ions - conditions con-
sidered avoidable had expedient changes previously been made in exchange 
personnel, organization, policy, or regulation. 
3. Compliance with Sosnick 's other standards for market criteria 
In an effort to satisfy the remainder of Sosnick's standards for market 
criteria [26, p . 828), I will take the following actions. 
In an attempt to be "specific" I will identify twenty areas in the pro-
2 
This is an attempt to satisfy Sosnick's "realistic" standard . [26, 
pp . 830-32] 
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ducer-packer exchange system that need attention. Designating these areas 
as "flaws," I will specify them as the factors which determine whether a 
market is effecttvely competitive. 
To satisfy the "definite" criterion, I will attempt to precisely state 
my criteria and substantiate each criterion with illustrative examples such 
that the reader may clearly resolve the question of whether a particular 
market is effectively competitive. 
By classifying the exchange system flaws as either "undesirable in 
themselves" or "undesirable in themselves and due to their adverse effects," 
I will attempt to "discriminate" between the reasons why I believe the flaws 
create ineffective competition. 
To comply with Sosnick's "comprehensive" standard, I have tried to pre-
pare an all-inclus ive list of necessary conditions for effective competi-
tion. 3 This list attempts to identify all of the kinds of deficiencies that 
would create inefficiency in a producer-packer cattle exchange system. 
In being "stringent," I have withstood the desire to moderate my nee-
essary conditions for effective competition so that I can designate a cer-
tain market as being effectively competitive. Included in this is a resist-
ance against lowering standards just so that my proposed electronic cattle ex-
change can be deemed desirable. Instead, I believe that my proposed ex-
change, if inefficient in design, should be identified as such now, before 
3 
Although I present this list as a comprehensive set of slaughter 
cattle market flaws, I realize that it may be impossible to formulate an 
all-inclusive list of market flaws. Readers may want to add further flaws 
- and they should be encouraged to do so. Furthermore, other economists 
may believe that my flaws are correct, but that my arguments are wrong. 
These readers too should be encouraged to correct my reasoning as further 
understanding of marketing sys t em efficiency is attained. 
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further research is done in this area . 
4. Subdivision of the producer-packer flaws 
For the purposes of organizing the set of flaws which follow I have 
divided the producer-packer exchange system into two sub- systems : 1) the 
assembly system - pertaining t o the physical movement of cattle from the 
feedlot to the slaughterhouse; 2) the transaction system - pertaining to the 
interaction of willing buyers and sellers to determine the price of the fed 
4 cattle connnodity. Accordingly, my list of criteria is divided into two 
areas of concern; 1) flaws in the assembly system, and 2) flaws in the 
. 5 transaction system . 
The listing of each flaw is accompanied by a brief discussion and 
several examples of the ineffectiveness created by the particular flaw. In 
addi tion, I indicate whether the flaw is with respect to the market conduct, 
6 market performance or market structure. 
C. The Flaws 
1. Conditions precluding an effective assembly system 
Listed below are two categories of flaws in the physical assembly of 
4 
The transaction system is defined such that the physical presence of 
the live cattle is not required for exchange price determination . 
5 . 
Flaws in the assembly system reflect operational 111efficiencies, while 
flaws in the transaction system indicate exchange inefficiencies . 
6 
I have excluded from the scope of my examination all aspects of mar-
ket structure (i.e. location and concentration of buyers and sellers, pro-
duct differentiation, etc.) except that pertaining to the regulation of the 
exchange. In this study my intent is to propose an improved exchange sys-
tem by concentrating on the market conduct and performance and thus taking 
the nonregulatory aspects of the present market structure as exogenous var-
iables. 
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slaughter cattle. Elimination of these flaws would allow for substantial 
savings in cattle marketing and procurement costs. Because the adversity of 
these flaws rests with extra costs and the wasteful allocation of resources, 
they pertain to market performance. Both categories of flaws are undesir-
able in themselves and their adverse effects. 
a. Assembly of cattle at central yards is require? Assemblage of 
cattle at terminal markets, auction barns, buying stations, or pooling yards 
causes redundant transportation, unnecessary livestock handling, nonproduc-
tive livestock facilities, and excessive transaction, marketing, and procure-
ment costs. 
1) Redundant transportation Marketing through intermediaries 
such as terminal or auction markets frequently precludes direct tranpporta-
7 tion routing. Consequently, cross-hauling results in the additional in-
currence of the following unrenumerative costs: fuel consumption, driver's 
wages, truck depreciation, highway wear, cattle shrink, animal bruising, 
a nd insurance against highway accidents . 
2) Nonproductive facilities Associated with auction and term-
inal markets, buying stations, and pooling yards are acres of cattle pens, 
sets of scales, numerous loading and unloading chutes, and countless buyer 
offices. In many cases, these facilities duplicate what is already avail -
able at feedlots and cattle packing plants. 
3) Unnecessary handling Not only does excess handling in-
7 
For example, redundant transportation occurs when a cattle feeder 
near Des Moines, Iowa (Central Iowa), ships fed cattle to a terminal market 
at Omaha, Nebraska (Eastern Nebraska), only to have the cattle purchased 
for slaughter in Cedar Rapids, Iowa (Eastern I owa) . 
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crease labor charges and facility requirements, but it also increases bruis-
ing, shrink, disease transmission, and the potential for death loss. Ideal-
ly, the marketing system should allow producers the o~tion of utilizing 
direct farm-to-packer shipments which eliminate assembly points . 
4) Excessive transaction and marketing costs The cost in-
curred in anticipation of exchange such as commission firm charges, auction 
charges, and consignment fees, are often excessive. Ideally, producers 
should have the option of selecting marketing methods for which the cost in 
anticipation of exchange does not exceed the essential cost of matching po-
tential buyers with willing sellers such that the collective traders' gain 
f rom the transaction is maximized. 
b. 
8 Packers not allowed to reduce procurement costs Marketing 
methods requiring packers to field a crew of buyer representatives or not 
allowing packers to plan a uniform delivery of cattle at plants result in 
unnecessary expenditures and the inefficient use of resources. 
1) Costly search for cattle Maintenance of centralized cattle 
markets and direct marketing channels do not allow packers to select less 
costly alternatives in purchasing cattle. To procure cattle at centralized 
markets, packers must have buyer representatives available to negotiate 
prices with producer agents. In the direct procurement process, packers 
must field a crew of buyers to locate and evaluate available cattle. 
Not only may packers have to incur the cost of training the buyers, but 
8 
For my purposes, cattle procurement may be defined as a reoccurring 
packer function which encompasses the packer's efforts to locate available 
cattle, commencing when he first recognizes the need for cattle and con-
tinuing until the cattle arrive at his plant . 
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they may also have to provide them with a car, an office, and absorb the 
cost of inaccurate quality estimates made by the buyers. Sometimes, the 
direct procurement process necessitates the maintenance of local buying 
stations. 
Besides requiring the presence of buyers, auction markets may squander 
buyer time by using progressive auctions rather than the more expedient re-
gressive ("Dutch") auction. 
In contradistinction to the centralized and direct marketing channels 
criticized above, a system which relies on carcass grading to determine the 
price paid on cattle and producer initiative to indicate available cattle 
eliminates the need for maintaining a large team of cattle buyers, and thus 
provides a less costly procurement alternative. 
2) Uneven delivery of cattle at plants Maintenance of cen-
tralized cattle markets and direct marketing channels do not allow packers 
to plan for a uniform delivery of cattle at plants. Uneven cattle delivery 
exists when during each week daily cattle receipts are not correlated with 
daily slaughter capacity. This nonuniform cattle delivery causes unneces-
sary packer carryover costs9 and incomplete utilization of the packer's 
9 
"Carryover cost" may be defined as the cost incurred when cattle are 
delivered prior to the day of slaughter. 
10 
human and capital resources. 
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This flaw is generally alleviated when feeders and packers contract 
cattle on the basis of a particular day's price with provisions for deliv--
ery on a specified future date . 
2. Conditions precluding an effective transaction system 
Included in this section are five distinct flaw categories each of 
which contain several major transaction system flaws. Because these flaws 
correspond to exchange inefficiencies that prevent the optimal matching of 
buyers and sellers such that their mutual gain is not maximized, they may 
be said to restrict effective competition in slaughter cattle markets . The 
five flaw categories concern: lack of trader prerogatives, the unavail-
ability of adequate information to traders, misregulation of trader inter-
action, unsatisfactory transaction outcomes and the infeasibility of imple-
10 Ideally, the procurement problem cited by Johnson [15, p. 35] should 
be avoided. In his report, Johnson reveals the inefficiency incurred in 
terminal marketing where most of the cattle are purchased early in the week 
for later slaughter. Data referred to by Johnson indicate the following 
daily purchase and kill trends for cattle marketed through terminals. 
Percentage of Week's Purchases Percentage of Week's Kill 
Made Each Da~ On Each Da~ 
Monday: 34.4% Monday: 18.4% 
Tuesday: 29.3% Tuesday: 19.4% 
Wednesday: 21.2% Wednesday: 19.8% 
Thursday: 10.9% Thursday: 19.5% 
Friday: 4.0% Friday; 18.2% 
Saturday: 0.2% Saturday: 4.7% 
Source: Missouri Agr. Exp . Sta., Why the Early Week Market?, 
North Central Regional Publication, no. 19 (Columbia, Mo. : 
Missouri Agr. Exp. Sta., 1958), p . 9. 
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mentation. All flaws in the first three categories and the fifth categor y 
represent defects in the regulatory aspect of market str ucture . Flaws in 
the fourth category are associated with unsatisfactory market performance. 
a. Lack of trader prerogative7, In this category of trader prerog-
atives I include two flaws which result from the failure to allow traders 
pertinent decision alternatives in the transaction process. As stated pre-
viously, I believe that a desirable market format allows a t r ader as much 
flexibility as can be financially justified without advocating his infringe-
ment upon other traders' rights. Not only does a flexible market format 
permit traders to select the method that maximizes their collective gain, 
but it also complements an American tradition of free choice. 
The current market organization and marketing policies frequently pre-
clude cattle trading on a carcass merit basis11 and do not a l low producers 
an opportunity to refuse bids or withdraw their sales offerings without in-
curring excessive costs. Not only are these flaws undesirable in them-
selves, but they may also generate price distortions which adversely effect 
the price coordination of the entire cattle industry . 
11., . b " Carcass merit asis refers to a livestock sales arrangement under 
whic h the net price paid to the producer is founded on a predetermined base 
price in dollars per hundredweight and a standard carcass quality. By way 
of a visual exami~ation (i.e. looking for the degree of marbling and con-
forma t ion) and physical measurement (i . e. backfat (inches) and rib-eye size 
(square inches)), the individual carcass is compared with the standar d car-
cass criteria and therein assigned a quality grade. Accordingly, the base 
price is adjusted by the premiums and discounts (in do l lars per hundred-
weight) associated with the quality r a t ing. The resultant adjusted base 
price becomes the price (in dollars per hundredweight) paid to the pr oducer . 
/ 
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1) Traders not allowed to select price basis Failure to 
allow cattle market participants the option of trading on either the live 
basis or a carcass merit basis acts as an unjustifiable restraint on effec-
tive competition by precluding a potentially more profit able alternative . 
i h rigid
l2 
Similarly, the absence of an option allowing traders to use e t er a 
or a market-determined quality price differential schedule results in an un-
warranted limitation on the trader's decision making process. 
a) Live basis pricing not available Traders should have 
the opportunity to exchange cattle on a live basis. Live basis trading 
would be advantageous to packers that desire to avoid the cost of grading 
carcasses associated with carcass merit purchases . This would be espec ially 
true if a packer has an established outlet that is thoroughly familiar with 
the packer's quality standards and does not require graded meat. Similarly, 
a packer's outlet may not require premium quality beef . Such an outlet 
would give a packer little incentive to pay the necessary premium for choice 
or prime cattle required with the carcass merit method. On the other hand, 
a producer may be skeptical of carcass merit sales methods and prefer to 
sell on a live basis . 
1211Rigid quality price differential schedule" refers to a premium-dis-
count schedule used i n adjusting the base price under car cass merit basis 
cattle sales arrangements . The incremental premiums and discounts associ-
ated with the incremental quality grades are determined by precedent, 
government regulation, the industry leader, or the individual packer. The 
schedule is termed "rigid" because the same scale is used on each producer's 
lot of cattle . 
The rigid schedule may be contrasted with the "market-determined 
quality price differential schedule" where a different premium-discount in-
crement scale is determined by bidder interaction for each lot of cattle. 
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b) Carcass merit pricing not avail able Due t o the in-
her ent disguise of hair, skin, bone, mud, and fat, live a nimal pricing can 
13 
not yield a consistently accurate evaluation of beef carcasses. I ncorrect 
l i ve quality estimates result in overpayments to producers fo r inferior 
quality and insufficient compensation for superior quality . This ineq-
uity garbles the transmission of pricing information and deflates packer 
p rofits . 
c) Market-determined quality price dif f er ent ial schedule 
not available Traders should be allowed the option of having competi-
tive market interaction determi ne the price differentials between good, 
h i d i 1
. 14 c o ce, an pr me qua ity carcasses. Likewise, a market-determined pre-
mium s c hedule for the various cutabili t y ratings should be available . 
Quality price differentials should reflect the added resale value to 
packers of higher quality carcasses based on the consumers' indicated will-
ingness to purchase superior quality retail cuts . The use of rigid price 
differentials separating the incremental yield gr ades, quality grades, and 
carcass weight categories established by precedent, government regulation, 
or the industry leader, rather than flexible differentials determined by 
13 Given the present state of technology, pricing accuracy is maximized 
by evalua ting cat tle on the basis of carcass merit, using the following 
measurements: 1) untrimmed car cass weight, 2) U.S . carcass quality grade, 
and 3) U.S . carcass yield grade . (15, p. 27) Not only does car cass evalu-
ation pr ovide the basis for a more equitable evaluation of the producer ' s 
cattle, but it also emphasizes the production of quality beef a nd makes 
producers directly accountable for their product 
14 
Market-determined quality price differentials would be expec ted t o be 
especially advantageous for producers of higher quality beef and pac kers 
whose outlets demand choice and prime quality meat. 
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competitive market interaction, may not accurately reflect the packer's in-
cremental resale value. 
To participate in competitive bidding for grade premiums a packer would 
be forced to calculate the maximum value he can justify paying for higher 
quality cattle . Consequently, it would be expected that the market-deter-
mined premium schedules reflect the actual value of higher quality cattle. 
Hence, the resulting price information available to cattle producers should 
be more accurate. 
d) Rigid quality price differential schedule not available 
Despite the advantages offered by market-determined quality price differen-
tial schedules, traders should have the option of utilizing a rigid quality 
price differential schedule . By making the rigid schedule an available al-
ternative, the traders, rather than some a rbitrary market official, are 
allowed an opportunity to weigh the costs, risks, and informational value 
of market-determined quality price schedules against the convenience, cer-
tainty, and price distortion attributes of rigid schedules. Furthermore , 
the availability of a r igid quality price differential schedule enables 
traders who do not favor the market-determined schedule to continue trading 
cattle on the basis of carcass merit, rather than leaving live basis trading 
as their only alternative. 
costs 
2) Feeders may not refuse packer bids without incurring excessive 
15 Packers and feeders should have equal bargaining power. To 
maintain equal bargaining power a feeder should be allowed the option of 
15 
"Equal bargaining power" refers to "the inability of a buyer or seller 
to influence prices by artificially restricting supply or demand." [15, p. 
41] 
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16 
refusing packer bids without incurring excessive costs. If this option 
is not available, the offering feeder may not be able to justify refusing 
what he considers to be an extremely low bid. Accordingly, packers may be 
able to force prices down on cattle delivered to centralized markets. Con-
versely, the availability of this option equalizes producer-packer bar-
gaining power because it permits the feeder to refuse the low bid and defer 
sales until another day. 
When evaluating producer bargaining power, the question may be asked: 
Are the cattle sold while still in the producer's feedlot? If the answer 
is "no," the evaluator should recognize the potential loss associated with 
refusing a bid price once cattle have been delivered to an assembly point, 
auction yard, or terminal market. 
b. Unavailability of adequate information to traders In order to 
make the optimal trading decision17 each trader needs to be provided with a 
complete set of market information which reveals the available marketing 
decision alternatives . Insufficient information precludes those alterna-
tives of which the participant is unaware. Although I doubt that a "per-
feet set of information" is a realistic goal, I do believe that certain mar-
ket policies and organizations render a more comprehensive coverage of mar-
ket information. 
Not only is accurate and complete information of pricing trends needed, 
16 
Costs of refusing a bid may include: cost of hauling cattle home from 
the centralized market, additional yardage if the cattle are held overnight 
for sale on the following day, and death loss. 
17
The optimal trading decision results in an efficient exchange out-
come which maximizes the traders' collective gains. 
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but the information system needs to provide a rapid disclosure of compet-
ing bids without necessarily revealing the bidders' identities . Further-
more, all bidders should be able to bid on each lot of cattle offered . 
Uncomprehensive market news not only has undesirable characteristics 
in itself, but also produces the unfavorable effects resulting in inaccur-
ate pricing. Not only does the incomplete disclosure of competing bids 
hinder pricing accuracy, but it also complicates trader decision making. 
Failure to allow all potential bidders to bid on each lot poses no fault in 
itself, but does promote adverse pricing behavior. Although the revelation 
of trader identity may appear to have no significant effect in itself , it 
does facilitate packer collaboration and predation. 
1) Inadequate market information A marketing system should 
18 be adaptable to an operative method of providing comprehensive market 
news to all traders. Restrictions on the coverage or accessibility of com-
modity market news promote an inequitable distribution of market informa-
19 tion, resulting in inefficient exchange. 
Unfortunately, inadequate market news more severely penalizes the 
smaller producer or packer thatfeels he can not justify the purchase of ad-
ditional market information. Conversely, larger participants, who believe 
the benefits to be gained by acquiring additional information exceed the 
costs, will enhance their bargaining positions by hiring informants, observ-
18
oue to the centralized location of transaction decisions, terminal or 
auction markets would be expected to be more adaptive to complete market 
news reporting . 
19 . 
As used in this chapter the term "market information" encompasses 
statistical and market data such as exchange prices and trading volumes. 
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ers, and market analysts. Although these larger traders maximize their 
gain from trad ing , the inadequate knowledge status of the smaller partici-
pants results in inefficient exchange because it precludes the maximization 
of collective gains. 
2) Competing bids no t rapidly disclosed Failure to provide 
complete and rapid disclosure of competing bids complicates the traders' 
decision making processes and r educes the competitiveness of the transac tion 
system by r educing the flow of pricing information . This info rmation de-
ficiency pr ecludes the a ttainment of a trade which maximizes trader s' col-
lective gains (i.e. the optimal trade), thus r esulting in inefficient ex-
change. 
Restriction of bid discl osure r educes the competitiveness of the mar-
ket by precluding sales to higher but unknown bidders. Insufficient bid in-
formation also compl i cates the marke t decision-making process by forcing 
the producer to assume that he has received a bid comparabl e t o those which 
he could have obtained from other buyer s . Only with additional knowledge 
can this assumption be verified. Thus, the information scarcity may lead 
producers into buying information through various informants . However, 
such purchases of information impose an inequality upon smaller pr oducers 
20 who can not afford the expenditure . 
ft Ahou ld be no r<·d thAl Llic dcc:E!n trnl l :i:t'tl 1h111t1u(· l lun market In~ mt.• t hnd~ 
and the centralized terminal ma rke ting me thod ar e f r equently c har ac t e rized 
by their incomplet e bid disclosur e, whereas the auction market provides 
relatively good intramarket bid i nformation . 
20A . ·1 s1m1 ar inequality may also be expected between large and small meat 
packer s . 
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3) Not allowing all bidders t o bid on every lot • 
Failure to 
allow all potential bidders to bid on every lot induces reduced competition 
and interregional price discrepancies in excess of transportation costs. 
Restricting the number of bidders that can bid on every lot 1 whether due 
to physical or spatial barriers, reduces price competi tion and ultimately 
may allow a few bidders to determine price. 
Because bidding produces pricing information, bidder restriction 
limits information and thus precludes attainment of a true indication of 
the demand for cattle. Inadequate knowledge of demand strength may promote 
pricing patterns inconsistent with the actual demand situation. 
Localized bidding promotes interregional price discrepancies in excess 
of transportation cost. This is especially true because decentralized pro-
curement is more likely to preclude the optimal matching of buyers and 
sellers and may lead to price discrimination against producers in isolated 
areas. 
4) Disclosure of bidder's identity required Bidder's identity 
is one piece of information which should not be made available to competing 
bidders. Forcing the disclosure of a bidder's identity may promote packer 
21 collaboration to reduce competition or cause packer predation. 
5) Disclosure of seller's identity not optional Revelation 
of a seller's identity allows packer-buyers to associate an otherwise homo-
geneous cattle cozmnodity unit with a particular feeder's "production repu-
21 
Predation might involve packer collusion to drive a smaller buyer 
from the market. By always outbidding the small packer, the colluding 
firms could eliminate the small packer's cattle supply and/or make his 
cattle procurement cost prohibitive. 
69 
22 tation." This reputational association is advantageous to sellers 
having favorable production reputations because it allows them to differen-
tiate their product. Conversely, the reputational association is a detri-
ment to sellers having unfavorable production reputations because it per-
mits packer-buyer discrimination against their cattle. Accordingly, I think 
that effective competition is most greatly enhanced when sellers have the 
option of revealing their identity to all potential buyers prior to the 
commencement of the price determination process. By providing this option, 
sellers rather than an arbitrary market official are allowed to weigh the 
benefits against the detriments of identity disclosure in their particular 
circumstances . 
Optional seller identity disclosure is superior to either compulsory 
anonymity or compulsory disclosure because it makes available the rewards 
for favorable producer reputation without totally depriving sellers of the 
protection from bidder discrimination afforded by seller anonymi t y . That is, 
when identity disclosure is optional a producer confident that he enjoys a 
favorable reputation may choose to reveal his identity to potential buyers 
in an attempt to reap the benefits of his reputation and ability to differen-
22
upon disclosure of a seller ' s identity, a buyer who has had previous 
contacts or dealings with the identified producer may be able to recall the 
producer's "production reputation" and thereby formulate a set of antici-
pated product c haracteristics which either precludes the need for visual 
inspection of the cattle or enables the buyer to perceive more background 
information about the cattle than can be obtained from visual inspection 
alone. The term "production reputation" refers to the attributes of one's 
cattle production operation which may be ascertained through either per-
sonal association or feedlot visitation . These production attributes may 
include the producer's quality standards, (i .e. does the producer generally 
feed choice or good quality cattle), production methods (i.e. does the pro-
ducer utilize an open feedlot or confinement facilities), cattle breed, 
herd health, production location, and the size of the production operation. 
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tiate his product. At the same time, a seller fearful that his reputation 
is unfavorable may seek protection from buyer discrimination by refusing 
to have his identity revealed. 
Admittedly, disclosure of seller identity hinders the attainment of 
effective competition because not all buyers may have previous knowledge 
about the producer and his production characteristics . This incomplete dis-
tribution of information leads to an inadequate basis for making bids, 
which strongly disfavors those buyers with inadequate reputational knowl-
23 
edge. However, this hindrance of effective competition may be offset 
by the fact that the ability to differentiate one ' s cattle on the basis of 
one ' s production reputation encourages the maintenance of a favorable pro-
duction reputation and thus the production of quality cattle. Furthermore, 
seller identity disclosure may partially substitute for a packer-buyer 's 
need to visually inspect cattle prior to bidding. 
c. Misregulation of trader interaction In order to maintain an 
equitable trading system, an explicit set of rules and ~egulations needs 
to be initially adopted by trading participants and the regulatory agency 
should be made responsible for its strict enforcement. Furthermore, the 
supervising agency and the participants need to establish provisions allow-
ing for regulatory amendments when needed. Regulatory "action or inaction'' 
that promotes transaction inefficiency constitutes misregulation of trader 
interaction. 
Inaccurate grading systems and packer discrimination against producers 
are not only undesirable in themselves, but also produce adverse effects. 
23 
The inequality of information distribution may force some buyers to 
needlessly purchase additional information . 
71 
Inaccurate grading systems elicit imprecise carcass evaluation, and thus 
cause incorrect payment to producers. Over a period of time, inaccurate 
grading systems may provide erroneous pricing signals to producers regard-
ing the quality of cattle desired. 
Packer collaboration is not objectionable in itself; however, mutual 
agreements may eventually lead to higher packer profits, reduced competi-
tion, and higher retail meat prices. 
1) Accurate grading system not optional Failure to allow 
traders the option of utilizing grading systems which accurately reflect 
the relative quality of beef carcasses leads to an imprecise valuation of 
the couunodity . This inexact grading yields overpayment for inferior quality 
and underpayment for superior quality, hence preventing the optimization of 
traders ' collective gains. However, required use of any grading system is 
undesirable because the cost of conducting the grading may exceed the value 
of the grading accuracy to the traders. 
2) Undesirable packer collaboration is allowed Lack of regu-
lation or failure to enforce existing anticollusion regulation can only be 
construed as an encumbrance to equalized bargaining power and effective 
competition. 
Undesirable collaboration may be defined as mutual agreement to coop-
e rate that needlessly hinders market efficiency or aggressiveness, thereby 
acting as an impediment to effective competition. Unwanted collaboration 
may include arrangements to fix market prices, to pool profits, to assign 
procurement zones, to limit purchases or production, to restrict entry, or 
drive out smaller competitors. Collaborators may hope to gain added bar-
gaining power by entering into conspiratory agreements. Accordingly, the 
72 
enhanced packer bargaining power may allow artificial manipulation of com-
modity demand and yield excessive packer profits. 
d. Unsatisfactory transaction outcomes In this section of trans-
action system criteria my primary concern relates to the performance of the 
market exchange system. Conceptually, my goal is to determine "how nearly 
the ratio of actual to potential gains from trade has been maximized?". 
[25, p. 114] But, instead of trying to establish a specific maximized-
gains criterion, I focus on several price criteria in an attempt to deter-
mine the likelihood that the realization of potential transaction gains has 
been maximized through the maintenance of effective competition. 
In this transaction flaw category, I introduce a criterion for lot-to-
lot random price fluctuation and for excessive spatial price differentials. 
Flaws associated with these criteria are both undesirable in themselves and 
their effects. Unwarranted price fluctuation yields immediate producer 
price inequality, while at the same time causing producer disillusionment 
and dissatisfaction. Spatial price differentials in excess of transporta-
tion costs mean that abnormal prices are being received by some producers 
which may lead to an unwarranted locational shift in production, Moreover, 
this la tter flaw is a symptomatic indication of inefficient, noncompeti-
tive trade. 
1) 
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24 Unwarranted price fluctuation Intrasession lot-to-lot 
random price fluctuation to the extent that price changes do not reflect 
quality differences
25 
and/or buyers' diminishing interest in accumulating 
more units yields inequitable treatment of sellers, inefficient exchange 
outcomes, and an adverse division of gains. Additionally, interlot price 
fluctuation complicates the formulation of bidding strategies and makes 
pricing differences associated with quality, location, and time, more dif-
ficult to perceive. 
2) Persistent maintenance of interregional price differentials 
in excess of transportation costs One overall evaluative standard of 
market performance proposed by Sosnick and others was "average prices for 
an essentially homogeneous commodity at spatially separated assembly points 
should not persistently differ by more than unit transportation costs, and 
should not persistently differ by less than that much if the commodity is 
actually shipped.J' [25, pp. 112-116] 
Persistent violation of this standard might be interpreted as a symp-
tom of inefficient, noncompetitive trade. The excessive price differen-
tials do indicate an abnormally low (or high) price at one location when 
24
An interesting discussion on relative market price stability is pre-
sented by Preston and Collins. (19, p. 98) The writers suggest that rela-
tive price stability is necessary in obtaining the maximum benefit from the 
market scheme rather than another allocation mechanism. However, the auth-
ors caution that price flexibility must amply mirror changes in cost and 
demand if an effective market is to be maintained. Under this argument, 
price stability may be denounced as inefficient. Collins and Preston con-
clude by proposing a consolidation of these two lines of thought: "A market 
is efficient when cost changes are readily reflected in price changes, demand 
changes are reflected in volume changes, and random instability not associ-
ated with fundamental readjustments is at a minimum •.. " (19, p. 98] 
25 
Sex, weight, quality grade, and yield grade. 
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compared to several other market sites. More importantly, the excessive 
price differentials signify a possible barrier to competition in one locale 
which is preventing competitive bidding. One possible barrier might be an 
ineffective interregional market communication network. Another possible 
competitive barrier would be collusive attempts t o restrain the entry of 
competing bidders. Or, the commodity may have an inherent transportation 
limitation (i,e. shrink or perishability) which hinders interregional trans-
portation and thus causes the incurrance of transfer costs in excess of mere 
transportation costs. 
e. Infeasibility of implementation In analyzing proposed commodity 
exchanges (i.e. those not presently in operation) it is desirable to addi-
. 11 .d . f 126 fl h. h hi d . 1 i f h tiona y 1 enti y structura aws w i.c may n er imp ementat on o t e 
exchange and/or make implementation impractical. 
Flaws which may make implementation infeasible include required en-
abling legislation, a required uniform commodity grading system, and 
sophisticated trading rules. 
These implementation flaws arise from r equirements which may not only 
have undesirable characteristics in themselves, but also may adversely ef~ 
feet the implementation of the proposed exchange. 
1) Enabling legislation required The implementation of pro-
posed exchange systems which require the enactment of enabling legislation 
may be hampered by the inherent constraints of the legislative process. 
Such constraints are likely to delay, dilute , modify, or totally refute the 
26 
See footnote 6 regarding the scope of my analysis of structural flaws 
in exchange systems. 
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needed legislation and accordingly burden the proposed system's implementa-
tion. 
Among the first legislative hurdles is the need to convince legisla-
tors of the interest in or need for the proposed marketing system in order 
to prove legislative priority. Even after it is scheduled for discussion 
on the legislative calendar, a legislative proposal must still obtain the 
consensus of a majority of the members of the legislative body that the 
proposal is worthy of enactment. 
Enactment of the needed legislation will frequently be further hind-
ered by a lack of legislator expertise in connnodity marketing, consumer 
lobbyists who oppose producer-oriented legislation, and legislators who be-
cause of political necessity cater to the preferences of urban voters. 
2) Establishment of a uniform connnodity grading system required 
Requirements that a uniform grading system for the connnodity be estab-
lished arbitrarily denies participants the opportunity to utilize alterna-
tive grading systems more ideally suited to their individualized needs. 
Furthermore, the cost of retraining connnodity graders to implement the new 
grading system may exceed the cost savings arising from convenience and the 
value of the increased grading accuracy attained through use of the uniform 
system. 
3) Sophisticated trading rules The operational mechanics, 
administrative rules and regulations, and buy-sell transaction details must 
be relatively unsophisticated to enable rapid comprehension by feeders, 
packers, and market agency personnel. Trading rules that are so complex 
and detailed that the cost of learning the mechanics of trading or retain-
ing exchange participants is greater than the potential return, restrict 
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participation by excluding those small cattle feeders or low-volume meat 
packers who can not justify the cost. 
Additionally, exchange rules must be expressed explicitly and enforced 
judiciously , to insure an equitable administration of the exchange system . 
D. Summary of Producer-Packer Exchange System Flaws 
In suDDllary, I have identified the following flaws as indicators of ex-
change inefficiency in the cattle assembly system: 
1 . Redundant transporta tion 
2. Nonpr oductive facilities 
3. Unnecessary handling 
4. Excessive transaction and marketing costs 
5. Costl y search for cattle 
6. Uneven delivery of cattle a t plants . 
Similarly, the existence of any one of the following flaws indicates 
that a slaughter cattle transaction system is inefficient: 
1 . Traders not allowed to select price basis 
2. Feeders may not refuse packer bids without incurring 
excessive costs 
3. Inadequate market information 
4. Competing bids not rapidly disclosed 
5 . Not allowing all bidders to bid on every lot 
6. Disclosure of bidder identity required 
7 . Disclosure of seller ' s identity not optional 
8 . Accurate grading system not optional 
9. Undesirable packer collabor ation is allowed 
10. Unwarranted price fluctuation 
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11. Persistent maintenance of interregional price differen" 
tials in excess of transportation costs 
12. Enabling legislation required 
13. Establishment of a uniform commodity grading system 
required 
14. Sophisticated trading rules 
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IV . DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSED ELECTRONIC 
SIMULTANEOUS PROGRESSIVE SLAUGHTER 
CATTLE AUCTION 
In view of the imperfections in prior electronic marketing system pro-
posals, this research project was formulated with the objective of design-
ing an improved and implementable electronic exchange for slaughter cattle 
fed in Iowa . Presented in this chapter is a development of the resultant 
electronic exchange proposal - the Electronic Simultaneous Progressive 
Slaughter Cattle Auction (ESPSCA). 
The development cotmnences with an evaluation of alternative transac-
tion systems in an attempt to identify the one most suitable for use in my 
proposed exchange (Section A). The development then progresses with an 
abstract description of the selected simultaneo us progressive auction trans-
action system (Section B). As the third step in the development of the 
ESPSCA, I proceed by adapting the basic simultaneous progressive auc tion 
transaction system for the sale of slaughter cattle fed in Iowa (Section C) . 
In the fourth and final step of this development (Section D), I present the 
design of a system that will enable the simultaneous progressive slaughter 
cattle auction t o be conducted electronically . 
A. Selection of a Transaction System 
The most fundamental component of any marketing method is its transac-
1 tion system. Thus, before commencing development of a new cattle marketing 
system, a theoretical examination of possible transaction systems should be 
1 11 I A transaction system is an institutional framework for exchange, as 
delineated by certa in rules of exchange which serve as guidelines for and/ 
or constraints on negotiations . (20, p. 46) 
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undertaken. After completing this comparative analysis, one transaction 
system must be selected which can be incorporated into an operational elec-
tronic exchange and which, when implemented, will facilitate maximization 
of exchange efficiency. 
In this section nine transaction systems are i dentified. After narrow-
ing the field to four auction-type transaction systems and examining an em-
pirical study on auction exchange efficiency, the simultaneous progressive 
auction is selected for use in my electronic exchange proposal. 
1 . Available transaction systems 
The economic price determination process may be undertaken by a number 
of different transaction systems, several of which are: auction, sealed 
bidding, collective bargaining, exchange, bazaar, and administered pricing. 
[20, p. SO] Each of these transaction systems is distinguished by certain 
characteristics which make it better suited for pricing particular types of 
economic goods. 
2. Advantages of the auction transaction system 
For the purposes of this investigation, I have limited my attention 
solely to the auction transaction system. I believe that auctions utilize 
a more open format which allows public and participant observation and thus 
yields an enhanced flow of information and increased exchange efficiency . 
The auction format distinguishes itself by permitting an organized, objec-
tive price determination involving numerous potential buyers for each indi-
vidual saleable commodity unit. Unlike collective bargaining where buyers 
and sellers discuss price possibilities until an agreeable price arrange-
ment is made by means of an unstructured agenda, auction rules specify the 
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exact procedure for price determination giving the auction an organized 
format . When auction rules require that bidders make successive incremental 
bids in order to outbid one another, auction format allows bidders to objec-
tively determine connnodity price with active knowledge of what the last 
bidder was willing to pay. By contrast, administered pricing and collec-
tive bargaining require subjective price determination based on supply and 
demand information, without actual knowledge of what other potential buyers 
would be willing to pay. Furthermore, the auction format permits the com-
petitive interaction of numerous potential buyers in the determination of 
price for a single unit of commodity. By contrast, direct exchange limits 
the pricing participants to one buyer and one seller, and therefore pre-
eludes bidder interaction. 
3. Identification of four auction transaction systems 
For my investigation it is necessary to identify and discuss four auc-
tion transaction systems 1) the successive progressive auction, 2) the suc·· 
cessive regressive auction, 3) the second price successive regressive auc-
2 tion, and 4) the simultaneous progressive auction. 
a. Successive progressive auction Being conunonly used in livestock, 
art, and antique sales, the successive progressive auction transaction sys-
tern is probably the most frequently used type of auction. The successive 
progressive auction is characterized by a specified sale order and dis-
closure of competing bids before the exchange price is finally determined. 
This auction transaction system is designated "successive" because individ-
2 
The discussion in this section draws heavily from Raikes (20, pp. 
48-49]. 
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ual units are sold consecutively, one after another, with a separate price 
determination for each unit. In addition, this auction is designated "pro-
gressive" because during the sale of each individual item on the sale 
agenda, the auctioneer starts the bidding at a price below the expected 
sale price and permits it to rise as bidders successively make incremental 
price bids. The last bidder, being the highest bidder, establishes the ex-
change price and becomes the buyer of the saleable unit. 
b. Successive regressive auction transaction system This auction, 
also referred to as a ''Dutch" auction, has been used successfully by the 
Ontario Hog Producers' Co-operative in their slaughter hog teletype auctions. 
Successive regressive auctions are characterized by a specified sale order 
and nondisclosure of competing bids before the exchange price is finally 
determined. The successive regressive auction transaction system is simi-
lar to the successive progressive auction transaction system in that units 
are sold successively, one after another. However, the successive regres-
sive auction differs in that the auctioneer starts prices above the expected 
selling price and prices are allowed to decline until a bid is entered. The 
first bidder, being the highest bidder, establishes the sale price and be-
comes the buyer of the saleable unit. 
c. Second price successive regressive auction transaction system 
This auction proceeds in a manner similar to the successive regressive auc-
tion, with the winning bidder being the first person to bid. However, in 
the second price successive regressive auction the price paid is that of-
fered by the second person to enter a bid. 
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d. Simultaneous progressive auction transaction system In-
stead of selling individual units successively in accordance with a speci-
fied sale order as in a successive progressive auction, bids on all units 
3 
to be sold during a particular simultaneous progressive auction session 
are received concurrently . All units are then sold simultaneously to the 
highest bidder on the individual units . As in the successive progressive 
auction, the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system does allow 
for incrementally higher bids and disclosure of competing bids prior to the 
time the exchange price is finally determined. 
4 . Selection of the most efficient auction transaction system 
On the basis of research performed by Raikes [20], I have selected the 
simultaneous progressive auction transaction system over the other three 
auction transaction systems for use in my proposed exchange . The simultan-
eous progressive auction was selected in part because this auction's simul-
taneit y element makes interlot relative price comparison possible during 
the pricing process . Furthermore, it is hoped that by incorporating the 
simultaneous auction f r amework into the cat tle marketing process, the lot-
to-lot price variability characteristic of the Ontario Hog Producers' Co-
operative successive regressive auction and the successive regressive 
slaughter cat tle auction proposed by Johnson [15, p. 70], can be avoided. 
Raikes ' research involved the construction of computer simulation 
models of the four auction transaction systems previously mentioned and a 
3
An "auction session" is the periodic time interval during which an 
auction is conducted. Each auction session begins with the initiation of 
bidding on units consigned for sale during the time period . The session 
continues throughout the duration of bidding on the consigned units and 
terminates when the last consigned unit is sold. 
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comparison of each auction's computed exchange efficiency with certain~ 
priori expectations. Findings by the Raikes study with respect to auction 
exchange efficiency, auction price dispersion, and auction buyers' gain, 
were persuasive fac tors leading to the selection of the simultaneous pro-
gressive auction transaction system. 
a . Auction exchange efficiency The Raikes analysis used "the ratio 
of the actual to the maximum attainable value of total joint payoff" as a 
measure of exchange efficiency. [20, p . 66] Raikes' empirical results 
showed that when homogeneous units are being auctioned, the four auction 
transaction systems are equally efficient. [20, p. 286] However , as ex-
4 pected, when heterogeneous units are being sold the simultaneous progres-
s sive auction is significantly more efficient than the three successive-
6 type auction transaction systems . [20, p. 286 ] 
Raikes credited the higher efficiency of the simultaneous progressive 
auction transaction system to the problems in bid strategy formulation in-
curred by buyers participating in the successive auctions. For example, 
successive a uction bidders frequently erred in their anticipation of rela-
tive price levels and consequently purchased the wrong type of goods. [20, 
p. 318] By contrast, bidding strategy formulation under the simultaneous 
4 The term "heterogeneous units" means that the quality characteristics 
of the different saleable units differ, although each member of the sale-
able unit is similar in quality. 
5
Using a 0.95 significance level, Raikes determined that of the four 
auction transaction systems considered, the simultaneous progressive auc-
tion is the transaction system with the highest mean measure of exchange 
efficiency. (20, p . 285] 
6 
There was no significant distinction between the efficiency of the 
three types of successive auction transaction systems. [20, p. 285] 
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progressive auction transaction system is facilitated because the prices for 
all saleable units are determined at the same time with all bids being made 
available to competing bidders during the actual price determination. 
Accordingly, there is no need to anticipate relative price levels under 
7 the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system. Furthermore, 
simultaneous progressive auction bidders have no reason to bid high to 
purchase units auctioned early during the session in order to protect them-
selves against the possibility of even higher prices later in the auction 
session. [20, p. 121] 
b. Auction price dispersion As expected, the simultaneous pro-
gressive auction transaction system yields a lower dispersion of prices 
when compared to the three successive auction transaction systems . Raikes 
indicated that the wide price dispersion associated with the successive re-
gressive auction may be attributed to the fact that bidders must enter the 
first and highest bid in order to purchase a lot and they must pay the price 
they bid. Under these circumstanc es subjective judgements about what other 
bidders will bid are influential factors in the price determination process. 
(20, p. 123] Because the subjective anticipations change rapidly during the 
course of a regressive auction session, bids and price levels may also 
change quickly. [ 20, p. 123] 
c . Auction buyers' gain The Raikes study empirically computed the 
amount of buyers' gain as "the ratio of the actual to the theoretically pre-
7 
Raikes noted that the availability of pric ing information made possi-
ble by the "simultaneous" and "progressive" characteristics may also reduce 
stress on traders, resulting in an increase in the average efficiency of the 
exchange outcomes . [20, p. 101] 
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dieted payoff to buyers." (20, p. 68] According to Raikes' results, the 
simultaneous progressive auction transaction system yields larger gains to 
the bidder than the successive progressive auction transaction system. 
These gains are normally unobservable, even though simultaneous auction 
prices are not lower than successive progressive auction prices. The gains 
are credited to the relative uniformity of prices, the lack of wrong pur-
chases frequently made without sufficient comparative pricing information 
in successive auctions, 8 and monopsonistic bidder behavior in the simultan-
eous progressive auctions. Raikes described this later characteristic in 
the sense "that bidders will realize that the more units they try to buy, 
the higher their average costs will become. Thus, bidders will cease bid-
ding when the expected gain from their last intramarginal unit becomes less 
than the expected increase in their costs." [20, pp. 123-4) 
d . Simultaneous auction disadvantages Although believed to be out-
weighed by advantages , the simultaneous progressive auction transaction 
system has several disadvantages which should be considered. In general, 
simultaneous auctions proceed at a slower pace than successive progressive 
auctions , resulting in a lower volume of units exchanged per unit of time. 
This reduced volume is partially caused by the large amount of time required 
for bidders to make relative price comparisons between the various units 
offered. Also, the Raikes study indicated that seller gains diminish when 
a large number of bidders simultaneously bid on a homogeneous commodity. 
(20 , p . 322] 
8 
Higher prices may be expected in the successive auctions as seriatum 
sale invites overbidding , especially in the initial portion of an auction 
session. [20, p. 124] 
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B. An Abstr act Explanation of the Simultaneous 
Progressive Auction Transaction System 
Before discussing applications of the selected simultaneous progres-
sive auction transaction system in cattle marketing, the reader should be-
come more familiar with the essential nature of the simultaneous progressive 
auction format. As has previously been noted, simultaneous progressive 
auctions are characterized, as well as distinguished from other auction 
transaction systems, by their unique combination of three trading features: 
1) progressive bidding, 2) contemporaneous price determination for two or 
9 more saleable units, and 3) simultaneous sale of two or more saleable units. 
To illustrate the role of these characteristics during the conduct of an 
auction session, I now present an abstract description of the preparatory, 
bidding, and closing stages of a simultaneous progressive auction. 
1. Preparatory stage of a simultaneous progressive auction 
In preparation for the conduc tion of a simultaneous progressive auction, 
10 all consigned lots are represented, either by their physical presence or 
9 Because the sale of cattle between the producer and packer will con-
stitute a sale of "goods," as defined by the Uniform Commerical Code, 554. 
2105(1), Iowa Code (1977), this auc tion sales transaction will be covered 
by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code . Thus, wherever appropriate in 
this chapter, I will use the relevant auction sales terminology and defini-
tions established by the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The Uniform Commerical Code, 554.2106(1), Iowa Code (1977), defines 
the term "sale" as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for 
a price. 11 Accordingly, in this paper the term "simultaneous sale" refers 
to the passage of title of two or more saleable units which occurs at the 
same moment in time. 
10 . 
The Uniform Conunercial Code, 554.2105(5), Iowa Code (1977), states 
that 111 Lot' means a parcel or a single article which is the subject of a 
s eparate sale or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the 
contrac t." Thus, in the context of a simultaneous progressive slaughter 
cat tle a uc t i on the term "lot" refers t o a group of slaughter cattle which 
i c:: rhP ~H1h.;N t of R separa.t:e sale tr:ansactd.on. 
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physical description, at a centralized marketplace. If the saleable units 
are physically present, all potential bidders gathered at the marketplace 
are permitted to observe, examine, and evaluate each lot for sale. 
2. Bidding stage of a simultaneous progressive auction 
Upon completion of the preparatory period, the auction session begins, 
allowing bids to be entered contemporaneously on all lots. Each potential 
bidder in attendance has an equal opportunity to repeatedly enter incremen-
tal bids on each lot. The bidding on each lot is for the purpose of de-
termining one price - the sale price (exchange price) of the particular lot. 
The current bid and the last bidder's identification code on each lot is 
posted for viewing by all potential bidders on a bid tally device. When-
ever a bidder desirous of purchasing a particular lot sees that his previou s 
bid on the lot has been surpassed by bids from other bidders, he has the 
opportunity to rebid on the lot. 
3. Closing state of a simultaneous progressive auction 
The auction session closes when no bidder is willing to enter another 
bid on any lot. Upon the auctioneer's announcement of the auction's comple-
tion, 11 title to each and all lots passes simultaneously to the last and 
the refore highest bidder on each individual lot. The sale price of each lot 
is the price of the last bid on the particular lot. 
11
The Uniform Conunerical Code, 554.2328(2), Iowa Code (1977), states 
that: "A sale by auction is complete when the auctioneer so announces by 
the fall of the hanuner or in other customary manner." 
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C. Incorporating the Simultaneous Progressive Auction 
Transaction System into a Producer-Packer 
Exchange System for Slaughter 
Cattle Fed in Iowa 
As the third step in the Electronic Simultaneous Progressive Cattle 
Auction (ESPSCA) development, I now present a description of a nonelectronic 
slaughter cattle exchange which utilizes the simultaneous progressive auc-
tion transaction system. 
This section commences with a discussion of the necessary modifications 
which should be made in the basic simultaneous progressive auction trans-
action system rules in order to acconunodate the marketing of slaughter 
cattle. Thereafter, attention is focused on the preparatory, bidding, and 
closing stages of the Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter 
Cattle Auction (NESPSCA). 
1. Necessary modifications in the simultaneous progressive auction trans-
action system rules 
Rules of the basic simultaneous progressive auction transaction system 
have necessarily been modified to accomodate the following NESPSCA features: 
a) central assembly of cattle not requ ired, b) organization of cattle into 
saleable "lot" units, c) multiple price determination, d) lot withdrawal, 
and e) at-feedlot bids. 
a. Central assembly of cattle not required Because central assem-
bly of cattle for buyer examination and evaluation is physically inefficient, 
the rules of the NESPSCA should be modified to permit sale of cattle while 
they are still in the feedlot or at a regional assembly yard . As a partial 
substitute for presale bidder inspection, consignors will have the option 
of having their cattle graded prior to sale at either the feedlot or assem-
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bly yard. When the grading option is elected, the grader's report will be 
made available to bidders prior to the auction. 
b. Organization of cattle into saleable "lot" units For organiza-
tional purposes, any number of cattle from the same consignor, similar in 
quality and weight, and consigned under the same trading basis, may be 
grouped together to form one saleable unit called a "lot." All prices de-
termined, as well as all exchange records, connnunications, and billings, 
will be with respect to this "lot" unit. 
c. Multiple-price determination It may be recalled that in the 
abstract simultaneous progressive auction illustration (Section B) the com-
12 modity could be consigned on only one trading basis and only one price 
per lot was determined by bidders. In order to allow consignors the option 
of having their cattle priced under one or more alternative trading bases, 
and to accommodate the sale of cattle on a carcass grade and weight basis 
with market-determined quality price differentials, it has been necessary 
to modify these basic simultaneous progressive auction rules in order to 
permit the determination of more than one price for each lot. 
To accommodate multiple-price determination it is first necessary to 
delineate the trading bases to be offered. Accordingly, I propose that the 
consignor be allowed to select one of three singular trading bases: 1) the 
12 
The words "trading basis" refer to an arrangement for determining the 
amount to be paid to the seller. Terms which vary from one arrangement to 
the next include the time of determining the pay weight (i.e. before or 
after slaughter), and the amount and type of grading to be per~ormed. 
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13 14 liveweight basis (L) , 2) the "in the mea t" basis (M), or 3) the carcass 
grade a nd weight basis (C). 15 Alternatively, I propose that t he consignor 
be allowed to select among one of four combination trading bases: 1) the 
higher of liveweight or "in the meat" basis (LM) , 16 2) the higher of live-
weight or carcass gr ade and weight basis (LC), 3) the higher of " in the 
meat" or carcass gr ade and weight basis (MC), or 4) the higher of live -
weight , "in the meat," or carcass grade and weight basis (LMC) . 
Secondly , multiple-price deter mination requires the identification of 
one or more "lot components" for each singular trading basis . Each "lot 
13under the liveweigh t trading basis the bid price is paid for each one 
hundred pounds of live animal sold , irregardless of the weight or quality 
of the resulting car casses . Bids are usually en t ered after visual inspec-
tion of the ca ttle and accordingly are expected to allow for quality, weight, 
a nd sex charac t eristics . 
14 Under the "in the meat" basis, producers a r e paid a price per hundred-
weight of hot beef carcass , i rregardless of the car cass quality and yield 
grade . Bids received under this basis are t o determine the price per hund-
r edweight to be paid for s t eer and heifer car casses . 
15under the "carcass grade and weight" basis, different prices in dol-
lars per hundredweight of hot carcass are determined for car casses meeting 
various sex, yield gr ade , quality grade, and weight specifications. Ideally, 
the price differentials between the carcass categories reflect the differ-
ence in the value of the carcasses to packers . 
After a producer ' s cattle have been slaughtered, each carcass is 
weighed and graded in order to determine the carcass categor y in which it 
falls . The bid price for each car cass category is then paid for all car-
casses falling into the particular category . 
16
When cat tle are consigned under a combi nation trading basis, bids for 
the cattle will be r eceived on the two or three singular trading basis 
which are included in the combination trading basis . After bidding on the 
cattle has ceased and before completion of the auction session, the auc tion 
officials will report the bid prices for his cattle under each s ingular 
trading basis . The consignor will then be given the opportunity t o sel ec t 
the one singular trading basis which he feels will yield him t he "highest" 
net price. Upon designa tion, the selected trading basis becomes the con-
signor's "exchange basis." 
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component" represents a specific trading basis, and possibly also a specific 
sex class, grade ca tegory, and weight category. Sex classes would include 
steers and heifers . Grade categories for the carcass grade and weight 
basis would reflect quality and yield grade categories and carcass weight 
ranges. Thus, for cattle consigned on a trading basis which includes the 
liveweight basis, bids in dollars per hundredweight of live animal, may be 
received for the following lot components: 1) liveweight, steer price; and 
2) liveweight, heifer price. For cattle consigned on a trading basis which 
includes the "in the meat" basis, bids in dollars per hundredweight of car-
cass may be received for the following lot components: 1) "in the meat," 
steer base price; and 2) " in the meat, 11 heifer base price. For lots con-
signed on a trading basis which includes the carcass grade and weight basis, 
bids will be received in dollars per hundredweight of car cass for the 
17 following lot components : 
Steers : - Choice Yield Grade No. 1-3 carcasses weighing less 
than or equal to 660 pounds; 
-Choice Yield Grade No. 1-3 carcasses weighing more 
than 660 pounds; 
-Choice Yield Grade No. 4-5 carcasses weighing less 
than or equal to 660 pounds; 
-Choice Yield Grade No . 4-5 carcasses weighing more 
than 660 pounds; 
- Good Yield Grade No. 1-3 carcasses weighing less than 
or equal to 660 pounds; 
-Good Yield Grade No . 1-3 carcasses weighing more than 
660 pounds; 
17
The yield grade and carcass weight categories were derived after con-
sultation with Dallas McGinnis, Iowa State University Extension Marketing 
Editor. These breakdowns were selected because they represent categories 
for which cattle prices are presently reported. However, the reader should 
note that these categories could be modified to meet cattle industry needs. 
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-Good Yield Grade No. 4-5 carcasses weighing less 
than or equal to 660 pounds; 
-Good Yield Grade No. 4-5 carcasses weighing more 
than 660 pounds; 
Heifers: -Choice Yield Grade No . 1-3 carcasses weighing less 
than or equal to 550 pounds; 
- Choice Yield Grade No. 1-3 carcasses weighing more 
than 500 pounds; 
- Choice Yield Grade No . 4-5 carcasses weighing less 
than or equal to 500 pounds; 
- Choice Yield Grade No . 4-5 carcasses weighing more 
than 500 pounds; 
-Good Yield Grade No . 1-3 car casses weighing less 
than or equal to 500 pounds; 
-Good Yield Grade No. 1-3 carcasses weighing more 
than 500 pounds; 
-Good Yield Grade No. 4-5 carcasses weighing less 
than or equal to 500 pounds; 
-Good Yield Grade No . 4-5 carcasses weighing more 
than 500 pounds . 
Lot components for each trading method must be exclusive and exhaus-
tive . That is, each animal in the lot must fall into one and only one of 
the lot components . 
When cattle are consigned on a singular trading basis, bids are re-
ceived only for the lot components applicable to the trading basis . Thus, 
for a lot of steers consigned under the liveweight basis, bids for only one 
lot component, "liveweight, steers" will be received . If, instead , a steer 
lot is consigned on the carcass gr ade and weight basis, bids will be re-
ceived on all the aforementioned CGW s teer lot components . In such cases 
where bids are being received on two or more lot components for one lot of 
cat tle , the listing of the current bid on each l ot component constitutes 
the lot ' s "bid array . " When cattle are consigned on a combination trading 
basis, bids will be received on the applicable lot components for each 
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singular trading basis making up the combination trading basis . Thus, if a 
lot of steers is consigned on the LC basis, the lot's bid array will be 
comprised of bids received on the "liveweight, steer" lot component and all 
of the CGW steer lot components. 
Due to the adoption of rules allowing the receipt of bids on two or 
more lot components per lot, there will be an array of bids on each lot at 
any one moment during the auction. To become the high bidder on a lot 
during the auction, a bidder need only raise the bid on any one of the lot 
components in a lot's bid array. When there are no bidder offers to raise 
any of the bids on any of the lots being auctioned concurrently, each lot 
is sold simultaneously to the high bidder on the lot. The exchange (sale) 
prices for each lot are given by the last bid on each lot component in the 
lot's bid array. The purchasing packer will pay the exchange price given 
by the final bid on each lot component for all cattle or carcasses in the 
lot which meet the sex, grade, and weight specifications of the particular 
lot component. 
d. Lot withdrawal To protect consignors from unacceptably low 
packer bids, auction rules should be modified to allow consignors to with-
draw part or all of the units composing their consigned lots. The withdraw-
al should be allowed after the l ot component prices have been determined, but 
prior to the time sales are consumated. Section 554.2328(3) of the Iowa 
Code, the relevant auction statute, provides that the auctioneer in an auc-
18 
tion with reserve may withdraw the goods comprising a lot at any time 
18 
An auction "is with reserve unless the goods are in explicit terms 
put up without reserve." Section 554. 2328(3), Iowa Code (1977). 
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until he announces completion of the sale. In a simultaneous progressive 
slaughter cattle auction this withdrawal could be accomplished in several 
ways, depending in part on the trading basis under which the lot was con-
signed. 
For lots on which bids are received on only one lot component, such as 
the singular liveweight or singular "in the meat" basis, consignors could 
be allowed to submit "reserve bids" along with their consignment i nstructions . 
These reserve bids would serve as minimum acceptable price bids for the ap-
plicable lot components. After the cessation of bidding, but pr ior to the 
announced completion of the sale each reserve bid would be compared with 
the last bid on the lot's lot component to determine whether the lot should 
be withdrawn or sold to the last bidder on the lot. If the last bid price 
when bidding ceased was lower than the specified reserve bid for the com-
parable lot component, market agency officials (i.e. the "auctioneer" ) would 
automatically withdraw the entire lot . On the other hand, if the bid price 
for the lot's lot component equals or exceeds the reserve bid, the sale of 
the lot would be consummated. 
Reserve bids are a desirable mode of unit withdrawal because the with-
drawal decision can be made by auction officials without contacting the con-
signor . However, it appears that reserve bids are a feasible withdrawal 
mode only for lots having bid arrays comprised of a single lot component. 
Use of reserve bids to withdraw lots on which bids will be received for two 
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or more lot components would also serve the function of providing minimum 
19 price protection. However, for these lots the reserve bid withdrawal mode 
would be unable to assure that realistic price differentials between the 
various lot components are registered . Thus, I propose that withdrawal of 
cattle in lots on which two or more prices are being determined, such as 
lots consigned on one of the four combination trading bases, the singular 
carcass grade and weight basis, or mixed lots consigned on either the singu-
lar liveweight or "in the meat" basis, be accomplished through use of a 
"withdrawal call." The withdrawal call would be a telephone call placed by 
auction officials to the consignor after the cessation of bidding and prior 
19conceivably some packers may be opposed to the proposed reserve bid 
method of lot withdrawal. This opposition may arise from the lack of cer-
tainty last-bidder status would give a packer-buyer. The uncertainty re-
mains, despite being the last bidder on a lot, because any impending lot 
purchase would always be subject to withdrawal. 
In view of this possible opposition, several alternative modes of lot 
withdrawal have been considered. Unfortunately, both of these alternatives 
are characterized with inherent weaknesses. 
The first alternative withdrawal procedure considered would enable con-
signors to bid, or hire brokers to bid in their behalf, on their own lots. 
Accordingly, if bid prices for a lot do not exceed the consignor's minimum 
acceptable price, he would buy his own lot back. Under section 554.2328(4) 
of the Iowa Code, sellers at auctions may be permitted to bid on their own 
lots. However, section 554.2328(4) of the Iowa Code requires that notice 
be given to all bidders that the seller reserves the liberty to bid on his 
own lot. Arguably, the possibility that packer-buyers may be bidding 
against producer-consignors will likely be more objectionable to packers 
than the proposed reserve bid withdrawal procedure. 
The second alternative withdrawal procedure considered would permit the 
auction clerks or auction computer (in the case of the ESPSCA) to bid until 
the bids for each of a lot's components exceed the corresponding reserve 
bid . However, this method of lot withdrawal would likely be as objection-
able to packers as the first alternative, because in essence this alterna-
tive also permits the consignor to bid against packer-buyers . 
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to the completion of the auction. After the auction official reports the 
final bid prices on each lot component for the consignor's lot(s), the con-
signor would be permitted to indicate how many and which of the units 
(cattle) in his lot(s) he desires to withdraw. 
Not only does the rule permitting consignors to determine how many and 
which units in the lot will be sold allow consignors to withdraw lots due 
to unacceptably low bids on one or more lot components, but it also insures 
that the price differentials between lot components in a lot's final bid 
array reflect differences in values placed on the lot components by bidders. 
Because consignors are permitted to withdraw partial or entire lots, bid-
ders have an incentive to enter bids in such a way that the bid on each lot 
component reflects the value of the lot component. By contrast, if con-
signors were not permitted to withdraw units from a lot after the cessation 
of bidding, the array of final bids on a lot may bear no relation to the 
values placed on the various lot components by bidders . Instead, bidders 
might enter bids so as to minimize the cost of becoming the high bidder . 
Accordingly, there is no reason to expect that bids on the various lot com-
ponents will reflect differences in values placed on the components by 
bidders . This is because a bidder may raise a bid on a lot component that 
is relatively overpriced rather than raise a bid on a lot component that is 
relatively underpriced if by doing so he can become the high bidder on the 
lot at a lower cost. This situation, where a bidder can become the high 
bidder by offering less additional money for the entire lot than the previ-
ous high bidder offered, is likely to occur if one or more lot components 
represent a very small proportion of the total quantity in the lot. 
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e. At-feedlot bids Bids and reserve bids for cattle sold on a 
liveweight basis would be "at-feedlot" or "at-assembly yard" bids. That is, 
these bids would indicate the amount being offered for cattle weighed at or 
near the feedlot or assembly yard after observance of standardized handling 
procedures (sorting, feed and water restriction before loading, and loading 
time). Bids and reserve bids for cattle sold on the "in the meat" or carcass 
grade and weight basis would also be "at-feedlot" or "at-assembly yard" bids. 
That is, transportation would be paid by the buyer, but pay weights would 
be determined at the slaughter plant after slaughter and observance of 
standardized trimming and other procedures. In determining the pay weight, 
no correction for shrink would be made. This arrangement is feasible be-
cause a recent study indicates that distance shipped does not affect carcass 
. h 20 weig t. Prices determined in the slaughter-cattle exchange are at-feedlot 
or at-assembly point rather than delivered prices because the determination 
of delivered prices would require that all bids be adjusted for transporta-
tion costs before acceptance. If the bids were on a delivered basis rather 
than an at-feedlot basis, a new, higher bid may actually be a lower bid to 
the consignor after the additional delivery costs are subtracted. Thus, if 
delivered prices were to be determined, all bids would have to be adjusted 
for transportation costs. In order to avoid this cumbersome transportation 
cost adjustment procedure, I have proposed the use of "at-feedlot" and "at-
assembly yard" prices. 
20
Raikes and Tilley [2lb, pp. 83-89]. 
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2 . Conduct of the Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle 
Auction 
The role of the above described auction rule modifications are now 
demonstrated in the following description of the preparatory, bidding, and 
closing stages of the NESPSCA. 
a. Preparatory stage of the Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive 
Slaughter Cattle Auction The preparatory stage of the auction encom-
passes the receipt of producer consignments, compilation of the auction sale 
bill, and arrangement of the bidding board for the receipt of bids. 
1) Receipt of the producer's consignment Preparation for each 
simultaneous progressive auction session begins with the consignment of 
cattle. In making his consignment each producer-consignor has the preroga-
tive to choose among a number of sales options. The flexibility inherent 
in his selection permits each producer to tailor a mode of sale most suited 
t o his needs. Illustrative of the consignment decisions the producer is 
allowed to make is the following list of consignment instructions to accom-
pany his consignments. 
a) Number of lots to be consigned Rather than require 
that a specified number of head comprise each lot, the auction market agency 
permits the consignor to determine the number of animals which are to be in-
eluded in each lot. This prerogative lets the consignor strategically group 
his animals for sale in a manner which he thinks will yield the highest 
overall price. Accordingly, the consignor must determine and specify the 
number of l ots to be consigned. 
The consignor's grouping decision may be economically constrained by 
the market agency's billing arrangement. Because the cost of auctioning a 
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lot is the same regardless of the number of head in the lot, the auction 
fee is assessed on a per lot basis. 
b) Sex composition of each lot In conjunction with his 
determination of the number of lots to be consigned, the consignor is per-
mitted to determine and specify the sex composition of each lot. Auction 
rules permit the consignment of "all-steer" lots, "all-heifer" lots, and 
"mixed" lots. "Mixed" lots are comprised of both steers and heifers. 
c) Consignment trading basis The consignor is permitted 
to determine and specify the trading basis on which his cattle will be 
auctioned. The consignor may select one of three singular trading bases: 
the liveweight basis (L), the "in the meat" basis (M), or the carcass grade 
and weight basis (C). Alternatively, the consignor may select one of four 
combination trading bases: the higher of liveweight or "in the meat" basis 
(LM), the higher of liveweight or carcass grade and weight basis (LC), the 
higher of "in the meat" or carcass grade and weight basis (MC), and the 
higher of liveweight, "in the meat", or carcass grade and weight basis (LMC) . 
d) Location of the consigned cattle at the time of the auc-
tion The consignor may decide to have his cattle auctioned while they 
are still in his feedlot. Alternatively, the consignor may deliver his cat-
tle to one of the exchange's regional assembly yards prior to the auction . 
e) }lhether the consignor desires to have his cattle graded 
prior to sale Regardless of the trading basis elected, the consignor 
may elect to have an exchange grader grade the cattle prior to the auc tion 
at consignor expense. If the cattle are graded, the grader's report will 
be included in the lot's description appearing in the auction sale bill. 
If the consignor elects to have his cattle graded and choses to have his 
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cattle sold while still in the feedlot , the producer will be required to 
pay for the cost of having the exchange dispatch a grader to the producer's 
feedlot and grade the cattle. If instead the consigned cattle are de-
livered to an exchange assembly yard prior to the auction and the con-
signor elects the grading option, the grading and weighing may take place 
there . 
f. Whether the consignor elects the Name Disclosure Option 
I ( 
Upon making the Name Disclosure Option election the name of the consignor 
21 is included in the lot's description appearing in the auction sale bill. 
21 Schrader et al. [23, pp . 15-16] and Holder [12, p. 25) have argued 
that there is a legal constraint barring disclosure of the producer's name 
to the buyers before the sale is consummated. For authority, these econo-
mists rely on Federal Trade Commission Advisory Opinion Digest No, 205 [29) . 
I think that Schrader and Holder have interpreted the meaning and im-
pact of Advisory Opinion No. 205 too broadly. In support of my position, 
I make the following arguments: 
1. The guidelines set forth by Federal Trade Commission Advisory 
Opinion No. 205 are inapplicable to the electronically con-
ducted simultaneous progressive slaughter cattle auction be 
cause the circumstances surrounding the auction differ sub-
stantially from the facts upon which Opinion No, 205 is based . 
2. Schrader and Holder, and not the Federal Trade Commission, 
concluded that disclosure of the seller's name would make 
the proposed computerized statistical information system ob-
jectionable. Under the facts given the Federal Trade Commis-
s ion, the names of producers participating in the computerized 
statistical reporting service were not to be revealed to sub~ 
scribers. The Federal Trade Commission approved the plan as 
submitted . The opinion does not single out name disclosure as 
the one critical factor which makes the computerized system 
objectionable . Instead, the Commission advised the applicant 
"that it has no objection to the proposed plan, provided it is 
not used for some illegal purpose. " 
3. Being an advisory opinion, rather than a judicial conclusion , 
Advisory Opinion No. 205 does not have the prohibitory force 
of law. Thus, Advisory Opinion No . 205 could not be used as 
authority to prohibit an electronic auction market agency from 
publishing the names of consignors prior to the consummation of 
sal es. 
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g) Des ired Delivery Interval For those lots which remain 
in the producer's feedlot at the time of sale, the producer is allowed to 
22 specify a Delivery Interval. The Delivery Interval designates a day or 
a period of several days during which delivery to the buyer's packing plant 
is desired. Specification of a Delivery Interval is not necessary for l ots 
delivered to an assembly yard prior to sale because they are presumed ready 
for the purchasing packer to load and haul as soon as the sale is consum-
mated and confirmed. 
h) Reserve bids For all-steer or all-heifer lots con-
signed on either the singular liveweight or "in the meat" basis, the con~ 
signor may specify a reserve bid. 
i) Whether consignor elects the Producer Haul Option Due 
to the use of at-feedlot and at-assembly yard bids, the presumption arises 
that all cattle will be hauled from the feedlot or assembly yard to the place 
of slaughter by the purchasing packer or a commercial carrier employed by 
the packer. However, if the producer-consignor does not want the packer to 
22
Among the Delivery Intervals which the producer-consignor may desig-
nate are the following: 
Delivery Interval No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
s 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Corresponding Delivery Date 
Monday 
Tuesday 
Wednesday 
Thursday 
Friday 
Saturday 
Sunday 
Monday or Tuesday 
Tuesday or Wednesday 
Wednesday or Thursday 
Thursday or Friday 
Friday or Saturday 
Saturday or Sunday 
Sunday or Monday 
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haul the cattle , the consignor may indicate his election of the Producer 
Haul Option at the time of his consignment. If this option is elected, the 
producer will also designate a Transportation Cost Schedule which specifies 
a set of transportation cost coefficients (in dollars per hundredweight of 
live animal) which indicate the fee he will charge the purchasing packer to 
haul the cattle to the packer's plant. 
If a Transportation Cost Schedule is specified, the cost coefficients 
for hauling cattle to the various packing plants will be included in the 
lot's description included in the auction sale bill. Accordingly, these 
cost coefficients may be taken into account by the bidders. 
If the individual consignor has prefiled one or more Transportation 
Cost Schedules with the market agency, the desired schedule can be desig-
nated by number. Otherwise, the consignor can submit the transportation 
cost coefficients along with his other consignment instructions. 
2) Compiling the auction sale bill Upon receipt of consign-
ments the auction market agency will compile the pertinent consignment de-
tails for each lot to form a lot description. Inc luded in each lot de-
scr iption is the assigned Lot Identification Numbe r, the name and telephone 
number of the consignor if he elected the Name Disclosure Option, the pro-
ducer's address, the location of the consigned cattle at the time of sale, 
the number of head of each sex in the lot, the consignment trading basis, 
the specified Delivery Interval, the Transportation Cost Schedule, and for 
those cattle graded prior to sale, the exchange gr ader 's report. 23 The 
23 
It should be noted that the producer-consignor's specified Reserve 
Bid is not included in the lot description, and therefore does not appear 
on the sale bill. 
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market agency then assembles all lot descriptions to form a sale bill, 24 
which is subsequently made available to all participating packer-buyers. 
An abbreviated sample of such a sale bill is presented in Figure 4.1. 
After copies of the sale bill have been distributed, each packer-buyer 
may study the lot descriptions, determine which lots he is most interested 
in procuring, and decide the maximum price he would be willing to bid for 
the individual lots . 
3) Preparing the bidding board for receipt of bids Meanwhile, 
the auction market agency, which operates the auction, has the duty to pre-
pare the auction bidding board for receipt and recordation of bids. 
The bidding board is a chalkboard divided into a number of rows 
and colunms by painted lines. See Figure 4.2. Each colunm on the bidding 
board represents a specific consigned cattle lot. 25 At the top of each 
column is printed the lot's Lot Identification Number, which corresponds to 
the Lot Identification Number listed with each lot description on the sale 
bill . Running across the bidding board are rows, each representing a dif-
ferent lot component. At the left side of the board is written the name of 
the lot component represented by the row. 
24
To assist the packer-buyers in rapidly identifying lots which are 
suited to their procurement needs, lots on the sale bill could be listed 
according to trading basis (i.e. L, M, C, LM, LC, MC, LMC) and sex. Within 
each categorical listing, lot descriptions could be listed on the basis of 
Delivery Interval, with those lots designated for earliest delivery being 
listed first. 
25
While the bidding board illustrated in Figure 4,2 has only four lot 
columns, a simultaneous progressive cattle auction agency could readily ex-
pand the size of the bidding board and thereby increase the number of lots 
which the board could accomodate. 
No. 100 
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NESPSCA SALE BILL 
Monday, October 12, 1977 
LIVEWEIGHT BASIS CATTLE: 
Steers: 
-Lot No. 1001-L-S 
Producer: 
Address: 
Tel. No.: 
Mr. Carl Cattlefeeder 
RR, Spencer, Iowa 50051 
515-232-7643 
No. of Head: 50 head 
Location of Cattle: Producer's Feedlot - 1 1/2 mi. north of 
Spencer, Iowa on Highway #18 
Delivery Interval: No. 9 
Grade and Weight: 
No. Head 
17 
8 
15 
10 
Grade 
Choice YG 111-3 
Choice YG #1-3 
Choice YG #4--5 
Good YG /11-3 
Transportation Cost Coefficients: 
ABC Packing Co., Dubuque $0 .85 
DEF Packing Co., Spencer - $0.15 
GHI Packing Co,, Mason City $0 .65 
Heifers: None Consigned 
None Consigned Mixed: 
IN THE MEAT BASIS CATTLE: None Consigned 
CARCASS GRADE AND WEIGHT BASIS CATTLE: 
Steers: 
-Lot No. 1002-LMC-S 
Producer: X 
Address: RR, Garner, Iowa 52443 
Tel. No.: X 
No. of Head: 100 head 
Weight 
1101-1200 lb. 
1001-1100 lb. 
1101-1200 lb. 
1001-1100 lb. 
JKL Packing Co., 
MNO Packing Co., 
PQR Packing Co., 
Nebraska 
Location of Cattle: Mason City Assembly Yard 
Delivery Interval: No. 1 
Estimated Average Weight: 1150 lbs. 
Sioux City $0.45 
Des Moines $0.75 
Dakota City, 
$0.50 
Figure 4 . 1. Illustration of the sale bill which would be distributed to 
all packer-buyers participating in the Nonelectronic Simul-
taneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction. 
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b. Bidding stage of the Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaugh-
' 
ter Cattle Auction Once the preparatory stage is completed, it is time 
to commence the bidding stage of the auction. 
At a predesignated time, the packer-buyers will assemble at the auc-
tion headquarters and await the commencement of bidding. Once the starting 
signal is given, each packer-buyer has an equal opportunity to enter incre-
mental bids on any or all lots consigned and on any lot component which 
makes up the lot's bid array . 
Although the auction rules could permit the auction officials to des -
igna t e some s t art i ng pric e for the base prices on each l ot, I instead pr o-
pose that the auction start with prices for each lot component at zero and 
thereby allow packer--buyers to set the first price. This means that the 
initial bid on a lot is likely to be $35.00, 40.00, 45.00, or more per 
hundredweight. Once the first price bid for each lot component is entered, 
successive bids are likely to range between $0.05 and $1.00 per hundred-
weight. Minimal bid increments permitted a r e $0.05 per hundredweight. 
Although bidding could proceed in a number of ways, it might be most 
simply accomplished by permitting each bidder to give his bid to an auction 
clerk. The c lerk will erase the old bid and use chalk to write the new, 
incrementally-higher bid in the appropriate place on the chalkboard. Then, 
the clerk will record the bidder ' s identification code number at the bottom 
of the lot bid array, to indicate that he was the last bidder on any lot 
component f or the particular lot. This bidding procedure can perhaps be 
best illustrated by the exemplary bidding sequence which follows below. 
Suppose that Packer-Buyer ABC is the first person to enter a bid during 
a particular session of the Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter 
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Cattle Auction. Acting pursuant to his desire to purchase cattle consigned 
on the liveweight basis only, ABC instructs an auction clerk to enter a 
steer price bid of $44 .00 per hundredweight on Lot No . 1001-L-S. Taking 
ABC's bid the clerk records the bid by following a simple procedure which 
is performed after each bid is received. To begin the bid recording pro-
cedure the clerk notes that there has been no prior bid entered in the box 
corresponding to liveweight basis steer price in bidding board Column No. 1, 
where bids for the steer price on Lot No. 1001-L-S are recorded. (If there 
had been a prior bid entered for this lot component, the clerk would have 
erased it or crossed it out.) Then, the clerk uses chalk to print the 
numerals pertaining to the new bid. In this case , the clerk would print 
"44.00." See Figure 4.3. Next, the clerk would focus his attention on the 
"Last Bidder Identification Box" at the bottom of the Lot No. 1001-L-S bid 
array; erase or cross out the identification letters of the previous last 
bidder on the lot; and print ABC's identification letters - "ABC" in the 
Last Bidder Identification Box of Column No. 1. See Figure 4.3. 
Furthermore, suppose that Packer-Buyer DEF has observed the entrance 
of ABC's bid and decides to raise the present $44.00 per hundredweight bid 
on Lot No. 1001-L-S by $0.75 per hundredweight. Thus, he instructs an auc-
tion clerk to enter a bid of $44.75 per hundredweight. Accordingly, the 
clerk focuses on Column No. 1 (See Figure 4.4) where bids for Lot No. 1001~ 
L-S are recorded. The clerk observes that a prior steer bid of $44.00 per 
hundredweight has been entered, erases or crosses out the 1144.00" bid and 
prints the new bid of "44.75." Then, the clerk erases or crosses out the 
previous bidder's (ABC's) identification code in the Column No. 1 Last 
Bidder Identification Box, and prints DEF's Identification Code "DEF". DEF 
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COLUMN NO . l 
LOT IDE~TIFICATlON NO . 1 001-L-S 
LIVE- Steer Price 44 . 00a 
WEIGHT: 
Heifer Price x 
IN THE Steer Base x 
MEAT : Heifer Base x 
CGW : Choi ce 1-3 , , 660 x 
Choice 1-3, >660 x 
Choice 4-5 , ~ 660 x 
s 
T Choice 4-5 , >660 x 
E 
E Good 1 - 3 , -' 660 x 
R 
Good 1-3 , >660 x s 
Good 4 - 5 , ~ 660 x 
Good 4 - 5 , >660 x 
CGW : Choice 1-3, ~ 500 x -
Choice 1-3, '>500 x 
Choice 4 - 5 , ~500 x 
H 
E Choice 4-5, >500 x 
I 
F Good 1-3, ' 500 x 
E 
R Good 1-3, >500 x 
s 
Good 4 - 5 , &500 x 
Good 4-5, >500 x 
ABC b 
U ST BIDDER 
IDE~7IFICATION NO .: 
aABC ' s bid of $44.00 per hundredweight, the first bid entered on Lot 
No. 1001-L-S, i s enter ed in the Liveweight Basis Steer Price Box . 
bABC's Bidder Identification Code, "ABC", is written in the Last 
Bidder Identification Box for Lot No . 1001-L-S. 
Figure 4.3. En t r y o f ABC' s initial bid and ABC' s Lost Bidder Identl ficn-
tion Code on liveweight basis Lot No . 1001-L-S. 
llO 
COLUMN NO. 1 
LOT I DE~"TIFlCATION "!'IQ . 1001-L-S 
LI VE - Steer Pr ice 
-.It,.~ a 
44 , 
WEIGHT! 
Heifer Price x ---
I N THE Steer Base x 
MEAT : Heifer Base x 
CGW: Choice 1-3 , , 660 x 
Choi c e 1-3 , >660 x 
Choi c e 4 - 5 , ~660 x 
s 
T Choice 4 - 5 , >660 x 
E 
, 660 x E Good 1 - 3, 
R Good 1-3 , >660 x s 
Good 4 - 5 , ~ 660 x 
Good 4-5, >660 x 
CGWt Choice 1-3 , ~ 500 x 
Choice 1-3 , ~500 x 
H 
Choice 4-5, , 500 x 
E Choice 
I 
4-5, > 500 x 
F Good 1-3, ' 500 x 
E 
R Good 1-3 , >500 x 
s 
Goo d 4 - 5, ~ 500 x 
Good 4-5, ')500 x 
-ltBe 
l.,\Sl llJDOER DEFb 
IUF'\T1 f1CATION N0 .1 
aDEF's incremental liveweight s teer base price of $44 .75 per hundred-
weight is entered in Lot No. 1001-L-S's Liveweight Steer Base Price Box, 
indicating that this is the last bid on this lot 1 s liveweight steer price. 
bDEF' s Identification Code - "DEF", is written in Lot No. 1001..-L-S's 
Last Bidder Identification Box, indicating that DEF now maintains the 
status of "Last Bidder" on Lot No. 1001-L-S. 
Figure 4.4. Entry of DEF's incremental bid and Last Bidder IdentlfJcAtfon 
Code on liveweight basis Lot No. 1001-L-S. 
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is now momentarily considered the last bidder on Lot No . 1001-L-S. If no 
more bids were entered on the lot during the remainder of the auction ses-
sion, and assuming that the $44.75 per hundredweight bid would equal or 
exceed the consignor's reserve bid, DEF would purchase Lot No. 1001-L-S on 
a liveweight exchange basis at a price of $44.75 per hundredweight. 
c. Closing stage of the Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaugh-
ter Cattle Auction The auction session's bidding stage closes when no 
packer-buyer is willing to enter another bid on any lot component in any 
consigned cattle lot. 
Before announcing the completion of the sale, the auction agency clerks 
must follow a procedure to determine whether withdrawal of any lot is re-
quired and the exchange basis for lots consigned on a combination trading 
basis. 
For those all-steer or all-heifer lots consigned on either the live-
weight or "in the meat" basis, this procedure requires that the auction 
agency clerks compare the bid price for the relevant lot component on the 
individual lot with the consignor's reserve bid. If the lot component bid 
does not equal or exceed the corresponding reserve bid, the lot is with-
drawn from the auction. If, instead, the bid price on the lot component 
when bidding ceased equals or exceeds the corresponding reserve bid, the 
lot will be sold to the last bidder on the lot pursuant to the terms of the 
trading basis . 
For mixed sex lots consigned on the liveweight or "in the meat" basis 
and lots consigned on a combination trading basis, auction agency clerks 
must place a withdrawal call to the consignor and inform him of the bid 
prices in his consigned lot's bid array. Once informed of his bid array, 
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the consignor must make two decisions . First, for lots consigned on a com-
bination trading basis the consignor must examine the bids pertaining to 
the lot components of the various trading bases and select one exchange 
basis. Once the consignor makes this selection, the selected trading basis 
becomes the lot's exchange basis and any animals delivered to the last bid-
der are delivered pursuant to the terms of the selected exchange basis. 
Second, the consignor must determine whether all, part, or none of the cat-
tle making up the consigned lot are to be withdrawn. 
After consignors have had an opportunity to withdraw their lots or 
specify the exchange basis for their lots, an auction official will form-
ally declare that all remaining lots have been sold "simultaneously" to the 
last bidder on each lot, regardless of the lot component on which the last 
bid was entered. The sale prices for each lot are represented by the final 
lot bid array for the elected exchange basis when bidding ceased. 
For those lots which are sold, the auction agency will confirm the sale 
with the consignor. In addition, the consignor will be informed of the 
identity and location of the purchasing packer, as well as the final lot bid 
array. 
For those lots which were delivered to an exchange assembly yard prior 
to the auction, the purchasing packer is obligated to transport the pur-
chased cattle to his slaughtering plant. For those cattle lots which re-
mained in the feedlot at the time of sale, the purchasing packer upon con-
firmation is required to contact the consignor and make a delivery appoint-
ment pursuant to hls designated Delivery Interval. 
If the consignor has elected the Producer Haul Option, the producer 
will be expected to haul his cattle or hire a commercial carrier to haul 
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his cattle to the place of slaughter . Because the packer's purchase price 
was determined on an at-feedlot basis, he will be expected to pay the con-
signor the transportation fee (in dollars per hundredweight of live animal) 
specified on the consignor's Transportation Cost Schedule for the particu-
lar packer . 
If the Producer Haul Option was not elected, the purchasing packer is 
expected t o bear the cost and responsibility of transporting the cattle. 
Conceivably, the exchange facilities could be used after each slaughter 
cattle auction to conduct a transportation service auction. This auction 
would enable packers to purchase transportation services from commercial 
carriers who offer to haul the cattle comprising a specified lot from the 
feedlot or assembly yard to the place of slaughter. The auction could be a 
simultaneous regressive (declining price) auction with the winning bidders 
(i.e . carriers) and prices determined by the lowest bid on each lot. 
If the consignor's lot(s) is(are) withdrawn, the auction agency will 
inform the consignor of this action and each lot ' s final bid array. Fur-
thermore, the agency wi l l r equest instructions as to whether or not the pro-
ducer wishes to reconsign the lot(s) for sale during a lat er auction session. 
D. Electronification of the Simultaneous Progressive 
Slaughter Cattle Auction 
As the fourth and final step in my development of the Electronic Simul-
taneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction, I now present a discussion 
which focuses on the selection, programming , and operation of the electronic 
equipment used to electronically conduc t the simultaneous progr essive 
slaughter cat tle auction described in the previous section (Section C). 
This portion of the development begins with a discussion of the need 
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for electronification of the simultaneous progressive cattle auction 
(Subsection 1). In view of the apparent desirability of conducting the 
auction electronically, I then commence a search for an electronic market-
ing system which will accommodate a simultaneous progressive slaughter cattle 
auction. The first step in this search involves an identification of the 
characteristics the overall electronic marketing system should possess 
(Subsection 2). As the second step in this search, five categories of auc~ 
tion functions which can be performed electronically are identified (Subsec-
tion 3). The final step in this search attempts to identify electronic 
hardware components which can perform the functions comprising each auction 
function category (Subsection 4). Based on these findings, certain elec-
tronic components are then selected and combined to yield the proposed 
ESPSCA system (Subsection 5). 
Once the electronic auction system has been outlined, my discussion 
focuses on operation of the electronic system. The first operational sub-
ject involves the description of a number of basic programmed-function sub-
routines which should be programmed for use during the bidding stage of the 
auction (Subsection 6). Once this preliminary material has been covered, I 
then present an overview of how the electronic auction would work, dividing 
the discussion into the preparatory, bidding, and closing stages of the 
auction (Subsection 7). This section closes with an enumeration of a number 
of extensions to the basic ESPSCA proposal which conceivably could be pro-
grammed or developed (Subsection 8). 
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1. Need for electronification of the simultaneous progressive cattle auc-
tion 
While the Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Cattle Slaughter Aue-
tion appears to be a promising price determination mechanism, I believe 
serious consideration should be given to the development of a system for 
conducting the auction electronically. Conceivably the chalk bidding board 
could be utilized as an interim or temporary bidding device while the simul-
taneous auction concept i s being introduced and initial volume is low. 
However, this bid recordation device is characterized by several weaknesses 
which make it poorly suited for permanent use. For example, the slow and 
awkward bidding process inherent in the chalk bidding board inhibits the 
high-volume trading which would be incurred by a centralized exchange used 
in marketing a l arge portion of the cattle fed in Iowa. In addition, the 
chalk bidding board requires that participating packer-buyers assemble at a 
cent ral location for the purpose of bidding. Not only is the assembly of 
packer-buyers physically inefficient, but it also inhibits the preservation 
of bidder anonymity. Under the chalkboard bidding method, an observant 
packer-buyer in attendance would be able to observe a fellow packer-buyer 
enter a bid and then watch as the auction clerk enters the bid and packer 
identification number on the chalkboard. In this manner, participating 
packer-buyers would rapidly learn each packer's identification code. Once 
this scheme of secret packer identification codes is broken down, the 
identity of the packer-buyer who stands to purchase a lot will be clearly 
revealed to competing bidders because his identification code will be 
overtly displaced in the Last Bidder Identification Code Box at the bottom 
of each column of the chalk bidding board. 
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In view of these weaknesses and the apparent need to conduct the simul-
taneous progressive auction electronically, I began to search for an elec-
tron marketing system (EMS) which would accomodate the auction. This search 
is described in the following three subsections. 
2. Characteristics the overall electronic marketing system should possess 
• 
The first step of my search involved the identification of character-
istics or qualities which the selected electronic marketing system should 
possess. These characteristics are enumerated below. 
a . Acc ommodation of the simultaneous progressive auction transaction 
system The primary selection criterion is that the electronic system 
accomodate contemporaneous bidding on more than one lot . From an operation-
al standpoint this means that the EMS must be able to simultaneously receive, 
reeord, and keep track of bids from numerous bidders, each bidding on dif-
ferent lots of cattle . 
b. Multiple-price determination To make the use of market-deter-
mined quality price differential schedules possible, the selected EMS must 
permit the determination of more than one price per lot. In part this means 
that the EMS must make it possible for each bidder to view the whole bid 
array for each lot being auctioned . 
c . Availability of EMS components Parties interested in establish-
ing an ESPSCA will want to select an EMS having components which are readily 
available for operational use. If there are presently no available elec·~ 
tronic components which could be brought together and programmed for the 
ESPSCA, implementation of the ESPSCA may have to be delayed for years until 
electronic engineers can design the needed components. 
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d. Cost of procuring and operating the EMp The cost of the EMS 
will likely influence the producer and packer interest in developing the 
system. Thus, while selection of the cost minimizing EMS may neither be 
required nor desirable, the system's cost of procurement, installation, and 
daily operation, should be closely evaluated. 
e. Simplicity of operation In an attempt to reduce the number of 
employees needed and the degree of technical training each employee must 
receive , the simplicity of operating the EMS should be another factor con-
sidered during the system selection process. Simplicity of operation should 
be viewed not only from the standpoint of the ESPSCA Headquarters, but also 
from the position of the individual packers who must hire or train personnel 
to operate the bidding component. 
f. Trading capacity The trading capacity of the EMS must be suf-
ficient to at least handle a major portion of the cattle marketings in Iowa. 
In addition, the EMS should allow for possible expansion to include cattle 
marketings from surrounding states. Furthermore, to permit interlot price 
compar isons, the EMS should be able to auction several hundred lots simul-
taneously. To achieve the needed trading capacity, it may be necessary for 
the EMS to utilize an electronic computer. 
g. Error minimization In addition, the selected EMS should be de-
signed to minimize the number of errors made by participating consignors and 
bidders. 
h. Adaptability to change Ideally, the selected EMS should be 
adaptive to new trading innovations or trading options which may be subse-
quently developed. Adaptability to change provides some assurance that the 
EMS will not be readily outdated or abandoned for newer electronic devices 
• 
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before the EMS has paid for itself. 
3. Identification of major auction functions 
The second step in my search for an EMS involved the ident ification of 
the five categories of simultaneous progressive auction functions which I 
believe can be performed electronically. These function categories are as 
follows: 
1. Auction Control - coordination and monitoring of all other 
electronic systems; 
2. Consignment - transmission of consignment instructions; 
3. Sale Bill Communication - transformation of electronic 
transmissions into a printed listing of consigned lot 
descriptions; 
4. Remote Data Transmission - electronic transmission of con-
signments and bidding data between geographically remote 
locations; and 
5. Bidding - receipt and recordation of bids entered to deter-
mine a lot's sale price . 
4. Search for electronic marketing system components 
The third step in this search involved an attempt to identify elec-
tronic components which can perform the functions in each of the five func-
tion categori es . 
a. Auction control function The conduct of the ESPSCA must be con-
trolled by an electronic component which I shall call the "central process-
ing unit" (CPU) . Most likely, the electronic component which will perform 
this function will be a high-speed electronic digital computer . However, 
before reaching this conclusion, it is necessary to further analyze the 
specific functions the CPU must perform and the characteristics the CPU 
should possess. 
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1) Functions to be peformed by the CPU To effectively control 
and monitor the ESPSCA, the unit acting as the CPU should be able to perform 
the following functions. 
a) Receive consignment calls The central processing 
unit will have to receive the consignment instructions as transmitted by 
the producers' consignment terminals. 
b) Compile and t ransmit the sale bill 
i! < 
Once the consign-
ments have been received, the CPU must compile the relevant consignment 
terms for each lot to form a lot description, and subsequently organize the 
lot descriptions into a sale bill. The CPU must then transmit the sale bill 
to all bidding stations. 
c) Coaunence the auction Prior to each auction session 
the CPU will have to prepare the bidding machines for the receipt of bids. 
Then, at a predetermined time, the CPU must signal to the bidders that the 
auction has commenced. This signal might be given by illumination of a 
green light on each bidding terminal's display area, or the bidding termi-
nal's control panel. 
d) Record bids The CPU must register each bid when en-
tered through the bidder's remote bidding terminal, distinguish between two 
or more different bids made by two or more separate bidders at almost the 
same instant, determine which lot and lot component the bid is for, deter-
mine the identify of the bidder, register the bid increments in the com-
puter's memory, and raise the bid appearing on the bid display as seen by 
all those bidders viewing the particular lot's bid array. 
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e) Warn that the auction session is nearing, completion 
The CPU, which acts as the auctioneer, must warn bidders that the auction 
session is nearing completion and that final bids should be entered. This 
warning might be given through use of a series of flashing amber lights 
which are illuminated on the control panel of each bidding terminal. 
f) Close the auction session When the allotted time 
period for the auction session has elapsed or the number of bids entered 
per minute drops to a predetermined rate, the CPU should stop accepting 
bids and signify to the bidders that the auction session has ended. This 
task may be performed by electronically locking-up the bidding terminals, 
or by disengaging the CPU from the bidding terminals such that new bids can 
not be registered. 
g) Determine whether each consignor desires to withdraw his 
consigned lot(s) Once an auction session's bidding has ceased, the CPU 
will need to place a withdrawal call to all consignors who have not submit-
ted reserve bids in their consignment instructions. During this conversa-
tion the CPU will need to report the bids comprising the bid array on each 
of the consignor's lots and request that the consignor designate the number 
of cattle in each lot he desires to withdraw. Furthermore, for lots con-
signed on a combination trading basis, the consignor will be expected to 
designate the elected exchange basis. For those lots on which reserve bids 
were submitted, no withdrawal call will be necessary. Instead, the CPU must 
use the reserve bids to determine whether the consignor's lot must be with-
drawn. If the bid price on the lot is lower than the lot's reserve bid, the 
CPU must withdraw the lot. Otherwise, the CPU must consummate the sale of 
the lot. The CPU must then place a confirmation call to the consignor. 
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During the confirmation call the CPU must report whether or not the lot was 
sold, and if so, the exchange price and the name of the purchasing packer. 
h) Inform each bidder of ·his purchases After the com-
pletion of each auction session the CPU should compile and transmit an in-
dividualized purchase list to each buying station. The purchase lists 
should include the following information . for each lot a bidder has purchased: 
1. The Lot Identification Number; 
2. The final bid array; 
3. The producer's name; 
4. The producer's telephone number and address; 
5 . The exchange basis on which the cattle were purchased; 
6. The total number of steers and heifers in the lot which will 
be delivered; 
7. The producer's desired Delivery Interval; and 
8. The producer's Transportation Cost Schedule if the Producer 
Haul Option has been elected. 
In addition, the confidential purchase list might include a computer tabu-
lated report which gives relevant statistical information on the particular 
packer's daily purchases . 
To preserve the confidentiality of the list, the CPU should transmit 
it directly to the remote data receiver at the particular buyer's bidding 
station. 
i) Give each bidder his bidding status whenever requested 
' c 
during an auction session To assist the individual bidder in executing 
his bidding strategy during each auction session, the CPU should be able to 
rapidly indicate the lots on which he has placed the last bid. 
j) Give market news to producers, buyers, ~nd the media 
Upon request, the CPU should compile and transmit market news reports to 
interested producers over WATS telephone lines, to packers and brokers over 
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the remote data transmission network, and to radio stations and other media 
over telephones and teletypes. The content of these market summaries may 
vary in accordance with the user's needs. Because the information compris-
ing these reports can be derived from data compiled by the CPU, the market 
reports may be constantly updated. 
2) Characteristics which the centralized processing unit should 
possess Discussed below are four characteristics which the CPU should 
possess in order to facilitate the performance of the auction control func-
tions outlined above. 
a) Monitors remote bidding stations To accommodate the 
ESPSCA and eliminate the cost of each packer maintaining a group of buyers 
at a centralized auction location, the CPU must be capable of centralized 
location while monitoring all the bidding terminals in packer and broker 
bidding stations situated at the individual packer's or broker ' s office. 
b) Capacity to be quick and responsive to user demands 
In order to acconnnodate the expected high volume of cattle trading the CPU 
must have sufficient capacity to conduct the auction at the rapid pace es-
tablished by the bidders. 
c) Voice connnunication To facilitate receipt of con-
signment calls via touch-tone telephone and to make withdrawal calls and 
confirmation calls to the producer-consignors once bidding has ceased, the 
CPU must be equipped with voice communication facilities. In addition , the 
audio communication facilities reduce the impersonality associated with a 
computerized exchange. 
d) System securitX To minimize or eliminate the incur-
rence of computerized theft, manipulation, or embezzlement, the CPU should 
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be as tamperproof as possible. This characteristic requires not only the 
reduction of human involvement in the computerized operations, but also the 
selection of an electronic system that prevents such computerized thefts 
from remote locations and portable computer terminals. 
3) Electronic components available to perform th: auction con-
trol functions There are several variables entering the computer pro-
curement decision which make discussion of the selection process difficult. 
For example, computer size selection may depend on what is readily available 
for the market agency to use because the market agency host may already 
rent or own an electronic computer . Thus, in this chapter I will not at-
tempt to describe various types of digital computers, nor various sizes and 
models which are available. Instead, I leave this to the people establish-
ing the ESPSCA market agency and the computer company sales representatives. 
Together, these parties should be able to select the size of computer best 
suited for the needs of the ESPSCA. 
Perhaps the best way to enable producers with touch-tone telephone con-
signment terminals to receive coUllllunications from the electronic marketing 
system is to equip the CPU with an audio-response unit. An audio-response 
unit converts digital commands f r om the CPU into simulated human speech . 
[5, p. 151] Thus, the CPU would be able to make audible responses to pro-
ducers through their touch-tone telephone consignment terminals. 
One of the large electronic computer manufacturers, International Bus-
iness Machines, Inc. (IBM), offers the IBM 7770 Audio Response Unit Model 3 
which can be incorporated with the firm's computer systems. This IBM audio-
response unit provides for a composed audio response to digital inquires 
from an IBM 1001 Data Transmission Terminal, a touch-tone telephone, or 
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other inquiry-type terminals. The spoken response is composed of American 
English vocabulary, prerecorded in a male or female voice on a magnetic 
drum within the 7770 unit. All audio responses are transmitted over the 
appropriate common-carrier communication facilities which lead the message 
back to the inquiry t e rminal. 
F\om a technical standpoint IBM describes the process of conducting a 
communication between the audio response unit and a producer-consignor using 
a touch-tone telephone consignment terminal as follows: 
To make the inquiry of the 7770, the calling party enters a series of 
characters from his terminal. The 7770 passes the characters one by one 
via the byte multiplexer channel to the System/370, which processes the in-
quiry and sends a response message back, character by character to the 7770. 
This response message is a series of drum word addresses that the 7770 uses 
to select proper words for this spoken reply. Using this audio-response 
unit, there is no limit on the length of the inquiry or the response, how-
ever, there is a maximum of 128 words in the standard 7770's vocabulary. 
Thus, through use of the audio-response unit, producers could readily 
communicate with the computer through the medium of the ir touch-tone tele-
phone, rather than having to use a punched card or teletype input terminal. 
b. Consignment function The ESPSCA consignment functions which 
encompass the entrance of consignment orders, as well as the receipt of 
market data and sale confirmations, should be accomodated through use of a 
remote consignment terminal (RCT). 
During the initial stage of the new simultaneous progressive slaughter 
cattle auction when trading volume is low, the most economical method of en-
tering consignment orders may be to have each individual producer utilize 
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his personal telephone to reach an inward WATS line to the auction head-
quarters. After connection with the auction headquarters, the producer 
could place the consignment order by talking to a n auction clerk. 
The clerk would then have to code the producer's consignment instruc-
tions and have it punched on computer cards, before feeding the consignment 
terms into the computer. Not only would this inte rmediate process be ex-
pensive, but there would be a longer time delay between the time the con-
signment was made until the consigment instructions were entered into the 
computer and scheduled for auction. A further disadvantage in this arrange-
ment is that the interim coding and keypunching steps would create an op- , 
portunity for errors t o creep into the producer' s consignment instructions . 
In view of these disadvantages in the indirect consignment arrangement, 
it is expected that when the volume of trading rises, the use of an elec-
tronic device which enables the consignor to transmit consignment data 
directly wit h the CPU at auction headquarters will be more economical and 
more efficient. In anticipation of the need for s e lecting a remote con-
signment terminal, it is necessary t o consider the functions t o be per-
formed by the RCT, the desirable characteris t ics which the RCT should pos-
sess, and the types of electronic hardware components presently available 
to perform the consignment functions. 
1) Functions t o be performed by the remote consignment terminal 
The RCT must facilitate four types of conversations with the CPU and/or 
its audio-response unit. These four types of conversations are: a) the 
consignment call, b) the confirmation call, c) the pricing report, and d) 
the correction-modification call. 
126 
a) Consignment calls Hhen a producer's cattle approach 
market weight he will want to contact the CPU and enter consignment instruc-
tions. Later using the RCT to become connected with the CPU, the producer 
will have to identify himself to the CPU by giving his producer number. In 
turn, the CPU will have to acknowledge the producer's membership or regis-
tration with the ESPSCA market agency. Before entering his consignment, 
the producer may desire a price summary of recent trading on the exchange 
and a volume report regarding cattle already consigned for a certain auc-
tion session. If after receiving this market information the producer de-
cides to consign one or more lots of cattle, he will have to use the RCT t o 
enter the pertinent data describing the lots to be consigned and consignment 
prerogatives (terms of consignment) he has elected. 
b) Withdrawal and confirmation calls After bidding dur~ 
ing an auction session has ceased and before the completion of the auction, 
the CPU will need to place withdrawal and confirmation calls to consignors. 
The remote consignment terminals must receive these transmissions and trans-
form them into audible language which the consignors can understand. Fur·-
thermore, if a consignor's lot has been withdrawn and he wishes to immedi-
ately reconsign his cattle, the remote consignment terminals must be able 
to accomodate the reconsignment . 
c) Market price report At any time during the trading 
day producers may want to use the remote consignment terminal to contact 
the CPU and request various market price reports. The reported information 
may include the price trend for the various trading bases during the pre-
sent auction session, the volume of bidding, the number of head consigned 
for a specified auction session, the summary of prices during the previous 
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auction session, and the U.S.D.A. livestock marketing estimates. 
d) Correction-modific~tion calls The remote consignment 
terminals should also acconnnodate correction-modification calls. These con-
versations would enable a consignor to modify the terms of his consignment 
or make corrections in the CPU's receipt of information during the consign-
ment call. 
2) Desired characteristics of the remote consignment terminals .. 
The desirable characteristics of the remote consignment terminals, which 
will allow a consignor t o particpate in the four t ypes of consignment con-
versations, are described below. 
a) Producer's cost of procuring the remote consignment 
terminal The cost of buying or leas~ng the electronic hardware which 
serves as the remote consignment terminal should be l ow enough that mos t 
producers will be able to afford their Gwn unit. 
b) Direct communication to the CPU The remote consign-
ment terminal desirably should be linked directly into the CPU's audio-
response unit. Direct communication between the producer-consignor and CPU 
eliminates the need for an intermediate message translation or keypunching, 
and the r eby reduces the possibilit y of errors in consignment instructions. 
c) Verbal confirmation of data transmission The remote 
consignment terminal should allow verbal confirmation of coded data trans-
mitted to the CPU by a consignor. The use of verbal confirmation will allow 
the producer to immediately detect whether or not the computer correctly 
received the message, or whether he has made a coding error. 
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3) Available electronic hardware components which can perform 
the consignment functions Because a number of electronic units present-
ly being manufactured have the desirable characteristics described above 
and could be programmed to perform the consignment function, a cattlefeed-
er's selection of the device to serve as his RCT will be based primarily on 
the expected consignment volume and the cost of procuring or leasing the 
consignment unit. Several of the hardware units which might serve as a 
consignment terminal are now described. 26 
a) Touch-tone telephone consignment terminal The touch-:-
tone telephone could provide moderate-sized cattlefeeders with relatively 
inexpensive access to the central processing unit. Through the use of a 
standardized code and the depression of the appropriate buttons on his 
touch-tone telephone, a cattlefeeder could make inquiries of the CPU and 
transmit pertinent consignment data on his lots. Upon receipt of these 
coded transmissions, the CPU could process the inquiry and by means of an 
audio-response unit provide the producer with a verbal response over the 
telephone lines which link the remote consignment terminals with the CPU's 
audio-response unit. [5, p . 151) 
26 
The use of touch-tone telephones, card-dialing telephones, audio-re-
sponse units, and WATS lines for communication between producers and the 
CPU, has pr eviously been included by Schrader et al. [23, pp. 24, 28, 29-34) 
and Holder (12, pp . 14, 43- 46) in their electronic exchange proposals. 
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b) Card-dialing telephone ·consignment terminal Somewhat 
larger volume cattle feeders and local farm supply companies may find a 
27 
card-dialing telephone to be an ideal remote on-line consignment terminal. 
Consignments made via card-dialing telephones would be made in a manner sim~ 
ilar to that for the touch-tone telephone except that card-dialing phone 
terminals accept consignment data such as the auction headquarter's tele-
phone number, the consignor's identification number, and the consignor's 
Transportation Cost Schedule, recorded in the fonn of punched cards. In 
response to consignment data transmissions from card-dailing telephone 
terminals, the CPU would direct that audible responses be made by the audio-
response unit. 
c) Punched-card consignment terminal Low-volume punched-
card transmission terminals are also available to serve as remote consign-
ment terminals. These input/output devices allow data punched on an 80-
column card to be transmitted over communication lines to the CPU. [5, p. 
155] These punched-card units are designed such that standard information 
(e.g. the consignor's identification number and the consignor's Transporta-
tion Cost Schedule) may be transmitted by means of punched cards and vari-
able information (e.g. the consignor's selection of a grading option and 
the consignor's decision regarding the name disclosure option) to be man-
ually keyed by the operator. [5, p. 155] 
By the use of a low-cost port-a-punch and specially designed 80-column 
cards, data cards could be punched at a remote location without the need 
27
The term "on-line" indicates that the peripheral hardware unit is di-
rectly tied into the computer [4, p. 21] such that it operates under the 
direct control of the central processing unit. [2, pp. 265, 270) 
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for a sophisticated key punch. The special cards have partially perforated 
holes such that a slight pressure with a stylus will cause the cardboard 
hole to pop out. [4, p. 53] The port-a-punch is a simple frame holder 
which facilitates the punching process. [4, p. 53) 
Punched-card consignment terminals are advantageous because the use of 
prepunched cards eliminates many of the errors likely to arise during on-
line composition of consignment transmissions made by depression of buttons 
on a touch-tone telephone. 
d) Teletypewriter consignment terminal Brokerage firms 
which offer ESPSCA consignment services to producers may wish to be equipped 
. h 1 . . 1 28 wit a te etypewriter term1na . Thes e keyboard/printer devices per-
mit on-line composition of consignment data transmissions by use of their 
manual keyboard and the receipt of printed, rather than audible responses 
from the CPU. (5, p. 155) In addition, teletypewriter terminals can be 
equipped to transmit consignment data at the rate of 75 characters per 
second by the use of a prepunched paper tape. (4, p. 508; 5, p. 156) 
Utilization of the latter data input method is advantageous because it re-
sults in transmissions at speeds considerably higher than the input speed 
of on-line keyboard message composition, resulting in lesser tie-up of 
communication lines and the CPU. (5, p. 156] The comparative input-speed 
advantage of the paper tape is enhanced by the fact that infrequent or 
first-time ESPSCA consignors who are likely to utilize the consignment 
broker may not have prefiled their address, telephone number, and Transpor-
28 
The use of teletype terminals was considered by Schrader (23, pp. 19, 
24) in his electronic exchange proposal. 
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tation Cost Schedule with the auction headquarters. Failure to prefile per-
tinent consignment data will require a longer consignment data transmission. 
c, Sale bill communication functions The sale bill communication 
functions require the selection of a device I shall call the "remote data 
receiver" (RDR). The remote data receivers must be able to receive lengthy 
transmissions of printed documents, such as the daily sale bills and sta-
tistical market reports, from the central auction headquarters. Because the 
speed of this transmission is not as essential as that with the bidding 
stations be able to respond to the messages transmitted from ESPSCA Read-
quarters, it appears that this function might be performed by either a 
teletypewriter or a line printer terminal. However, before selecting an 
electronic device to serve as the RDR, it is desirable to consider the 
functions to be performed by the RDR, the characteristics the RDR should 
possess, and the capabilities of the alternative electronic hardware de~ 
vices which could perform the sale bill communication functions. 
1) Functions to be performed by the remote data receiver The . 
primary func tion to be performed by the RDR is the receipt and printing of 
transmitted information. The types of information which would be trans-
mitted to the RDR for each auction session include the following. 
a) Auction sale bill To facilitate bidding from remote 
bidding stations, each regular bidder must receive a catalogue-type listing 
prior to each auction session which presents the lot description for each 
of the lots consigned for sale during the day's auction session. The spe-
cif ic details to be included in each lot description would be the same as 
those included in the NESPSCA sale bill. 
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b) Confidential purchase list Once the CPU has consum-
mated the auction sales it will compile and transmit a confidential pur-
chase list to each buying station . The RDR at each buying station should 
receive and print these purchase list transmissions so that each buyer will 
have a copy of the list for future reference. Specifically, a packer-buyer 
will use the information on the purchase list to establish contact with the 
producers in order to make delivery appointments, as well as to figure the 
amount to pay each producer. The exact information to be included on the 
purchase list has previously been listed under the auction contr ol function. 
c) Market news suunnary For the convenience of bidders, 
the CPU might also transmit a comprehensive market summary to the RDR at 
each bidding station after the close of every auction session . The summary 
might be comprised of a statistical report regarding the cattle traded on 
the ESPSCA during the past week. The specific information included in the 
market news summary might include: 
1. The high, low, and average price paid for each lot compo-
nent under each exchange basis; 
2. The cattle marketing weight trend; 
3. A carcass grading s ummary taken from the kill r eports of 
packers slaughtering cattle during the preceding week; 
4. The U.S.D.A. estimates of cattle deliveries around the 
country under all marketing methods. 
2) Characteristics the remote data receiver should possess 
To perform these sale bill communication functions the RDR should possess 
the following characteristics. 
a) Written copies of transmissions The RDR should be 
capabl e of receiving, translating, and printing the transmissions from the 
CPU such that the data can be studied later by packer-buyers . 
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b) Accommodate lengthy transmissions The RDR must have 
the capacity to receive lengthy transmissions of information within a short 
time period. If auction sale bills can not be dispatched until the morning 
of the particular auction session, the dispatched information must reach 
the bidding stations and be printed in time for each firm's buying repre-
sentatives to study the sale bill and determine which lots the firm is in-
terested in bidding on. 
c) Remote operation The RDR must be able to operate 
several hundred miles away from the location of the central processing unit . 
d) Computer coordinated To expedite the transmission of 
all the lot details in each lot's lot description it would be desirable for 
the RDR to be linked directly to the CPU. Accordingly, the CPU could di-
rectly transmit the lot description for each lot consigned for the particu-
lar auction session without the possibility of error during an intermediate 
human translation step. 
e) Confidentiality of transmissions Although much of 
the information dispatched over the remote data transmission network will 
be generally distributed to all regular buyers, the transmission of a par-
ticular bidder's purchase list must be sent only to the particular bidder's 
RDR. Thus, the communication network must be capable of transmitt ing con-
fidential information to only one designated bidding station, while also 
maintaining its general dispatch capabilities for other types of informa-
tion releases. 
3) Alternative devices presently available to perform the sale 
bill communication functions At least two presently available electronic 
hardware units, the teletypewriter and the computer line printer terminal, 
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appear to be capable of performing the sale bill communication functions. 
a) TeletyPewriter terminals The use of teletypewriter 
terminals would permit eac h bidding station to receive printed data directly 
from the central processing unit at a rate of ten characters per second. 
(4, p. 509; 6, p, 119] Because time is not of the essence in transmission 
of the sale bills, the teletypewriter terminal would appear as a feasible 
means of receiving the auction sale bill transmissions from the CPU. 
b) Line printer terminals 
I 
An alternative, somewhat 
faster and more expensive transmission of sale bills could arise from the 
use of a line printer terminal. A number of usable line printer terminals 
utilizing v arious printing mechanisms are presently available . The printing 
mechanisms frequently being employed in line printer terminals include: 
horizontal, vertical, and circular type bars; cylindrical printing drums, 
and rotating type chains. Due to the different printing devices employed, 
impac t printers vary in output speed from 100-2000 lines per minute. [4, 
p. 193] While printers with output capabilities a t the upper end of this 
spectrum are not necessary for performance of the sale bill communication 
function, such printers would be workable. 
The main types of line printer terminals being marketed today are 
briefly described below. 
1. Bar printers Bar printers use a series of vertically rising 
type bars resulting in a relatively slow output, varying from 
100 to 150 lines per minute. [6, p . 119] 
2. Comb printers Comb printers utilize a set of type charac-
ters mounted on a solid bar placed horizontally in front of 
the paper. To print, the bar slides from left to right, with 
hammers striking the desired characters. Comb printers attain 
output speeds of up to 150 lines per minute . [6, p. 122] 
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3. !fheel printers The wheel printers, which have n sPrie~ ("If 
circular type bars alligned horizontally, at tain a maximum out-
put of 150 lines per minute. [2, p. 278; 6, p . 120) 
4. Drum printers Drum printers, which have embossed charac-
ters placed on a cylindrical drum, attain speeds of from 700 
to 1600 lines per minute. [6, p. 120) 
5. Chain printers Chain printers utilize a horizontally ro-
tating chain containing a series of t ype s lugs . Haunners are 
activated behind the paper forcing the desired type slug on 
the rotating chain against the ribbon and paper to form the 
printed characters . Chain printers attain speeds of from 600 
to 1300 lines per minute. [2 , p. 278; 4, p. 194; 6, pp. 
120-21) 
d. Remote data transmission function Because the proposed ESPSCA 
will operate with consignors located at their remote production sites and 
packer-buyers located at remote bidding terminals, the electronic marketing 
system must accommodate the transmission of consignment and bidding data over 
great distances. Transmission of data between geographicall y remote i nput / 
output sites and the CPU, cmmnonly referred to as "teleprocessing", could 
b d d b h f bi . f . . h 1 
29 e accommo ate y t e use o a com nation o communication c anne s. 
For example, a Wide Area Telecounnunications Service (WATS) system 
which utilizes normal telephone channels but at lower per call rates than 
regular long distance service, could link the remote producer consignment 
terminals with the CPU's audio-response unit. Leased teletype channels, 
which are capable of transmitting 5 to 20 characters per second, could link 
teletypewriters at bidding terminals with the CPU. [6, p . 128] Leased 
voice-grade telephone channels, capable of transmitting data at about 300 
characters per second, could be used to collD!lunicate with remote on-line 
input/output units such as teletype consignment terminals and cathode-ray 
29 
These channels are wire cables or lines which form paths for electri-
cal transmissions between terminals . (6, p. 128] 
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tube bidding terminals. (6, p. 128] 
e. Bidding functions The bidding functions require that an elec-
tronic device called a "bidding terminal" enable bidders to electronically 
enter bids during each ESPSCA session. Ideally, the bidding terminal will 
be capable of remote operation such that bids can be entered on the ESPSCA 
via a bidding terminal located in each bidder's office. 
Before selecting an electronic component to perform the bidding func-
tion, it is first necessary to identify the functions which each bidding 
terminal should be able to perform. Secondly, it is necessary to describe 
the desirable characteristics which the bidding terminals should possess. 
Third, it is necessary t o consider the possible electronic components which 
could be designed to perform the bidding functions. And finally, I wi·ll 
describe the cathode-ray tube display station which is an electronic device 
that conceivably could serve as a bidding terminal. 
1) Functions to be performed by the bidding terminal In ad-
dition to facilitating the entry of bids during each ESPSCA session, each 
bidding terminal must be able to perform the following bidding functions. 
a) Bidding terminal tells the bidder whether he was the 
tast bidder on the lot at which he is looking Once a bidder places a 
bid on a lot he will want to know that his bid has been registered and when 
he has subsequently been outbid. Thus, the bidding terminal must be able 
to give the individual bidder this information. This function must be per-
formed in order to prevent the bidder from erroneously trying to outbid 
himself. 
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b) Bidding terminal gives each bidder his bidding status 
Due to the simultaneous nature of the auction 1 each bidder will probably be 
bidding on several lots concurrently, and probably watching the price trend 
on several more lots at the same time. Because a bidder may rapidly be out-
bid, it is desirable that the bidding terminal rapidly t ell t he individual 
bidder on which lots he continues to be the last bidder, and on which lots 
he has been outbid. Performance of this function will expedite the auction 
process because otherwise the bidder would have to manually copy the entire 
bid array for each lot on which he bids in order to later determine whether 
he has subsequently been outbid. 
c) Give starting and closing signals Each bidding term-
inal must be able to receive signal transmissions from the CPU, and then, 
through flashing or colored lights, give bidders signals which indicate that 
an auction session has begun, that an auction session is about to end , and 
that an auction session has ended. 
2) Desirable characteristics the bidding terminals should possess 
There are at least six characteristics which each bidding terminal should 
possess in order to accommodate the simultaneous bidding on numerous lots of 
cattle during an ESPSCA session. 
a) Each bidder has a bidding terminal To permit compet-
itive bidding , it is desirable that each regular bidder have his own bid-
ding terminal, fully equipped to enter bids on the ESPSCA. This means not 
only that the cost must be such that he feels he can afford his own bidding 
terminal, but also that the centralized processing unit can handle the many 
incoming bids from the numerous bidding stations. 
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b) Sensitivity and responsiveness of the bidding terminal 
( 
The bidding terminal must enable the CPU to readily distinguish between two 
bids made at almost the same point in time, on the same lot, and made by two 
different bidders at remote bidding terminals. In addition, the bidding 
terminals must assist the CPU in quickly identifying the bidder, the amount 
of the bid, the lot component on which the bid is being made, and the lot 
on which the bid is being entered. Furthermore, the bidding terminal must 
quickly respond to the bidder's request that he be able to look at another 
lot. 
c) Capability of bidding on each lot component Theb~-
ding equipment must allow each bidder to bid on all of the lot components 
for any lot being auctioned. The existence of this characteristic is es~ 
sential for the implementation of market-determined quality price diff eren-
tial schedules and combination trading bases. 
d) Allows bidder to view more than one lot bid array at the 
same time Due to the simultaneous nature of the ESPSCA there likely will 
be a number of lots in each auction session which a bidder will be interest-
ed in buying and on which the bidder will want to closely follow price 
trands. Thus, it is desirable that the bidder be able to look at several 
lot bid arrays at the same time. This capability will allow the bidder not 
only to monitor the bidding in the several lots he is interested in, but 
will also enable him to compare each lot's quality price differential 
schedule. 
e) Viewing one lot component in all lots To facilitate 
interlot price comparison it will be desirable for bidders to see and study 
the bid price for a selected type of lot component in each lot being sold 
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under the same trading basis. 
f) Acconunodating sever al buyers at one bidding station 
For large packers it may be necessary to have several buyers, each operat-
ing similar bidding machines, or different parts of the same machine, con-
currently. However, when multiple bidder set-ups are utilized, the bidding 
terminal system should be designed to prevent two different bidders, 
employed by the same company, from bidding against each other . 
3) Consideration of electronic devices which could be designed 
to perform the bidding functions In trying to select an electronic bid-
ding device to serve as a bidding terminal, several possibilities including 
the teletype and an electronic bidding board were considered but eventually 
abandoned. The problem with the teletype network utilized by Johnson [16) 
and the Canadian provinces [17) in the conduct of their regressive succes-
sive auctions was that one teletype machine could neither accommodate bid-
ding on more than one lot contemporaneously, nor permit the determination 
of more than one price per lot contemporaneously. 
Another possibility considered and subsequently abandoned was the de-
sign of an electronic bidding board. This electronic bidding board would 
have been similar in size and arrangement to the chalkboard presented i n 
the previous section. However, instead of utilizing chalk, the conceived 
electronic bidding board would have used banks of digital or light emitting 
diode cells to display the numerical bids. The existing bid on each lot 
component would then have been increased by the individual bidder's depres-
sion of the appropriate bidding buttons. 
The electronic bidding board could have been deployed in several ways. 
One deployment scheme would have located a central electronic bidding board 
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at the auction headquarters and assigned packer-buyers to closed booths in 
front of the board. Inside his assigned booth each packer-buyer would have 
a clear view of all lot bid arrays on the electronic bidding board and have 
access to a complete set of bidding buttons. However, the booth arrange-
ment would restrict the bidder's vision such that he could not observe 
which lots his competing bidders were bidding on. A small bank of lights 
inside each booth would indicate the lots on which the individual packer-
buyer was the last bidder. 
Another configuration of the electronic bidding board would utilize a 
closed-circuit television network to broadcast an image of the central bid-
ding board to the remotely located bidders. Under this configuration, the 
bidder's local packing company office would be equipped with a television 
screen to view the central bidding board over the closed-circuit television 
network and a set of bidding buttons which would enable the bidder to enter 
bids on any lot component in any lot. Whenever a button was depressed te 
enter an incremental bid, the bidder would be able to see it registered on 
the central bidding board via the television network. 
Still another conceivable configuration of the electronic bidding 
board would locate a separate electronic bidding board in each buyer's 
office and have them interconnected through the central processing unit. 
The CPU would receive all bids and instantly record a bid increment entered 
by one packer-buyer on all of the remotely located bidding boards. 
Despite all of the potentially deployable configurations of the elec-
tronic bidding board, implementation of such a system would be delayed be-
cause the board is not now in standard production. That is, before imple-
mentation would be possible, a considerable amount of engineering and pro-
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gramming would be required. In addition, the electronic bidding board sys-
tem would be limited in the number of lots which could simultaneously be 
auctioned because it probably will not be economically feasible to con-
struct a bidding board for more than 10 to 25 lots. 
4) Description of the cathode-ray tube display station bidding 
terminal Upon recognizing the infeasibility of both the teletype and 
electronic bidding board systems, I continued my search for an electronic 
bidding device. Further consideration led me to consider the possibility 
of using the graphic-display capabilities of the cathode-ray tube display 
station for performance of the bidding functions. Because gr aphic- display 
systems are designed to provide instant output from a digital computer by 
producing a visual display of recorded data now in main or secondary 
storage, and are readily available from a number of computer hardware 
manufacturers, the units appear to be ideally suited for use as bidding 
terminals. [5, p. 148] Upon further examination I realized that the ver-
satility of these graphic-display units would perm.it the programming neces-
sar y to acconnnodate t he simultaneous progressive auction. In addition, the 
cathode-ray tube can be readily incorporated into the computer-oriented 
auction system outlined above. Based on these considerations, the cathode-
ray tube was the bidding device recommended for deployment in my electronic 
simultaneous progressive slaughter cattle auction proposal. 
By itself, the cathode-ray tube looks much like a television tube. 
However, the cathode-ray tube is frequently incorporated into a console unit 
which has the input-control mechanisms used in determining what is to appear 
on the CRT screen . The three control devices which are combined with the 
CRT to comprise each graphic-display unit are: the alphameric keyboard, 
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the programmed-function keyboard, and the fiber-optic light pen. Collec-
tively, the cathode-ray tube and the complementary control devices are re-
ferred to as a "display station." When the input-control modes and the CRT 
are used together, the display station allows a user to enter data into the 
CPU, retrieve other data, and revise the recalled data. 
This discussion now proceeds with a technical description of the com-
ponents of the cathode-ray tube display station. 
a) Cathode-ray tube The cathode-ray tube (CRT), the 
primary component in the graphic display system, is essentially a vacuum 
tube in which cathode rays are produced. [14, pp. 231-32] Cathode rays 
are streams of electrons projected from the surface of a cathode, a nega-
tively charged electrode placed in the cathode-ray tube. (14, pp. 231-32] 
The visual display of information is produced on the face of the cathode-
ray tube by the action of a stream of cathode rays being emitted from an 
electron gun and passing through a character stencil. [4, p. 212 ] The 
cathode rays then hit the phosphor coating on the interior surface of the 
cathode-ray tube, causing the coating to glow briefly. [5, p. 149] To 
retain the image on the cathode-ray tube screen, it is necessary to regen-
erate the image 30-50 times per second. [5, p. 149] 
When only one CRT display station is to be installed at a bidding sta-
tion, stand-along cathode-ray tube models containing their own display con-
troller may be installed. [l, p. 83] However, multiple deployment of CRT 
display stations at one bidding terminal normally requires the installation 
of a display control unit which permits each display unit to operate inde-
pendently. [l, p. 83] 
Because the CRT display station is a frequently utilized piece of com-
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puter hardware, it is readily available for deployment in the ESPSCA. 
Accordingly, much engineering design and development of a previously non-
existent electronic component is eliminated. Computer manufacturers pres-
ently market CRT display units in a number of sizes. For example, the 
IBM 2250 Display Unit Model 3, which operates through the IBM 2840-2 Dis-
play Control, features a twelve inch square central viewing area on the 
face of a 21 inch cathode-ray tube. [14] The IBM 2840-2 Display Control 
will acconunodate the installation of up to four IBM 2250 Display Units at 
one location. Another IBM display station model, the IBM 2260 Display Sta-
tion, which operates through the IBM 2848 Display Control, features a 4 
inch by 9 inch rectangular viewing area on the cathode-ray tube screen. 
(14] The IBM 2265 Display Station combined with the IBM 2845 Display Con-
trol, features a 14 inch CRT on which a maximum of 960 alphameric charac-
ters can be displayed. Furthermore, the IBM 2265 can be obtained in two 
different display formats. One format provides 15 lines with 64 characters 
per line within a 10 . 4 by 4.8 inch frame . The other format provides 12 
lines with 80 characters within a 10.4 by 3 . 12 inch frame. The IBM 2845 
Display Control will acconunodate the installation of up to 16 IBM 2265 Dis-
play Stations at one location. The basic IBM 3275 Display Station displays 
up to 480 characters in 12 lines of up to 40 characters each . Several 
larger models of the IBM 3275 Display Station are available, one of which 
displays up to 1920 characters. Because the IBM 3275 Display Station is 
able to stand along without the use of a control unit, it is ideally suited 
for use in bidding terminals requiring only one display station. 
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b) Alphameric keyboard Perhaps the least sophisticated 
of the three devices conunonly available for control of the display station 
is the "alphameric keyboard." This input-control device is simply a type-
writer keyboard consisting of the 26 letters of the alphabet, the ten 
numerals, and a few frequently used symbols. The operator of the display 
station uses the alphameric keyboard by typing in the desired command mes-
sage or data, just as any typist types on a typewriter keyboard. As the 
message is composed, it is displayed on the cathode-ray tube screen for 
verification or editing. Subsequently, the message is transformed into 
electr onic impulses and transmitted to the central processing unit and main 
storage unit. 
When deployed as an integral component of each remotely located bid-
ding display station, the alphameric keyboard will be used almost exclu-
sively for the entry of nonrepetitive commands, such as the designation of 
Lot Identification Numbers. By use of the various alphameric and numerical 
character keys, the operating packer-buyer can keystroke the call numbers 
of each lot he wants to view on the cathode-ray tube screen. Almost all of 
the other cathode-ray tube control operating commands which would be used 
by an ESPSCA bidding station are repetitive and thus readily lend themselves 
to s tandardized programming. Because expediency in conduction of the auc-
tion is essential, the display stations will be programmed such that each 
programmable connnand may be entered by merely depressing the appropriate 
key on the programmed-function keyborad. 
c) Progranuned-function keyboard The programmed-function 
keyboard, which may physically be described as s 32~key general-purpose 
keyboard, is the second input~ontrol device frequently deployed with 
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cathode-ray tube units for use in controlling the display appearing on the 
cathode-ray tube's screen. During the installation of a programmed-func-
tion keyboard at a CRT display station, a computer p~ogrammer can prepare 
a series of specially-designed subroutine programs. Upon activation, each 
of these subroutines performs a desired operation on the display appearing 
on the CRT screen. Each key on the programmed-function keyboard is then 
assigned one of these progranuned-function subroutines and hooked up such 
that depression of the key will activate the assigned subroutine. 
When the CRT display station operator depresses a key on the programmed-
function keyboard, a composed electronic impulse is transmitted from 
the keyboard over the exchange's teleprocessing network to the CPU. Upon 
receipt of the electronic impulse, the CPU deciphers the impulse message 
and identifies the desired programmed subroutine. Instantly, the CPU calls 
the specified subroutine and acting pursuant to the subroutine, transmits 
data for display or otherwise revises the displayed image appearing on the 
activator's CRT display screen by sending return transmissions over the 
teleprocessing network. Upon reaching the activating CRT display station, 
the transmissions cause the requested data or display modification to appear 
on the CRT display screen. 
By use of the programmed-function keyboard at a CRT bidding terminal, 
the operating packer-buyer will be able to request that lot bid arrays be 
displayed on his CRT display screen, specify the bid increment represented 
by each bid and order various market news reports from the central process-
ing unit. When the programmed function keyboard is properly implemented 
such that each button can direct the CPU to perform a specified operation 
via programmed subroutine, the use of the programmed....function keyboard, as 
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opposed to the alphameric keyboard, will expedite the bidding operations 
and lessen the time of each auction session. 
d) Fiber-optic light pen The third input-control mode 
available as an accessory for many cathode-ray tube units is referred to as 
the fiber-optic light pen. The fiber-optic light pen is a pen-like device 
which enables the display station operator to identify to the computer pro-
gram a particular line, point, or character in the displayed image. By 
moving the pen point to the part of the image he wants to identify and 
pressing the point against the CRT faceplate, the pen's switch is activated, 
Once activated, the pen will sense light at the point coming from the illu-
minated line or character at which the pen is pointed, thereby generating 
a signal for a programmed operation to be performed on the identified image. 
The light pen can be used alone or in conjunction with one or both of the 
keyboards in rearranging, deleting, or adding information to that shown on 
the screen. [ 5, p. 149] 
When deployed as an integral component of each ESPSCA bidding terminal, 
the primary role of the fiber-optic light pen will be to identify to the 
central processing unit the lot characteristic in a particular lot's bid 
array on which the operating packer-buyer desires an incremental bid be 
entered. The exact increment represented by each such bid will be specified 
to the CPU by the operating packer-buyer's depression of the desired incre-
ment key on the programmed-function keyboard. 
5 . Proposed ESPSCA system design 
Based on the foregoing assessment of the required component functions, 
the desired component characteristics, and the available electronic compo-
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nents, I have selec t ed certain elec tronic hardware components which I believe 
can be combined to achieve an operative electronic system for the conduction 
of the ESPSCA. Presented below is a function-by-function description of 
the proposed electronic system used to conduct the Electronic Simultaneous 
Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction. In this description, an attempt has 
been made to illustrate how components of various capacities could be 
matched with the expected trading volume of producers, brokers, and packers. 
While reading this subsection, the reader should make frequent reference to 
Figure 4,5, which displays a flowchart of the proposed ESPSCA system. 
a. Auction control function The auction control function would be 
performed by a high-speed digital computer (i.e. the central pr ocessing 
unit (CPU) and main storage unit (memory)), centrally located at the 
ESPSCA's headquarters. To accommodate audible transmissions t o r emote con-
signment terminals, the CPU would be equipped with an audio-response unit. 
When needed to supplement the main storage unit, auxiliary on-line storage 
units , s uch as magnetic drums, disks, or tapes, would be utilized. 
b. Consignment function At the geographically remote production 
areas , mode rate-sized cattlefeeders may install their own personal touch-
tone t e lephone consignment terminals. Large- sized feedlot operators may 
instead decide to install card-dialing telephone consignment terminals. 
Rural banks and farm supply stores may obtain small, punched-card consign-
ment terminals and make it accessible for a small per lot fee or as a com-
plementa rv customer service. Consignment card files for the punched-card 
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Figure 4.5. Flowchart of the proposed design of the Electronic Simulta-
neous Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction . 
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30 terminals could be prepared off-line by the use of specially perforated 
computer cards and a port-a-punch. Because all of the foregoing consign-
ment terminals are capable of receiving only audible transmissions from the 
CPU, they would be connected with the audio-response unit at ESPSCA head-
quarters. 
Broker age firms which offer consignment services to producers unwilling 
to purchase their own consignment terminal, could buy or rent a teletype-
writer consignment terminal, To facilitate rapid transmission of consign-
ment data, these teletypewriter consignment terminals could be equipped to 
transmit from off-line prepared paper tapes. 
c . Sale bill communication function Some participating packing 
companies, such as the moderate-volume packer in Figure 4.5, may choose to 
buy or rent a teletypewriter terminal to receive the daily sale bill trans~ 
missions from the CPU. Other packing companies, such as the large-volume 
packer in Figure 4.5, may instead equip their buying station with a line 
printer terminal to receive the sale bill transmissions. 
d. Remote data transmission function Under the proposed ESPSCA 
system design, all of the consignment terminals capable of receiving only 
audible transmissions from the CPU (i.e. the touch-tone telephone, the card-
dialing telephone, and the small, punched~card consignment terminals) would 
be connected with the audio-response unit at ESPSCA headquarters via WATS 
lines. Because the consignment brokers' teletype consignment terminals are 
30
The term "off-line" refers to the usage of peripheral hardware com-
ponents, not operating under the direct control of the central processing 
unit, to prepare or process data for subsequent transmissions. [4, p. 22] 
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able to receive printed transmissions from the CPU, they would avert the 
audio-response unit and be connected directly with the CPU via leased voice-
grade telephone channels. Teletypewriters installed at bidding terminals 
would receive transmissions from the CPU over leased teletype channels. 
All other hardware at each bidding terminal (i.e. the line printer and the 
cathode-ray tube display stations) would be connected with the CPU via 
leased standard voice-grade telephone channels. 
e . Bidding function Located at each bidding station, in addition 
to one of the sale bill communication terminals, would be one or more 
cathode-ray tube display stations. Comprising each cathode-ray tube dis-
play station would be a cathode-ray tube, an alphameric keyboard, a pro-
grammed-function keyboard, and a fiber-optic light pen. In addition, 
multiple deployment of cathode-ray tube display stations usually requires 
the installation of a display control unit at the particular bidding termi-
nals. 
Moderate~volume packing companies would likely install only one 
cathode-ray tube display station, while larger volume packers are more 
likely to install multiple cathode-ray tube display stations . Brokerage 
firms which buy cattle for small-volume packing companies not equipped for 
participation on the ESPSCA may also install multiple cathode-ray tube dis-
play stations. 
6. Developing programmed-function subroutines for use during the auction's 
'( ' ' bidding stage 
Before presenting an overview of the conduct of an Electronic Simul-
taneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction session, it is necessary to 
describe some of the programmed-function subroutines which will likely be 
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utilized by each participating packer-buyer during ever y auction session. 
All of these subroutines will be oper a tional through each display station's 
programmed-func tion keyboard, and thus must be programmed prior to the 
commencement of bidding on the ESPSCA . The f our basic types of program.med-
function subr outines which must be pr ogrammed are: DISPLAY, DISPLAY TERMI-
NATION, ERROR CORRECTION, and BID INCREMENT. 
a . DISPLAY-type subroutines When pr ogrammed and operational, DIS-
PLAY-type subroutines facilitate bidding by enabling packer~buyers to view 
specified lot bid arrays on the r eques ting packer-buyer's cathode-ray tube 
display screen. Frequently, a packer-buyer' s i nter est wi l l be in viewing 
the lot bid array for only one or two l ot s . However, a t other times a 
packer-buyer will want to view as many lot bid arrays at the same time on 
the CRT display screen as the screen will accommodate . The number of lot 
bid arrays which a bidding station ' s CRT display screen can accommoda t e is 
dependent upon the size of the sel ected CRT display s t a tion and the com-
position of the lots for which lot bid arrays are desired . For the purpose 
of my proposal I will assume that a CRT with display screen accomodating 
a maximum of 960 characters (arranged in the forma t of 15 lines of up t o 64 
characters each) is the larges t uni t that is economically feasible for the 
ESPSCA. Accord ingly, any columnar lot bid array must not r equire more than 
15 lines. Due to the f l exibility inherent in the CRT, the computerized bid-
ding system can be programmed to fill the needs of the individual packer-
buyer by offering subrout ines which permit the viewing of between one and 
eight lot bid arrays s imultaneously . Among the DISPLAY-type subrouti nes 
which could be programmed are: DISPLAY-I, DISPLAY~SPLIT-2, DISPLAY-SPLIT-4, 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL, DISPLAY-ONE COMPONENT, and DISPLAY-SPLIT- 2- 0NE 
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COMPONENT. 
Although each of the six DISPLAY-type subroutines will yield a differ-
ent display configuration on a packer-buyer's CRT display screen, all DIS-
PLAY-type subroutines would be programmed for activation through a similar 
five-step procedure. The steps comprising this procedure are as follows: 
Step 1. 
Step 2. 
Step 3 . 
Step 4. 
Step 5. 
DISPLAY subroutine designation The display station oper-
ator (DSO) (usually the packer-buyer operating the bidding 
terminal) depresses the key on his display station's pro-
grammed-function keyboard which corresponds to the desired 
DISPLAY- type subroutine. 
Lot bid array specification The display station operator 
'would use his display station's alphameric keyboard to type 
the Lot Identification Number(s) pertaining to the lot(s) 
whose bid array(s) the particular packer-buyer wishes to view 
on this CRT display screen. 
Command completion After typing the last alphabetic char-
acter in the last Lot Identification Number the display sta-
tion operator wishes to include in a command message, the 
DSO should then indicate to the computer that the command is 
complete by depressing the period key on his alphameric key-
board. The "." appearing at the end of the command message 
indicates to the computer that the command message termi-
nates with the period. 
Editing Once the final character of the command message 
is typed, the display station operator would view each char-
acter of the command to verify its correctness as it appears 
on the display station's CRT display screen. If errors in 
the command message are observed, error correction proce-
dures should be initiated. 
Transmission Once certain that the DISPLAY-type subroutine 
command message is without error, the display station opera-
tor will then depress the TRANSMIT key on his display sta-
t ion's alphameric keyboard. 
Once the TRANSMIT key is depressed the DISPLAY command, as shown on 
the CRT screen, is transformed into an electronic impulse and transmitted 
to the central processing unit over the exchange's teleprocessing network. 
Upon receipt of the transmission from a particular CRT bidding station, the 
CPU deciphers the electronic message to determine which DISPLAY subroutine 
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the r equesting display station operator wants activated and which lot bid 
array he wants to view on his CRT screen. Pursuant to the DSO's command 
the central processing unit activates the designated DISPLAY subroutine. 
Upon activation, the DISPLAY subroutine calls the consignment file for the 
specified lot(s) from the computer's memory and transmits the lot identifi-
cation heading (i.e. Lot Identification Number, producer's name if the Name 
Disclosure Option has been elected, and the number of head of each sex in 
the lot), the lot component price descriptions (i.e. "Steer Price", "Heifer 
Base", and "Choice YG 1-3 < 660") and the present bid for each lot compo-
nent price. 
Having presented the DISPLAY subroutine activation procedure, my dis-
cussion now proceeds with a description of each of the proposed DISPLAY~ 
type subroutines, 
1) DISPLAY-1 subroutine The least sophisticated DISPLAY-type 
subroutine is DISPLAY-1, which results in the display of one lot bid array 
on the utilizing DSO's CRT display screen. Because only one lot bid array 
is displayed under this subroutine, the CRT scree n can accommodate a bid 
array of a steer , heifer, or mixed lot consigned under any of the seven 
trading bases (i.e. L, M, C, LM, MC, LC, and LMC). 
To view one lot bid array via the DISPLAY-1 subroutine, the DSO should 
depress the DISPLAY 1 key on his display station's programmed-function key~ 
board. (Step 1 in the DISPLAY subroutine command procedure . ) If the DSO 
wants to view the bid array for Lot No. lOOS~LMC~M , he would then keystroke 
the following characters on his alphameric keyboard: "1005-LMC-M." After 
typing the last character of the command message, the DSO would then view 
the message as it appears on his CRT display screen, for verification and 
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error correction. See Figure 4 . 6. 
After editing and transmission, the bid array for Lot No, 1005-LMC-M 
would appear on the r equesting DSO' s display screen a s shown in Figure 4.7. 
a) Lot identification heading 
< ' ' 
For each lot bid array 
displayed under the DISPLAY-1 subroutine, regardless of the trading basis 
under which it has been consigned, the top line of the bid array will be 
the "lot identification heading . " The "lot identification heading" may be 
comprised of three components: 1) the particular lot's Lot Identification 
Number; 2) if the consignor selects the Name Disclosure Option, the con-
signor's first initial and last name; and 3) the number of head of each sex 
in the particular lot. In Figure 4 . 7, the lot identification heading may 
be read from left to right to indicate that: 1) the lot's Lot Identifica-
tion Number is 1005-LMC-M, 2) the consignor's name is F. Cattlefeeder, and 
3) that the mixed lot is comprised of 150 steers and 50 heifers. For one-
sex lots, only one head number is given. If in doubt, the packer-buyer can 
readily determine the sex of the animals by looking at the last letter in 
the Lot Identification Number (i,e. "S" indicates an all-steer lot, while 
"H" indicates an all-heifer lot). 
b) Lot component descriptions and prices Beneath the 
lot identification heading in every lot bid array viewed under the DISPLAY-
1 subroutine are the lot component descriptions and the current bid price 
on each lot component. 
Whenever a lot is consigned on the liveweight basis, whether solely on 
this basis (See Figure 4.8) or in conjunction with other trading bases (See 
Figure 4.7), the bid array display for the lot under the DISPLAY-1 subrou-
tine will include the heading "LIVEWEIGHT." 
Figure 4.6. 
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DISPLAY-1: 1005-LHC-M. 
The DISPLAY-1 subroutine command mes sage for Lot No , 
1005-LMC-M as it would appear on the display station 
operator's cathode-ray tube display screen prior to 
transmission . 
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LOT NO. 1005-LMC-M F. CATTLEFEEDER 150/50 
LIVEWEIGHT: STEER PRICE 0 
HEIFER PRICE 0 
IN THE MEAT: STEER BASE 0 
HEIFER BASE 0 
STEERS: CHOICE 1-3, ~660 0 HEIFERS: CHOICE 1-3, ~500 0 
CHOICE 1-3, > 660 0 CHOICE 1-3, >500 0 
CHOICE 4-5, !;660 0 CHOICE 4-5, ~500 0 
CHOICE 4-5, > 660 0 CHOICE 4-5, > 500 0 
GOOD 1-3, ~660 0 GOOD 1-3, 6 500 . Q 
GOOD 1-3, >660 0 GOOD 1-3, > 500 0 
GOOD 4-5, ~660 0 GOOD 4-5, ~500 0 
GOOD 4- 5, >660 0 GOOD 4-5, >500 0 
YOU WERE THE LAST BIDDER: 
Figure 4.7. The appearance of a lot bid array for a lot consigned under 
the LMC trading basis as it would be viewed on the cathode-
ray tube display screen under the DISPLAY~l subroutine. 
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LOT NO. 1001-L-S T. CATTLEFEEDER 50 
LIVEWEIGHT: STEER PRICE 0 
YOU WERE THE LAST BIDDER: 
Figure 4.8. Befor e any bid has been entered the lot bid array for the all-
s t eer Lot. No, 1001-L-S, which was consigned for sale only 
under tne liveweight trading basis, would appear on the cath-
ode-ray subroutine as shown above. 
158 
Depending on the sex of the consigned lot, the bid array display will also 
include the "STEER PRICE" lot component description (See Figure 4.8), the 
"HEIFER PRICE" lot component description, or both lot component descrip-
tions (See Figure 4. 7). Immediately following each lot component descrip-
tion as it appears on the cathode-ray tube display screen will be the cur-
rent bid for the particular lot component prices. If no bid has yet been 
entered for the particular lot component, a zero (i.e. "O'') will instead 
appear after the lot component description. 
Whenever a lot is consigned on the "in the meat" basis, whether solely 
on this basis or in conjunction with other trading bases, the bid array 
display for the lot under the DISPLAY-1 subroutine will include the heading 
"IN THE MEAT." Depending on the sex of the consigned lot, the bid array 
display will also include the "STEER BASE" lot component description, the 
"HEIFER BASE11 lot component description , or both lot component descriptions. 
See Figure 4.7. 
Whenever a lot is consigned on the carcass grade and weight basis, 
whether solely on this basis or in conj unction with other trading bases, 
the bid array display for the lot under the DISPLAY-I subroutine will in-
elude the heading "CGW." If the consigned lot is comprised only of steers, 
the bid array will include the heading "STEERS" and the following lot com-
ponent descriptions: 
CHOICE 1-3 ~ 660 
CHOICE 1-3 > 660 
CHOICE 4-5 ~ 660 
CHOICE 4-5 > 660 
GOOD 1,3 !i 660 
GOOD 1-3 > 660 
GOOD 4~5 ~ 660 
GOOD 4-5 > 660 
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If instead the consigned lot is comprised solely of heifers, the bid array 
will include the heading "HEIFERS" and the following lot component descrip-
tions: 
CHOICE 1-3 :s 500 
CHOICE 1-3 > 500 
CHOICE 4-5 $ 500 
CHOICE 4-5 > 500 
GOOD 1-3 ~ 5'00 
GOOD 1-3 > 500 
GOOD 4-5 ~ 500 
GOOD 4-5 > 500 
If the consigned lot is a mixed sex lot, as is the case with Lot No. 1005-
LMC-M shown in Figure 4.7, the bid array will include the lot component de-
scriptions for both steers and heifers. 
c) Last bidder indicator Appearing at the bottom of 
every lot bid array viewed under the DISPLAY-1 subroutine are the words: 
"YOU ARE THE LAST BIDDER:." The purpose of this feature is to indicate to 
the individual packer-buyer whether or not he presently is the last bidder 
on the lot and thus whether he would stand to purchase the lot if the auc-
tion were to terminate before another bid is entered on the particular lot. 
If a packer-buyer who is presently viewing the particular lot's bid array 
was the last bidder on the lot, an illuminated "X" will appear on his 
ca thode-ray tube display screen adjacent to the colon at the end of the 
"YOU WERE THE LAST BIDDER:" caption. 
2) DISPLAY-SPLIT-2 subroutine Another DISPLAY-type subroutine 
which could be used as an alternative to the DISPLAY-1 subroutine is DISPLAY-
SPLIT-2. Upon activation, the DISPLAY-SPLIT-2 subroutine splits the acti-
vating DSO's CRT display screen vertically such that it will accommodate the 
contemporaneous viewing of two lot bid arrays, arising from lots consigned 
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under any trading basis. The display station operator would find this sub-
routine a desirable selection whenever he wants to view and/or compare the 
prices on two different lots at the same time. 
The DISPLAY-SPLIT~2 subroutine is activated by the display station 
operator's depression of the DISPLAY-SPLIT-2 key on his display station's 
programmed-function keyboard. Immediately thereafter, the display station 
operator would use his alphameric keyboard to type the Lot Identification 
Number of the two lots he desired to view. If the two designated lots were 
Lot Nos. 1003-MC-S and lOOS~LMC-M, the resultant command message which 
would appear on the DSO's display screen for editing would be as follows: 
"DISPLAY-SPLIT-2: 1003-MC-S, 1005-LMC-M." Immediately after transmission 
the activating DSO's cathods-ray tube display screen is split vertically in 
half. Subsequently, the bid array for the first lot designated in the 
command message, in this case Lot No. 1003-MC-S, appears in the left one-
half of the screen and the bid array for the second lot designated in his 
command message, in this case Lot No. 1005-LMC-M, appears on the right one-
half of the screen. See Figure 4.9. 
In Figure 4.9, the reader will note that the arrangement of lot iden-
tification headings, lot component descriptions and prices, and the last 
bidder indicator are analogus to that under the DISPLAY-I subroutine except 
f or the fact that e ach bid array is alloted only one~half of the display 
screen. As is the case in Figure 4.9, the bid arrays displayed simultane-
ously v i a t he DISPLAY-SPLIT-2 subroutine need not represent lots consigned 
on the same trading basis. It should also be noted that whenever a bid 
array for a mixed lot consigned on a trading basis which includes the car-
cass grade and weight basis is viewed under the DISPLAY-SPLIT-2 subroutine, 
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LOT NO . 1003-MC-S W. SMITH 100 LOT NO. 1004-LMC-M J . JONES 15/25 
IN THE LIVE- STEER PRICE 
0 
MEAT: STEER BASE 0 WEIGHT: HEIFER PRICE 0 
CGW: STEERS 
IN THE 
STEER BASE 0 
CHOICE 1- 3 , ~660 0 MEAT: HEIFER BASE 0 
CHOICE 1-J, .>660 0 
CHOICE 4-5, =.660 0 CH 1-J ~660 0 CH 1- 3 ~500 0 
CHOICE 4-5, > 660 0 CH 1-3 >660 0 CH 1- 3 >500 0 
GOOD 1-3, ~660 0 CH 4-5 ~660 0 CH 4- 5 f500 0 
GOOD 1-3,>660 0 CH 4-5 >660 0 CH 4-5 >500 0 
GOOD 4-5 , ~660 0 G 1-3 6660 0 G 1- 3 ~500 0 
GOOD 4-5, >660 0 G 1-J >660 0 G 1-J >500 0 
G 4-5 ~660 0 G 4-5 ~500 0 
YOU WERE THE LAST BIDDER: 
G 4-5 >660 0 G 4-5 >500 0 
YOU WERE THE LAST BIDDER: 
Figur e 4.9 , A display of two lot bid arrays as they would appear on t he 
cathode-ray tube display screen under the DISPLAY~SPLIT-2 
subroutine . 
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it is necessary to shorten the carcass grade and weigh component price de-
scriptions by abbreviating the words "CHOICE" as "CH" and ''GOOD" as "G". 
3) DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 subroutine A third DISPLAY-type subroutine, 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-4, could be programmed to split the activating display sta-
tion operator's cathode-ray tube display screen into four columns, thereby 
enabling a packer-buyer to observe and/or compare the bid arrays for four 
lots on his CRT display screen . 
The DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 subroutine can be activated by the operating 
packer-buyer's depression of the DISPLAY SPLIT-4 key on his cathode- ray 
tube display station's programmed-function keyboard. Once this key is de-
pressed the subroutine should be programmed to enable the operating packer-
buyer to use his alphameric keyboard to type the Lot Identification Numbers 
of the four lot bid arrays he wishes to view. For example , the packer-
buyer might type: "1001-LM-S, 1002-LM-H, 1003-C-S, 1005-LMC-S . " The 
operating packer-buyer would then view the following command message on his 
CRT screen: "DISPLAY SPLIT- 4: 1001-LM-S, 1002-LM-H, 1003-C-S, 1005-LMC-S . " 
After verification and transmission, a tabular display, like that shown in 
Figure 4.10, would appear on the display screen. Under the DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 
subroutine, one set of lot component descriptions would appear along the 
left side of the screen. Spaced across the top of the screen would be the 
four Lot Identification Numbers. 31 Lined-up in columns under each Lot 
Identification Number would appear the prices comprising the particular lot ' s 
bid array. In each lot column the current bids for the applicable lot 
31 
The other data normally included in the lot identification heading 
must be omitted under the DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 subroutine due to space limitations. 
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1001-LM-S 1002-LM-H 1003-C-S 1005-LMC-S 
LW: STEER PRICE 0 x x 0 
HEIFER PRICE x 0 x x 
MEAT : STEER BASE 0 x x 0 
HEIFER BASE x 0 x x 
CGW : CH 1-3, ~660 x x 0 0 
CH 1-3, > 660 x x 0 0 
CH 4-5, ~660 x x 0 0 
CH 4-5 , >660 x x 0 0 
GD 1-3, f660 x x 0 0 
GD 1-3, >660 x x 0 0 
GD 4-5, ~660 x x 
GD 4- 5 , )660 x x 
YOU WERE LAST BIDDER: 
Figure 4 .10. The display of four l ot bid arr ays viewed unde r the DISPLAY-
SPLIT-4 s ubroutine when at least one of the lots is consigned 
on the carcass grade and weight trading basis. 
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component prices under the trading basis (bases) each lot is consigned 
under, are lined-up with the appropriate lot component descriptions on the 
cathode- ray tube display screen 's left side. In each lot bid array column, 
an illuminated "X" fills the -space of any lot component price description 
not appli cable fo r the particular lot . 
The sex composition and trading basis of the four lots specified in the 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 command message will be determinative of the lot component 
descriptions which will appear along the left side of the screen. For ex-
ample, if all four lots are steer lots consigned on either the liveweight , 
"in the meat," or liveweight-" in the meat" basis, neither the heifer com-
ponent descriptions nor the carcass grade and weight component descriptions 
will be displayed. See Figure 4.11. If, however, one of the four lots 
specified is also offered on the carcass grade and weight basis , the CGW lot 
component descriptions will also appear . See Figure 4.10. 
Due to the 15 line by 64 character CRT display screen const r aint, 
there are two limitations on the types of lot bid arrays which may be viewed 
under the DISPLAY- SPLIT-4 subroutine . First, the bid array of any mixed lot 
consigned on the carcass grade and weight trading basis can not be viewed 
under this subroutine because the screen does not have enough space to 
d t h 1 f h "f 32 accommo a e t e ot component prices or both steers and ei ers. Secondly, 
if two or more lots, consigned on the carcass grade and weight basis are 
included in the same DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 subroutine command message, the two or 
32 
A larger cathode-ray tube display screen could possibly permit the 
display of bids for mixed lots consigned on a carcass grade and weight basis. 
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1101-L-S 1102-LM- S 1103-LM-S 1104-L-S 
LW: STEER PRICE 45'.00 45 . 25 44.50 46.00 
MEAT: STEER BASE x 45 . 00 44.25 x 
YOU WERE LAST BIDDER: x 
Figure 4 . 11. The display of four lot bid arrays viewed under the DISPLAY-
SPLIT-4 subroutine when none of the lots contain heifers and 
none of the lots are consigned on the carcass grade and weight 
basis . 
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more lots must be comprised of the same sex. Violations of either of these 
constraints will result in an error message appearing on the packer's CRT 
display screen after he depresses the TRANSMIT key. 
4) DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL subroutine A fourth subroutine 
which could be programmed to provide a display similar to that of the 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 subroutine is the DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL subroutine. The 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL subroutine permits the operating packer-buyer to 
simultaneously view and/or compare up t o eight bid arrays consigned on either 
the liveweight, "in the meat", or liveweight-"in the meat" basis . 33 After 
the operating packer-buyer depresses the DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL key on 
his programmed-function keyboard, the subroutine should be programmed to 
enable the operating packer-buyer to use his alphameric keyboard to designate 
the lot bid arrays he wishes to view. For example, a packer-buyer 's specif-
ication might be as follows : "TOP: 1001-L-S, 1006-LM-S, 1009-L-S; BOTTOM: 
1002-L-H, 1008-L-H, 1011-L-H, 1015-LM-H." Subsequently, the operating 
packer-buyer would observe the following command message on his CRT display 
screen for editing : "DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL: TOP : 1001-L-S, 1006-LM-S, 
1007-LM-S, 100901-S; BOTTOM: 1002-L-H, 1008-L-H, 1011-L-H, 1015-LM-H." 
After transmission, the operator's CRT display screen would immediately be 
split in half, horizontally, with those lots specified for the "TOP" in the 
command message appearing in tabular format across the top one- half of the 
screen, and those specified for the "BOTTOM'' appearing similarly across the 
33
Due to the CRT display screen size constraint, no lot bid arrays for 
lots consigned on the carcass grade and weight basis can he viewed under this 
subroutine. If the dis~lay station operator violates this constraint, an 
error message will appear on the DSO's cathode-ray tube display screen after 
he depresses the TRANS}:ITT key. 
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bottom one-half of the screen. See Figure 4.12. 
5) DISPLAX-ONE COMPONENT subroutine A somewhat different 
DISPLAY-type subroutine which should be programmed would enable the ope r ating 
packer-buyer to view and/or compare bids for a similar lot component from 
each of fourteen lots. The DISPLAY-ONE COMPONENT subroutine would be a 
desirab le selection if, for example, a packer-buyer wanted to compare and 
analyze the trend in bidding on the steer pri ce for lots consigned under the 
liveweight basis. Accordingly, this packer- buyer could activate this subrou-
tine by depressing the DISPLAY-ONE COMPONENT key on his display station's 
programmed-function keyboard. The subroutine should be programmed to then 
permit the operating packer-buyer to use his alphameric keyboard to type the 
following command which designates the trading basis, lot component price, 
and Lot Identification Number pertaining to the prices he wants to view . The 
resultant command might be as follows: "LIVEWEIGHT-STEER PRICE: 1101-L-S, 
1102-L-S, 1103-LM-S, 1104-LM-M, 1105-L-S, 1106-LM-M, 1107-LMC-S, 1108-L-S, 
1109-L-N, 1110-L-M, 1111-LM-S) 1112-LM-S, 1113-LMC-S, 1114-L-S . II 
Aft e r editing and transmission, the activating packer-buyer ' s CRT display 
screen would appear as shown in Figure 4.13. At the top of all displays under 
the subroutine would appear the name of the trading basis and the lot compo-
nent pr ice the operating packer-buyer reques ted. In Figure 4.13, "LIVEWEIGHT-
STEER PRICE" indicates that the displayed bids represent the steer price 
component of lot bid arrays for lots whose consignment trading basis includes 
the liveweight basis . Listed beneath this heading in the order they appeared 
in the command message, are the Lot Identification Numbers and the corre-
sponding current bid prices on the specified lot component . 
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1101-L-S 1102-LM-M 
LW: STEER PRICE 45.25 45.00 x 
HEIFER PRICE x 42.25 x 
MEAT: STEER BASE x 76.50 76.75 x 
HEIFER BASE x 73.25 x x 
YOU WERE LAST BIDDER: x 
1105-L-H 1106-LM-S 1107-L-S 1108-L-H 
LW: STEER PRICE x x 45.50 x 
HEIFER PRICE 43.00 x x 44.25 
MEAT: STEER BASE x 75.75 
HEIFER BASE 73 . 75 x 
YOU WERE LAST BIDDER: 
Figure 4. 12 . Illustration of eight lot bid arrays displayed under the 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL subroutine. 
Figure 4.13. 
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LIVEWEIGHT BASIS STEER PRICE 
1101-L-S 45.25 
1102-LM-S 45.00 
1103-LM-S 46.00 
1104-LM-M 0 
1105-L-S 45.50 
1106-LM-M 45.25 
1107-LM-S 44.75 
1108-L-S 44.00 
1109-L-M 45 .25 
1110-1-M 46.25 
1111-LM-S 0 
1112-LM-S 45.35 
1113-LC-S 43.50 
1114-L-S 45.75 
Illustration of a display of fourteen liveweight basis steer 
prices under the DISPLAY-ONE CO,MPONElIT s ubroutine . 
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6) DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-0NE COMPONENT subroutine An extension of the 
concept underlying the DISPLAY-ONE COMPONENT suhroutine results in the DIS-
PLAY-SPLIT-2-0NE COMPONENT subroutine . Upon activation, the DISPLAY-SPLIT-
2-0NE COMPONENT subroutine could be programmed to result in the operating 
packer-buyer's CRT display screen being split in half vertically, in order 
to accommodate two columns of fourteen lot component bids. In addition, this 
subroutine could be programmed to enable the operating packer-buyer t o spec-
ify that prices for one lot component be displayed in the left one-half of 
the CRT display screen and prices for another lot component in the right 
one-half. · 
To activate this subroutine the operating packer-buyer would depress the 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-0NE PRICE key on his display station's programmed-function 
keyboard. Then, the subroutine should be programmed to enable the operating 
packer-buyer to use his alphameric keyboard to type a command message which 
designates the desired trading basis, lot component price, and Lot Identifi-
cation Numbers . For example, the activating packer-buyer might type the 
command: "LEFI': LIVEWEIGHT-STEER PRICE: 1121-LM-S, 1122-LM-S. 1123-LM-M, 
1124-IJ.IC-S, 1125-LM-S, 1126-LM-S, 1127-LM-M, 1128-LM-S, 1129-LM-S, 1130-LMC-S, 
S, 1131-LM-M. 1132-LM-M, 1133-LM-S, 1134-LMC-S; RIGHT: MEAT BASIS-STEER 
BASE: SAME LOT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS AS FOR LEFT ONE-HALF ." The result-
ant CRT display might appear as shown in Figure 4 .14 . 
b. DISPLAY TERMINATION subroutines Whenever a packer-buyer has com-
pleted his bidding or analysis of a display resulting from a DISPLAY-type or 
auxiliary subroutine, some method of clearing the display from his CRT screen 
is needed. As a result of this need, I propose that two DISPLAY TERMINATION-
type subroutines be programmed. The ~reposed subroutines are: 
Figur e 4.14 . 
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LIVEWEIGHT - STEER PRICE IN TIIE MEAT - STEER BASE 
1121-LM-S 42.75 1121-LM-S 42.00 
1122-LM-S 42.50 1122-LM-S 41. 50 
1123-LM-M 0 1123-LM-M 40.50 
1124-LMC-S 41. 75 1124-LMC-S 41.00 
1125-LH-S 41.00 1125-LM-S 39.75 
1126-LM-S 43.25 1126-LM-S 42.50 
1127-LM-M 40.50 1127-LM-M 40 . 00 
1128-LM-S 42.50 1128-LM-S 41. 75 
1129-LM-S 43 .10 1129-LM-S 42.60 
1130-LHC-S 41.25 1130-1..MC-S 41.05 
1131-LM-M 40.85 1131-LM-M 
1132-LM-M 41. JO 1132-LM-H 
1133-LM-S 42.90 1133-LM-S 
1134-LMC-S 41. 00 lt34-LMC-S 
Illustration of a possible display of the current bid on one 
particular lot component for fourteen lots and the current bid 
on another lot component for another fourteen lots under the 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-0NE Price suhroutine. 
172 
1) the ERASER subroutine, and 2) the CLEAR subroutine. 
1) ERASER subrout i ne The role of the ERASER subroutine would 
be to clear the activating packer-buyer's CRT display screen without termi-
nating the underlying DISPLAY-type subrouti ne. Accordingly, the underlying 
DISPLAY-type subroutine r emains operative and prepared to receive the 
packer -buyer's designation of another set of Lot Identification Numbers for 
bid arrays to he viewed under the same DTSPLAY-typP subrout lncs . 
A packer-buyer who had com9leted his examination of one set of bid ar-
rays under a certain DISPLAY-type s ubroutine and who wishes to readily view 
another set of bid arrays under the same DISPLAY-type subroutine would ac-
t ivate the ERASER subroutine by depressing the ERASER key on his programmed-
function keyboard. Once activated, the ERASER subroutine would erase the 
previous image f rom the activating packer-buyer's CRT display screen . Sub-
sequently , the ERASER subroutine would leave the underlying DISPLAY-type 
subroutine prepar ed to receive the packer-buyer's connnand message assembled 
on his alphameric keyboard, specifying another set of lot bid arrays which 
the packer- buyer now desires to view . Because the ERASER subroutine rather 
than the CLEAR s ubroutine was selected, the packer-buyer need not redepr ess 
the particular DISPLAY-type s ubroutine key before keystroking the new com-
mand message . 
2) CLEAR sub routine The function of the CLEAR subroutine is to 
clear the activating packer-buyer's CRT display screen and terminate the pre-
viously operational DISPLAY-type subroutine. 
Whenever a packer-buyer has completed his viewing of a set of lot bid 
arrays displayed under one DISPLAY-type subroutine and subsequently desires 
to analyze another set o~ lot bid arrays under a different DISPLAY-type 
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subroutine, the packer-buyer should activate the CLEAR subroutine . This 
activation is accomplished by depressing the CLEAR key on his display sta-
tion's programmed-function keyboard. The activating packer-buyer could 
then proceed in ordering the new display by depressing the programmed- func-
tion keyboard key pertaining to the desired DISPLAY-type subroutine and en-
tering the desired Lot Identification Numbers via his alphameric keyboard . 
c . ERROR CORREGrION-tYPe subroutines In view o~ the potential for 
typographical errors in command messages and errors arising from the designa-
tion of lot bid arrays which can not be viewed under a certain DISPLAY- type 
subroutine, the need was recognized for an expedient method of command- mes-
sage error correction . To facilitate rapid correction without retyping a 
lengthy cormnand message it was recognized that the fiber-optic light pen 
could be used to identify the particular error to the CPU. Accordingly , . the 
need has arisen for the development of two programmed-function subroutines: 
1) the ERROR ERASER subroutine, and 2) the ERROR CORRECTION subroutine. 
Upon activation, the ERROR ERASER subroutine would erase any individual 
or series of characters which appear on the activating packer-buyer ' s CRT 
display screen and which have been identified to the CPU. The characters 
to be erased could be identified to the CPU by having the packer- buyer point 
the tip of bis display station's fiber-optic light pen at the erroneous 
characters . The packer- buyer who has discovered and erased an error would 
then activate the second subroutine in the error correction command sequence, 
the ERROR CORREGrION subroutine. Upon activation of the ERROR CORRECTION 
subroutine, the packer~huyer could use his display station's alphameric key-
board to type the corrective characters, The corrective characters would 
fill the space vacated by the erroneous characters, from left to right, in 
174 
the order typed. If the number of corrective letters exceed the number of 
deleted characters, the subroutine should be programmed to automatically 
widen the space by moving characters on the right side of the vacancy 
further to the right on the screen, or to the next line, if necessary. 
The exact procedure for utilizing the two ERROR-type subroutines would 
be dependent upon the stage in the command procedure during which the partic-
ular error is observed. Two possible stages of error discovery are: 1) the 
editing stage - the error would be fotmd by the Display Station Operator 
while editing the command message, and 2) the post-transmission stage - the 
error would be discovered by the central processing unit. The procedures for 
utilizing the two ERROR CORRECTION-type subroutines during these two stages 
are now discussed. 
1) Editing stage error discovery: Errors dis covered while editing 
the command message Typographical errors in command messages may 
frequently be encountered. For example , a Display Station Operator may 
accidentally type the erroneous Lot Identification Numbers "1202-LMC-S" 
when he intended to type "1022-LMC-S." If the DSO discovers such an error 
while editing the command message displayed on his CRT display screen, he 
should first depress the ERROR ERASE key on his programmed-function keyboard. 
The activating DSO can then use his fiber-optic light pen to identify for 
the CPU the erroneous characters in the command message as it appears on his 
CRT display screen. In the case of the exemplary "1202" and "1022" error, 
the DSO would point the fiber-optic light pen at the first "2" and the "O" 
that follows in the erroneous 111202i• Lot Identification Number. As each 
erroneous character is identified, it ~s cleared from the computer's system 
and thus vanishes from the display system. After all erroneous characters 
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have been erased, the operating packer-buyer should depress the ERROR COR-
RECTION key on his programmed-function keyboard. The operator may then use 
h h k b d h · 1 "O" and "2" . t e alp americ ey oar to type out t e corrective numera s: 
As t yped , the corrective numerals appear in the space vacated by the errone-
ous command components . The result is the desired Lot Identification Number, 
"1022-LMC- S". When the error corrections have been entered, the DSO may then 
then continue as if no error had been made. Accordingly, he would depress 
the TRANSMIT key and view the requested lot bid array. 
2) Post-transmission error discovery : Errors discovered by the 
Central Processing Unit If an error, such as the specificati on of a Lot 
Identification Number pertaining to a lot bid array which is too large to be 
viewed under a particular DISPLAY-type subroutine escapes discovery dur ing 
the editing stage, the CPU, upon deciphering the transmitted command, will 
discover the error and flash the appropriate error message on the erring 
operator's CRT display screen. For example, if a Display Station Operator 
transmitted Lot No. 1005-LMC-M in a connnand message fo r the DISPLAY-SPLIT- 4 
subroutine, the computer could be programmed to note that the operator had 
designated a mixed lot offered on the LMC basis, which can not be viewed 
under the DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 subroutine . Accordingly, the computer could flash 
an e rror message on the erring DSO's CRT display screen. This e rror message 
might read as follows: "TRANSMITTED DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 COMMAND MESSAGE INCLUDED 
LOT LDENTIF:I:CATION NO . 1005-LMC-M. MIXED LMC BASIS LOTS CAN NOT BE VIEWED 
UNDER THE DISPLAY-SPLIT-4 SUBROUTINE . 1' The CPU could then be programmed to 
redi~play the erroneous connnand message on the erring packer-buyer's CRT 
display screen. Thereafter, the DSO could ~allow the same procadure used for 
errors discovered during the editing stage. Acco~dingly, the DSO would use 
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the ERROR ERASE and ERROR CORRECTION subroutines, in conjunction with the 
fiber-o~tic light pen and the alphameric keyboard, to enter another Lot 
Identification Numbe r which is not in violation of the DISPLAY-type subrou-
tine cons traints . 
d. BIDDING-type subroutines Once a packer-buyer has utilized the 
DISPLAY-type and ERROR CORRECTION-type subroutines to obtain the desired 
display of lot bid arrays on his CRT display screen, the packer-buyer's 
attention then turns to the entrance of a bid or bi ds on the bid arrays 
displayed on his screen. By use of his display station's programmed-f\lllction 
keyboard, in conjunction with its fiber-opti c light pen, the packer-buyer 
will be able to enter the desired incremental bids on any lot component for 
any lot bid array displayed on his CRT. Because of the rapid communication 
abilities of the computerized auction network, bids entered are instantly 
received by the CPU, recorded in the particular lot's consignment file, and 
displayed on the CRT display screen of the bidder. At the same instant the 
new bid is displayed on the CRT display screen of any other packer-buyer who 
is watching the lot bid array for the same lot on his CRT. 
1) Description of the BIDDING-type subroutines To facilitate 
bidding on the ESPSCA, the following BID INCREMENT subroutines should be 
programmed such that each may be initiated by the depression of a separate 
key on the display station's programmed- f\lllction keyboard. The BID INCREMENT 
subroutines, each representing a different bid increment which may be elec-
tronically entered, are as follows: 
5¢ BID INCREMENT 
10¢ BID INCREMENT 
25¢ BID INCREMENT 
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50¢ BID INCREMENT 
75¢ BID INCREMENT 
$1 . 00 BID INCREMENT 
$2.50 BID INCREMENT 
$5 . 00 BID INCREMENT 
$35.00 BID INCREHENT 
$40 . 00 BID INCREMENT 
$45.00 BID INCREMENT 
$50 . 00 BID INCREMENT 
$55.00 BID INCREMENT 
$60.00 BID INCREMENT 
$65.00 BID INCREMENT 
$70 . 00 BID INCREMENT 
$75 . 00 BID INCREMENT 
Each of these subroutines represent an incremental bid in dollar s per 
hundredweight. If a subroutine is activated to enter a bid on a liveweight 
basis lot component, the increment is interpreted in dollar s per hundr ed-
weight of live animal. Otherwise, the bid increment is interpreted in 
dollars per hundredweight of carcass , In any event, the minimum bid incre-
ment allowed is $0 . 05 per hundredweight . 
Another BIDDING-type subroutine which should be progr anuned is the BID 
INCREMENT CLEAR subroutine. This subroutine could be progrannned to termin-
ate the particular BID INCREMENT s ubroutine which a packer-buyer had been 
utilizing, without interrupting the DISPLAY-type subroutine presently being 
utilized by the display s tation. 
2) Utilization of the BIDDING-type subroutines in the bidding 
proc,ess To help the reader unders tand the role of these bidding sub-
routines , I now discuss their role in the bidding process. 
Each BID INCREMENT suoroutine should oe programmed such that for a 
178 
particular CRT display station it is activated upon the operating packer-
buyer's depression of the desired BID INCREMENT s11brout1.ne> ke>;t on his pr0-
grarraned-function keyboard. Upon acttvation of a BID INCRE~IBNT subroutine . 
the system is prepared to enter an incremental bid of the amount represented 
by the particular activated subroutine. The bid could be entered on any lot 
component of any lot which is presently being viewed on the bidder's CRT 
display screen. The bidder indicates the desired lot and lot component to 
the CPU by pointing the tip of his CRT display station's fiber-optic light 
h 1 d . . h 34 pen at t e ast- 1g1t c aracter in the present bid for the particular lot 
and lot component, and subsequently pressing the fiber-optic light pen point 
against the CRT's faceplate . Upon identification , the CPU, acting pursuant 
to the particular BID INCREMENT subroutine, records the incremental bid for 
the particular lot component in the lot's consignment file. In addition, 
the CPU identifies the CRT display station at which the bid was entered and 
records the bidder's identification number in the LAST BIDDER memory space 
of the lot's consignment file. Furthermore, the packer's identification 
number is recorded adjacent to his incremental bid in the appropriate con-
signment file's lot component space along with a bid sequence number . This 
enables the computer to identify the source of each bid and the sequence in 
which it was en tere d s uch that if a packer-buyer subsequently withdraws a bid, 
the computer can identify his bid and the lot component bid which preceded it. 
Throughout this b.idding process a DISPLAY-type subroutine will read the 
present bid prices for the previously specified lot from its consignment file 
34 
In some cases the last bid will be "O" indicating that no previous 
hid has been enter ed. In this case, the bidder should point his fiber- optic 
light pen at the "O". 
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and tranamit them to the bidder's CRT display station for display. Therefor e , 
once the new inc remental bid has been recorded in the bidding- record segment 
of the lot's consignment file , the new incremental bid will be t r ansmitted 
to the bidders CRT display screen for display . Similarly, the incremental 
bid is displayed on the CRT display screen of other packer-buyer s viewing the 
same lot bid array. In addition, because the lot file now r eports that the 
bidder is the l ast bidder on the lot, this information will be t r ansmitted 
t o the bidder ' s CRT display scr een and indicated by means of an illuminate d 
"X" character appearing at the bottom of the parti cular lot ' s bid arr ay. 
On ce this bid recordation process had been completed the bidde r may 
choose t o enter another bid of the same increment on a lot component in an-
other lot bid array. In this case, the packer-buyer needs only to use his 
fiber-opt i c light pen to identify the lot and lot component on which the 
bidder want s the bid incr ement entered . 
If instead the bidder wishes to enter a bid of another increment on 
anothe r lot, the packer-buyer should cancel the previously used BID INCRE-
MENT subr ou tine by depressing the BID INCREMENT CLEAR key on his pro-
grannned-function keyboard . Subsequently , the packer- buyer may depres s the 
BID INCREMENT key pertaining to the incremental bid now desired . 
7. Conduction of an ESPSCA auction session 
So far in this section the reader has been introduced to the elect ronic 
equipment selected for use in my proposal and the basic programmed- fun ction 
subroutines which should be developed for utili zation during the bidding 
stage of the auction. Having cover ed this introductory material, the reader 
is now prepared for an overview of how one session of the Electronic SiJnul-
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t aneous Pr ogr essive Slaughter Cattle Auction might be conducted , As has 
been t he case in pr evi ous sections , this presentation is divided into the 
preparatory, bidding, and closing s tages of the auction session. 
While r eading this overview, it should be remembered that the underly-
ing mode of price determina tion on t he ESPSCA is the same as that used by 
the simultaneous progressive slaughter cat t le chalkboard auction (NESPSCA). 
The ESPSCA differs only i n that all processes a re conducted electronically, 
r a ther than manually. 
a . Pr eparator y s tage of an ESPSCA session Any Iowa cattlefeeder 
i nterested in consigning a lot of cattle for sale on the ESPSCA can use his 
35 personal t ouch-tone telephone in his home or office to contact the c en-
tralized ESPSCA headquarters . When the connection has been completed , the 
cattlefeeder will be gr eeted by the CPU's audio-response unit. Using a pre-
established code a rrangement , the cattlefeeder can then enter his individual-
ized producer identification number and request up-to-the minute market in-
formation for cattle traded on a specified trading basis. Upon receipt of 
these t r ansmissions, the CPU v erifies that the r eques t i ng producer is a bona 
fide member of the exchange and obliges by verbally reporting the average, 
high , and low sale prices for cattle under the specified trading bases dur-
ing the curr ent and previous auction sessions . 
If, after hear ing the price trend report, the inquiring cattlefeeder 
decides to consign one or more lots, he would follow the standardized code 
35
Producers who decide not to purchase their own personal touch-tone 
telephone could have access t o the ESPSCA via a t e l ephone at a local bank, 
e l eva t or, or farm supply store , fo r which the producer pays a small, per-
u::;e fee . Or. the pr oducer could access the ESPSCA via independent broke1- . 
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directions in his consignor's manual in order to assembl e and transmit the 
appropriate coded consignment instructions, The transmitted consignment 
message will instruct the CPU with regard to the following consignment terms: 
1. Number of lots to be consigned; 
2. Desired trading basis for each lot; 
3 . Number of head of each sex in each lot; 
4, Location of the cattle at the time of sale; 
5. Auction session for which consignment is being made; 
6. Desired Delivery Interval; 
7 . Desired gr ading option; 
8. Whether the pr oducer elects the Name Disclosure Option; 
9. Producer's designated Transportation Cost Schedule for each lot; and 
10 . Consignor's designated Reserve Bid for each single lot component lot. 
Upon receipt of this consignment transmission, the CPU deciphers the mes-
sage verbally repeats the consignment details for consignor ver ification, 
assigns each lot a Lot Identification Number, and records the data in the 
lot's consignment file. When required by the consignor ' s grading option 
selection, a grader will be dispatched and the grader ' s report will be in-
cluded in the particular lot ' s consignment file. 
As the next auction session approaches, the ESPSCA computer would pre-
pare to compile an auction sale bill by compiling a list of lots consigned 
for sale during this auction session . Subsequently, the computer will cat-
egorize these lots by trading basis, sex composition, and designated Deliv-
ery Interval. The computer would then pull the data needed from each lot's 
consignment file to compile each lot description. 
The computer would then transmit the sale bill to each remotely lo-
cated packer-buyer station via the ESPSCA 's teleprocessing network . This 
sale bill transmission is subsequently received and printed by each bidding 
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station's teletype or line printer. 
Upon receipt of the printed sale bill, each bidding station's staff has 
an opportunity to study the lot descriptions of consigned lots and identify 
the lots their firm is most interested in procuring. 
b. Bidding stage of an ESPSCA session As the pre-arranged auction 
starting time approaches, each participating packer's ESPSCA buyer seats 
himself in front of his firm's CRT bidding console and bidding station con-
trol panel. At precisely the specified starting time a green starting 
light on each bidding station's control panel is illuminated, indicating to 
each packer-buyer that the current auction session has commenced. 
Upon receiving the starting signal each packer-buyer who is operating 
a CRT display station will follow a five-step procedure in using this pro-
grammed-function and alphameric keyboards to enter command messages for DIS-
PLAY-type subroutines . These commands will express each operating packer-
buyer' s desire to view one or more lot bid arrays on his CRT display screen . 
When the requested bid array(s) is (are) flashed on the requesting packer-
buyer' s display screen, he may view and analyze the then-existing bids . If 
the packer-buyer subsequently desires to enter a bid on a particular lot dis-
played on his screen, he would select the desired bid increment and depress 
the corresponding BID INCREMENT key on his programmed-function keyboard . 
The packer--buyer will then prepare to enter the bid by pointing his display 
s tation' s fiber-optic light pen at the last illuminated character in the 
previous bid for the desired lot and lot component . The bid will actually 
be entered when the packer-buyer presses the point of his fiber-optic light 
pen against the faceplate of his display screen at this point. 
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Immediately after receipt and registry of the individual bid increment 
the display will reflect the new incremental bid and an "X" at the bottom of 
the appropriate bid array indicating that the particular packer-buyer is now 
the last bidder on the lot . In addition, the new incremental bid is regis-
tered on the CRT display screen of any other packer-buyer who also is view-
ing the particular lot's bid array . 
This bidding procedure, analogous to the manual procedure fol lowed by 
the participants in the chalkboard simultaneous progressive cattle auction, 
is repeated by all packer-buyers until they reach their bid authorization 
ceilings. 
c. Closing stage of an ESPSCA session As the participating packer-
buyers approach their bid authorization ceilings, the number of bids entered 
per minute will decrease. When bid entrance drops to a predetermined rate 
per minute, the CPU transmits a command to each bidding station which 
causes an amber warning light on the station's control panel to be illumi-
nated. Upon illumination, this amber light would alert packer-buyers that 
the end of the session is approaching. 
The actual termination of bidding could arise in several ways. It is 
conceivable that after the warning light is flashed, bidding activity will 
continually diminish, with eventually no more bids being entered. Accord-
ingly, after a passage of 60 seconds without the entrance of a single bid, 
the CPU could automatically disengage itself from receipt of further trans-
missions f rom any CRT bidding stations ~nd lock each bidding station's in-
put modes. Subsequently, the CPU could cause a red light to be illuminated 
on the control panel of each bidding station, indicating that bidding has 
ceased. 
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flurry of last minute bidding by buyers, each trying to edge out another 
bidder, the amount of bidding permit ted between the warning and termination 
stages may have to be limited to a specific time period. 
Under either termination procedure, the cessation of bidding will be 
followed by the computerized comparison of reserve bids with the last bid 
price for each lot component and the placement of withdrawal calls. The CPU 
will then transmit a purchase list comprised of Lot Identification Numbers 
representing the lots purchased by a particular packer to his buying station 
via the ESPSCA 's teleprocessing network and the bidding station's line 
printer . When each packer-buyer has been informed of his purchases, the 
CPU will then activate its audio-response unit and direct the making of 
confirmation calls to each consignor who had not already r eceived confir-
mation via withdrawal call. During each confirmation call conversation, the 
audio--response unit will verbally inform the consignor whether his consigned 
lot(s) was (were) sold, the selling price, the trading basis under which 
the lot was sold, the identity and location of the purchasing packer, and 
the purchasing packer 's telephone number . Upon receipt of his purchase 
list, each packer will be expected to telephone the consignor and make 
final delivery arrangements pursuant to his specified Delivery Interval. 
8 . Extensions to the basic ESPSCA proposal 
Because the r eader has now been exposed to the basic aspects of my 
ESPSCA proposal, I believe he is now in a position to appreciate an enumer-
ation of possible system extensions. These extensions could be incorporat-
ed into the CRT display station 's system in an attempt to more fully uti-
lize the capabilities of this electronic marketing system. 
185 
The ESPSCA system extensions fall into two basic categories; 1) addi-
tional programmed-function subr outines, and 2) multiple CRT deployment. 
a. Additional programmed-function subroutines The types of addi-
tional progranuned-function subroutines, in the order of which they are now 
discussed, include the following: 1) BID STATUS, 2) SESSION MAR.KET TREND 
REPORT, 3) UNDERPRICED, 4) DISPLAY-SCAN, and 5) BID WITHDRAWAL. 
l) BID STATUS-tyoe s ubroutines Upon activation, the BID STA-
TUS-type subroutine could be programmed to inform the individual packer-
buyers of his present bidding status . That is, this subroutine would cause 
a list of the Lot Identification Numbers pertaining to the lots on which the 
individual bidder has placed the last bid, to be displayed on the partic-
ular bidder's CRT display screen. By using the BID STATUS-type subroutines 
a bidder would be able to rapidly determine how many lots he is likely to 
purchase and how many lots he must continue to bid on if he wants to pro-
cure the number of cattle needed by his packing firm. Because it is the 
last bidder on each lot who buys the lot of cattle, regardless of the last 
lot component on which the bid was entered, knowledge of this information 
will be important to each bidder. This will be especially true as the auction 
session approaches completion. 
As previously presented, all DISPLAY-type subroutines would be pro-
grammed to project a symbolic indicator below a lot bid array whenever the 
bidder looking at that bid array on his CRT display screen was the last 
bidder on the lot. However, when a bidder is monitoring and bidding on sev-
eral lots this indicator will not be a feasible means of giving him his 
overall bidding status . The deficiency arises from the fact that this pro-
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posed last bidder symbolic indicator reports the packer-buyer's ~iddin~ 
status with respect to only one lot rather than all of the lots the bidder 
might have bid on during the auction session. Thus, as the auction session 
nears completion, the individual bidder will not have time to call up each 
of the lots he is trying to buy and see whether or not the symbolic last 
bidder indicator still appears. Therefore, the programmed-function BID 
STATUS report appears to be a desirable medium through which a bidder can 
be kept up-to-date on his overall bidding status. 
The BID STATUS-type subroutine might be made available in several 
different versions. For example, the BID STATUS subroutine might be pro-
grammed to yield a CRT display which lists up to fourteen lots on which the 
activating packer-buyer has placed the last bid. See Figure 4.15 . Another 
version, the BID STATUS- SPLIT-2 subroutine, could be programmed such that 
upon activation the particular packer-buyer's CRT display screen would be 
split in half, allowing two columns of up to fourteen lot identification 
numbers each to appear on the screen . Each lot identification number appear-
ing on the screen would represent a lot on which the particular bidder has 
placed the last bid. Still another type of bid status report might be made 
available to bidders through the development of a BID STATUS-NO LONGER THE 
LAST BIDDER (BID STATUS-·NLTLB) programmed-function subroutine. When the 
BID STATUS-NLTLB key is depressed on a packer-buyer's programmed- function 
keyboard, the CRT display screen is immediately divided into two halves . In 
the left half appears the listing of up to fourteen lot numbers representing 
those lots on which the particular bidder has entered the last registered 
bid. In the right one-half of the CRT display screen would appear a listing 
of the lot identification numbers of up to fourteen lots on which the bid-
Figure 4.15. 
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YOU WERE THE LAST BIDDER ON THE FOLLOWING LOTS: 
1004-C-M 
1009-LMC-S 
1017-LM-H 
1018-L-M 
1022-LM-M 
1104-LMC-S 
1112-L-S 
1154-MC-S 
1179-LMC-B 
1231-L-S 
1256-LMC-S 
A display presented under the BID STATUS subroutine . 
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der has entered a bid during the auction session, but on which the bidder 
has since been outbid. See Figure 4.16. 
Regardless of the form of BID STATUS-type subroutine the individual 
bidder selects to use, the information must remain confidential with only 
the individual bidder having access to the information included in his bid 
status report. Thus, upon receipt of a bidding status inquiry the CPU will 
have to identify the buying station requesting the information and transmit 
that station's status only to that particular station . 
2) SESSION MARKET TREND REPORT subroutine To provide each 
packer-buyer with up to-the-second information on the overall pricing trend 
during the current auction session, the ESPSCA could offer a SESSION MARKET 
TREND REPORT programmed-function subroutine. Upon activation, this subrou-
tine could direct the CPU to instantly compute a statis tical market summary 
and flash these figures on the activating packer-buyer's CRT display screen . 
Pricing information included in this market report might include the high, 
low, and average bid price for each lot component under all trading bases 
at that very instant . See Figure 4.17. 
3) UNDERPRICED subroutine Due to the selective viewing of lot 
bid arrays inherent in the use of the CRT bidding devices, bidders may 
inadvertently overlook some underpriced lots during each auction session. 
Some packer-buyers may attempt to identify these underpriced lots by scan-
ning through the lot bid array for all lots being auctioned during the ses-
sion. However , this repetitive process would consume a large amount of the 
buyer ' s time and provides no certainty that when the search is completed the 
identified lots remain underpriced. 
Figure 4.16 . 
YOU WERE THE LAST BIDDER 
ON LOT NO.: 
1006-L-S 
1009- LM-H 
1026-LMC-M 
1045- L-S 
1079-MC-S 
1121-L-H 
1177-LMC-S 
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YOU A.RE NO LONGER THE LAST 
BIDDER ON LOT NO . : 
1002-L-H 
1008-LMC-S 
1034-C-S 
1054-L-S 
1112-LM-M 
1124-L-S 
1156-LMC-H 
1179-L-S 
1202-LMC-S 
1209-L-li 
1222-L-H 
1309-LMC-S 
1334-L-S 
A display presented under the BID STATUS-NO LONGER THE LAST 
BIDDER subroutine . 
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SESSION MARKET TREND REPORT 
LOT COMPONENT: HIGH LOW AVE. 
LW-STEER PRICE 48.50 42.25 45.50 
LW-HEIFER PRICE 46.00 40.00 43 . 25 
M-STEER BASE 46.50 43.00 45.25 
M-REIFER BASE 45.00 41. 25 43.50 
CGW- STEERS HIGH LOW AVE. CGW-HEIFERS HIGH LOW AVE . 
CH 1-3, ~660 46.75 43.00 44. 75 CH 1-3, ~500 45 .75 40 . 00 43 . 50 
CH 1-3, > 660 46 . 50 40 . 00 44.75 CH 1-3, >500 46.00 40.25 43 .00 
CH 4-5, ~ 660 47 . 00 40 . 00 44 . 50 CH 4- 5 , ~500 44.75 38 . 75 42.25 
CH 4- 5, >660 45 . 00 41.00 44 . 40 CH 4-5, > 500 45 . 00 38.00 42.75 
GD 1-3, ~660 46 . 00 42 . 00 43. 75 GD 1-3, ~500 44.00 37.25 42 .00 
GD 1-3, > 660 46.50 41. 25 43.50 GD 1-3 , >500 44 . 25 39 . 00 42 . 25 
GD 4- 5 , ~660 45.00 40.00 43.00 GD /i-5, ~500 43.50 36.00 41.00 
GD 4-5, >660 45 . 25 40 . 50 43. 25 GD 4-5, >500 43.75 37.50 40 . 75 
Figure 4.17. A display presented under the SESSION MARKET TREND REPORT 
s ubroutine . 
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By the development of an UNDERPRICED subroutine , ESPSCA programmers 
could enable all packer-buyers to rapidly identify those lots being auc-
tioned during the present session which are greatly underpriced. Conceiv-
ably , by the combined use of the UNDERPRICED subroutine and the alphameric 
keyboard a packer-buyer would be able to specify a lot component and trad-
ing basis for which the buyer would like to learn the identity of up to 
fourteen lots which ar e comparatively underpriced. Upon receipt of such an 
inquiry, the CPU could instantly compute this information and display the 
listing of Lot Identification Numbers representing the underpriced lots on 
the activating packer-buyer's CRT display screen. See Figure 4.18 . 
4) DISPLAY-SCAN-tyPe subroutine One method of enabling a packer-
buyer to rapidly view the bid arrays for a number of lots would be through 
the development of several DISPLAY-SCAN-type programmed-function subroutines . 
The DISPLAY-SCAN-1, DISPLAY-SCAN- 2, and DISPLAY-SCAN-4 subroutines could be 
programmed to display a predesignated repertoire of bid arrays in sets of 
one, two, or four lot bid arrays at a time, respectively , on the activating 
packer- buyer's CRT display screen. Each one , two, or four bid array set 
could be displayed for a 45-second period. At the end of each 45-second 
period, each display would be automatically erased and replaced by a display 
of the next set of lot bid arrays in the repertoire. This process could be 
continued until all lot bid arrays in the station's predesignated repertoire 
have been shown . At that point the subroutine could be programmed to auto~ 
matically r edisplay all the repertory lot bid arrays in the same order. 
When desired, the DISPLAY-SCAN subroutine should be programmed to allow 
the bidder to momentarily halt the scanning process by depression of a 
Figure 4.18 . 
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ntE FOLLOWING LIVEWEIGHT BASIS LOTS ARE UNDERPRICED : 
1001-L-S 
1002-L-H 
1022-L-M 
1029-L-S 
10.55-L-S 
1066- L-H 
1109-L-M 
11.54-L-H 
11.57-L-S 
1187- L-S 
1223- L-M 
1244- L-H 
1293-L-H 
134 7-L-S 
A display presented under the UNDERPRICED subroutine , 
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DISPLAY-SCAN-HOLD key on his programmed~function keyboard. Upon activation 
this subroutine would temporarily discontinue the progressive display of bid 
arrays, enabling the packer-buyer to study a particular display for more 
than 45 seconds and/or to enter bids on certain lot components. Once this 
detailed analysis has been completed, the packer-buyer could depress the DIS-
PLAY-SCAN HOLD RELEASE, thereby allowing the scanning subroutine to continue. 
5) BID WITHDRAWAL subroutine In order to comply with section 
554.2328(3) of the Iowa Code, 36 a bid-retraction subroutine should be 
programmed which would enable a bidder to retract his bid on any lot at any 
time before an auction session is completed. Bid retraction could readily 
be accomodated through the development of a BID WITHDRAWAL subroutine
37 
for use in conjunction with the programmed-function keyboard and the fiber-
optic light pen. 
To prepare for activation of the BID WITHDRAWAL subroutine, the bidder 
should depress the CLEAR key on his programmed-function keyboard . The bid-
der should depress the DISPLAY-1 key and use his alphameric keyboard to spec-
ify the lot from which bid withdrawal is desired. When this lot's bid array 
is displayed on his CRT screen, the bidder should check to determine whether 
36
sec tion 554.2328(3), Iowa Code (1977), states that in any auction 
for the sale of goods, such as slaughter cattle, "[a] bidder may retract his 
bid until the auctioneer's announcement of completion of the sale .... " 
37 
Expected actual use of the BID WITHDRAWAL procedure would be rare 
as the fast pace of the electronic auction would find an erring bidder who 
would otherwise desire to withdraw his bid, outbid before the withdrawal 
procedure can be initiated. In those few cases where a bidding error is 
made and the erring bidder is not outbid, the availability of the BID WITH-
DRAWAL subroutine would be a desirable feature. 
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the last bidder indicator , "X", still appears at the bottom of the lot bid 
array. If the "X" still appears, the bidder should depress the BID WITH-
DRAWAL key on his programmed-function keyboard and then point his fiber-
optic light pen at the "X" indicator on his display screen. Upon this 
activation, the BID WITHDRAWAL subroutine should be programmed to perceive 
the identity of the withdrawing bidder and the lot on which withdrawal is 
desired. Then, the computer will have to search the bidding record segment 
of the lot's consignment file to determine what the increment of the bidder's 
last bid on the lot was and on which lot component the bid was entered. 
Once this is determined, the computer will subtract the increment from the 
lot component's current bid price and display this adjusted price on the 
withdrawing bidder's display screen. Also, the subroutine should be pro-
grammed to remove the withdrawing bidder's identification number from the 
last bidder file and re-identify the next to the last bidder on the lot. Ad-
ditionally, the "X" indicating that the withdrawing bidder was the last bid-
der should be removed from his display screen. 
Once the withdrawing bidder denotes the removal of the "X" symbol 
from the bottom of the lot's bid array and the reduction in the particular 
lot component's bid price, the bidder may regard his bid as withdrawn. 
Accordingly, he may depress the CLEAR key on the programmed-function key-
board. Thereafter, the bidder may proceed with his bidding, treating the 
withdrawn bid as though it had never been entered. 
b. Multiple cathode-ray tube deployment 
/ 
So far in my description of 
of the ESPSCA I have assumed that each packer's bidding station was equipped 
with only one CRT display station and employed only one packer-buyer to 
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operate it. However~ I think that in many buying offices, especially where 
the buying volume is great 1 it will be desirable to combine several indepen-
dently operated display stations to form a bidding station with the capac-
ity to accommodate a large-volume packer or broker. For example, if three 
CRT display units are procured, they can be clustered together for operation 
by one buyer. If the three screens are arranged in a half-hexagon arrange-
ment, the buyer could be seated on a swivel chair and monitor the bidding 
or price reports being displayed on each of the three screens . Of course, 
if a packer sees the need, two or more clusters of three CRT display sta-
tions, each operated by a separate packer-buyer, may be deployed. 
Because the use of a display control unit allows each CRT display sta-
tion in the multiple deployment to operate independent of the next, a packer-
buyer operating a cluster of three CRT display stations can call a differ-
ent subroutine on each of the three stations. By use of a workable mixture 
of DISPLAY-type and auxiliary subroutines, a packer-buyer will be able to 
purchase large volumes of cattle . 
To exemplify the possible coordination which could be achieved by a 
packer-buyer operating a three-unit cluster, consider the following display 
scheme: At the beginning of an auction session a packer-buyer interested in 
purchasing cattle consigned only on a liveweight basis might activate the 
BID STATUS-NLTLB subroutine on the display station on his left, activate the 
DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-HORIZONTAL subroutine on the center display screen directly 
ahead of him, and activate the DISPLAY-SPLIT-2-0NE COMPONENT subroutine on 
the display screen to the packer-buyer's right. With this display scheme, 
the packer-buyer will be able to view the bid arrays for eight different 
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liveweight basis lots, observe and compar e the steer base price on 28 other 
all-steer liveweight lots, a nd monitor his s tatus to see which lots he r e-
mains the last bidder on and those on which he had been outbid. When the 
desired bids have been ent ered on those lots appearing on the center screen, 
the ERASE key on the CRT display screen ' s programmed-function keyboard could 
be depressed, and the Lot Identification Number pertaining to e i ght more 
lots might be typed on the display station's alphameric keyboa~d. Whenever 
desired, the SESSION MARKET TREND REPORT subroutine could be activated on 
one display station such tha t the packer - buyer could learn the trend of bid-
ding over the entire auction. 
Although the above example of coordinated use between two or more 
cathode-ray tubes may be among the more commonly used, there are numerous 
other combinations of prograill!!le d-function subr outines which can be used con-
currently by a cluster of display s t ations . The exi stence of so many 
coordinated operations which may be used by large buyers with CRT clusters, 
along with the ability to permit a total bidding operation by small buyers 
having only one CRT bidding machine, is a true indicator of the adaptabil-
ity of this electronic bidding system. 
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V. COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF ELECTRONIC EXCHANGE SYSTEMS 
A. Introduction 
Before the ESPSCA or any other electronic conunodity exchange system is 
recommended for implementation, cattle producers and packers will want as-
surance that the recommended exchange will yield a better exchange environ-
ment and/or better exchange results than present exchange systems, and that 
the recommended exchange is the best suited of known electronic exchanges 
for the particular commodity marketing situation. Because the exchange 
environment and results have so many attributes and the relative importance 
of various attributes is likely to vary between situations, it is unlikely 
that one electronic exchange will be best suited for deployment in all situ-
ations. 
To assist in determining those situations where deployment of the 
ESPSCA may be desirable and the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the 
ESPSCA relative to pri or electronic exchange proposals, twenty potentially 
unfavorable attributes (i.e. "flaws") of the slaughter cattle exchange en-
vironment were identified in Chapter III. In this chapter the twenty flaws 
are used as the basis for a comparative evaluation of four types of proposed 
electronic exchanges: 1) telephone auctions, 2) teletype auctions, 3) com-
puterized exchanges, and 4) the ESPSCA, 
While the enumeration of slaughter cattle market flaws in Chapter III 
drew heavily from Sosnick's ideas [26], my usage of the flaws in this chap-
ter differs from Sosnick in the sense that they are not criteria in them-
selves. Instead, I have chosen to articulate each flaw or undesirable at-
tribute as an affirmative criterion statement which describes the desirable 
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status of the attribute. The reason for this divergence was that I think 
the "affirmative" criteria statements provide more useful guidelines in 
designing an exchange. Accordingly, these criterion statements more nearly 
achieve what Sosnick [26, p. 828) and Stigler [27, p. 504] have referred to 
as "a list of meaningful and manageable criteria." 
For each flaw the evaluation is organized as follows. First, under 
the heading "problem" the attribute of the exchange outcome or environment, 
which is the basis or cause of the flaw, is briefly restated. Whenever 
possible, this discussion will identify indicators or measures of these 
attributes . Second, a criterion against which the measures or indicators 
may be compared, is articulated. For some attributes it may be sufficient 
only to indicate desirable directions of change in the measures. Third, in 
some instances it is possible to identify certain conditions the existence 
or nonexistence of which serve as useful guidelines in determining the ex-
tent to which the exchange proposal satisfies the criterion. And finally, 
the attribute measure(s) or indicator(s) for each of the individual exchange 
proposals is(are) compared to the criterion to determine whether or not the 
particular exchange proposal satisfies the criterion. These evaluative 
ratings are enumerated in Figure 5.1 and interpreted in the chapter summary. 
B. Evaluation 
Redundant transportation, nonproductive facilities, unnecessary han-
dling, and uneven delivery of cattle at plants are four separate flaws 
arising from related attributes of livestock assembly. Because the guide-
lines, evaluation, and ratings for each of these attributes are identical, 
I will first state the problem and criterion for each attribute, and then 
199 
present the guidelines, evaluation, and ratings applicable to all four at-
tributes. 
1. Redundant transportation 
a. Problem The possibility of incurring cross-hauling costs is 
1 indicated when an exchange system routes livestock through intermediate 
assembly points. 
b. Criterion An exchange system should allow producers the option 
2 of selecting marketing methods which eliminate unnecessary transportation . 
2. Nonproductive facilities 
a. Problem Required maintenance and operation of nonproductive 
facilities not only imposes unnecessary marketing costs on producers and 
packers, but also wastes resources. 
b. Criterion An exchange sys tem should allow producers and pack-
e r s the option of utilizing marketing methods which avoid the use of non-
productive facilities. 
1As used in this chapter the term "exchange system" refers to a "trans-
action system" (defined in note 1 on page 78) which has been equipped with 
the appropriate hardware and trading rules for operational sale of a par-
ticular commodity. 
2
The term "marketing method" refers to one of the modes of marketing a 
commodity through an exchange system. Each marketing method is comprised 
of a set of steps which a producer and exchange personnel must perform in 
order to complete the marketing process. Each possible combination of 
steps which will accomplish the marketing process through a particular ex-
change system constitutes a different "marketing method." 
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J. Unne cessary handling 
a. Problem Unnecessary livestock handling costs frequently arise 
from requirements that livestock be assembled, graded, sorted, and/or 
pooled prior to or after sale. 
b . Criterion An exchange system should allow producers and packers 
the option of selecting marketing methods which eliminate unnecessary live~ 
stock handling. 
4. Uneven delivery of cattle at plants 
a . Problem Uneven daily cattle delivery causes unnecessary packer 
carryover costs and an incomplete utilization of the packer's human and 
capital resources . The potential for uneven cattle delivery is indicated 
when an exchange system requires assembly of livestock prior to sale. 
b. Criterion An exchange system should allow packers the option 
of procuring cattle through methods which permit them to schedule a uniform 
daily receipt of cattle at their plants . 
c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction Each of 
these four criteria may be substantially satisfied when producers and/or 
packers are provided with the option of having their cattle sold while still 
i n the feedlot, or alternatively, shipping them to an assembly station prior 
to sale . If presale assembly and feedlot sales can not be made optional, 
these criteria can still be satisfied to some extent when cattle are re-
quired to be sold while still in the feedlot. However, exchange systems 
which require presale assembly probably will not satisfy the criteria. 
d. Evaluation Four proposed electronic exchanges , the MFA feeder 
pig telephone auction~ the MFA slaughter hog telephone auction, the Maine 
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egg auction, and the Ontario Hog Producers' slaughter hog teletype auction , 
fail to satisfy the redundant transportation, nonpr oductive facilities , and 
unnecessary handling criteria primarily because each exchange proposal re-
quires that all producers deliver their commodity to an assembly point prior 
to sale. In addition, the MFA slaughter hog telephone auction, the Maine 
egg auction, and the Ontario Hog Producers' slaughter hog teletype auction 
fail to satisfy the uneven delivery criterion. Presale assembly of live-
stock is likely to cause each of the four flaws to arise . Furthermore, re-
quired presale assembly precludes the utilization of more desirable live-
stock routes or methods. The defects in each of the four exchanges could 
largely be eliminated if producers were allowed the option of selling their 
commodity while still on the farm. The MFA feeder pig telephone auction 
does not fail to satisfy the uneven delivery criterion because the exact 
date of feeder pig delivery to feedlots probably will not be crucial. 
The Manitoba slaughter hog teletype auction , the Alberta slaughter 
hog teletype auction, and the ESPSCA substantially satisfy each of the four 
criteria because they provide the producers and packers with the option of 
incurring redundant transportation costs, nonproductive facility charges, 
unnecessary handling costs, excessive transaction costs, and uneven deliv-
ery at plants, by shipping livestock to an assembly yard prior to sale, or 
avoiding these cost by selling livestock while still in the feedlot. 
The Iowa Sheep Producers' telephone auction, the I.D . A. , Johnson's 
slaughter cattle teletype auction, Schrader's electronic egg exchange, 
Holder's slaughter hog computerized exchange, and Henderson's electronic 
feeder calf exchange satisfy these criteria to a lesser extent. Even though 
these exchange proposals do not provide producers (packers) with the 
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option of selling (buying) livestock either while still on the farm or 
after delivery to an assembly yard, these exchanges are somewhat desirable 
because by requiring the livestock to be sold while still on the farm r e -
dundant transportation costs , nonproductive facilities costs, unnecessary 
handling costs , excessive transaction charges, and the costs of uneven de-
livery at plants, are almost totally eliminated . 
5. Excessive transaction and marketing costs 
a. Problem Required marketing through a particular marketing 
method frequently causes producers to incur excessive costs in anticipation 
of exchange such as commission firm charges, auction charges, and consign-
ment fees . 
b. Criterion An exchange system should allow producers t he option 
of using alternative marketing methods which avoid the incurrence of ex~ 
cessive costs in anticipat ion of exchange . 
c. Evaluation The Ontario and Alberta slaughter hog teletype auc-
tions fail to satisfy this criterion because under provincial law marketing 
through these auctions has been made compulsory for almost all resident 
pork producers. Due to the compulsory nature of these teletype auctions, 
producers have no choice but to pay the auction fee . Although the Manitoba 
slaughter hog teletype auction rules allow producers the option of marketing 
directly to packers or alternatively through the auction, this exchange also 
fails to satisfy the criterion because in either case producers ar e required 
to pay a standardized auction fee . The Ontario and Alber t a auctions could 
satisfy this criterion only if the compulsory marketing requirements were 
abandoned and producers were allowed the option of utilizing other marketing 
methods with lower transaction costs . The Manitoba auction could satisfy 
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this criterion if producers elec ting to market directly to packers were not 
required to pay the same auction fee paid by producers using the auction. 
All of the previously proposed telephone auctions and computerized ex-
changes , as well as the I.D.A., Johnson's slaughter cattle teletype auction, 
and the ESPSCA, substantially satisfy this criterion because they contem-
plate voluntary producer partic ipat i on, and thereby allow producers the op-
tion of utili zing alternative marketing methods with lower transaction 
3 costs. 
6. Costly search for cattle 
a . Problem Marketing methods or exchange systems which require 
visual inspection of cattle by packer-buyers prior to purchase force packers 
to incur the unnecessary costs of fielding a crew of buyers to evaluate 
cattle . These procurement costs include the cost of training buyers,. the 
cost of inaccurate quality estimates made by buyers, as well as the cost of 
provid i ng buyers with a car and an office. Besides requiring visual in-
spection of cattle, some exchange systems squander packer-buyer time by 
utilizing negotiation or progressive auction transaction systems rather 
3 Admittedly one weakness of this criterion is that satisfaction of the 
criterion worsens the "free-rider" problem. That is, by allowing producers 
the option of using alternative• lower cost marketing methods, an exchange 
system will encourage producers to become " f ree-riders," A "free-rider" 
avoids the payment of electronl c exchange fees by entering agreements to 
sell their cattle directly to a packer at some price determined on the 
electronic exchange. In other words, these parties will rely on the elec-
tronic exchange for its price making capacity without paying their portion 
of the exchange's operating costs. Furthermore, because this action will 
result in a reduced volume of trading through the electronic exchange, some 
additional concern may be raised as t o the representativeness of prices 
determined on the elec tronic exchange, 
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than the more expedient regressive auction. 
b. Criterion An exchange system should allow packers the option 
of selecting less costly methods of procuring cattle. 
c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction This 
crite rion may be s ubstantially satisfied when an exchange allows packers 
the option of visually inspecting livestock or relying on live or carcass 
grading done by independent graders, and the option of utilizing several 
different transaction systems for determining exchange price. Electroni c 
exchanges which make only one of these two options available may still 
satisfy the criterion to some extent. Even if an electronic e xchange 
offers neither of these options, it may still satisfy the criterion to 
some extent if it requires that traders utilize the regressive auction 
transaction system and a carcass me rit grading sys tem which eliminates the 
need for prebidding visual inspection of the cattle . Exchanges which offer 
neither of the options and require use of some transaction system less ex-
pedient than the regressive auction or require packer-buyers to visually 
inspect cattle prior to bidding, probably fail to satisfy this criterion . 
d . Evaluation All of the previously proposed telephone auctions 
fail to satisfy this criterion because they require that traders utilize 
the time consuming successive progressive auction transaction system and re-
quire that the traders rely on live animal grading performed by an inde-
pendent grader rather than giving traders the option of visually inspecting 
the animals pr i or to bidding. Similarly, Holder's computerized slaughter 
cattle forward contract market and Henderson ' s electronic feeder calf ex-
change fail to satisfy the criterion because they require that traders 
utilize the time consuming bid-offer matching transaction system and r equire 
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that traders rs-ly on carcass evaluation of purchased livestock. 
Even though the I.D.A., Schrader's electronic egg exchange, and the 
ESPSCA do not allow traders the option of using a more expedient transac-
tion system such as the regressive auction, these exchanges satisfy this 
criterion to some extent because they allow packers the option of relying 
on a live animal or carcass evaluation, or visually inspecting the live-
stock prior to bidding. 
The Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta slaughter hog teletype auctions, as 
well as Johnson's slaughter cattle teletype auction, satisfy this criterion 
to some extent because they require that traders utilize the successive 
regressive auction transaction system and they rely on carcass evalua-
tion of purchased livestock. 
i 
7. Traders not allowed to select price basis 
a. Problem Failure to allow traders the option of utilizing either 
a live or carcass merit basis, as well as a market-determined or rigid 
quality price differential schedule, precludes utilization of potentially 
more profitabl e or otherwise more desirable alternatives. 
b. Criterion Traders should have the option of trading on either 
a live or car cass merit basis, Those traders electing a carcass merit 
trading basis should have the further option of utilizing either a market-
determined or rigid quality price differential schedule. 
c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction Because car-
cass evaluation is inherently more accurate than live animal grading, ex-
change systems which arbitrarily require that traders utilize a carcass 
merit trading basis are socially more desirable and accordingly may still 
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satisfy this criterion to some extent. By contrast, exchange systems which 
require use of a live trading basis will probably not satisfy the criterion. 
Even though an exchange system requires that either a market~etermined 
or a rigid quality price differential schedule be used rather than making 
their use optional, the criterion may still be somewhat satisfied. However, 
r equired use of a market-determined quality price differential schedule is 
usually preferred to required use of a rigid schedule. 
d. Evaluation 
1) Availability of optional live or carcass merit base~ Three 
electronic exchanges, the MFA slaughter hog telephone auct ion, the Iowa 
Sheep Producers' telephone auction and the I.D.A., fail to satisfy the first 
portion of this criterion because each exchange requires that a live trading 
basis be utilized . The defects in each of these exchanges could be sub-
stantially e l iminated if traders were allowed the option of utilizing either 
the live basis or a carcass merit basis. 
The ESPSCA substantially satisfies this portion of the criterion be-
cause it allows traders the option of utilizing either a live basis or one 
of two carcass merit trading bases (i.e. carcass grade and weight or "in 
the meat"). 
The Ontario Hog Producers' slaughter hog teletype auction, the Mani-
toba slaughter hog teletype auction, the Alberta slaughter hog teletype 
auction, Johnson's s l aughter cattle teletype auction, and Holder's slaugh-
t er hog computerized exchange satisfy the first portion of this criterion 
to a lesser extent because each proposal requires that livestock be sold 
only on a carcass grade and weight basis. 
Evaluation of the MFA feeder pig telephone auction, the Maine egg auc-
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tion, Henderson's feeder calf exchange, and Schrader's electronic egg ex-
change under this portion of the criterion is difficult because carcass 
grading of eggs or feeder livestock is impractical. 
2) Availability of optional market-determined or rigid quality 
price differential schedules None of the previously proposed telephone 
auctions, teletype auctions, or computerized exchanges satisfy the second 
portion of the criterion because none of them have been designed to accommo-
date a market-determined quality price differential schedule .
4 
Furthermore, 
due to the transaction systems and electronic equipment utilized by these 
proposals, they can not be modified to make market-determined quality price 
differential schedules available. In view of these restrictions, Holder's 
proposal, which would permit four to twelve changes per year in the rigid 
quality price differential schedule, may be as c l ose as these exchanges can 
come to achieving a market-determined quality price differential schedule. 
4
In making this statement I recognize that exchange systems which 
utilize the successive progressive auction transaction system, such as the 
telephone auctions, do in a sense provide for market-determined quali t y 
price differentials. That is, these exchange systems permit bidders to bid 
lot prices up to different amounts with the lot price differentials reflect-
ing in part the differences in quality of the individual lots. For example, 
if Lot A is known to be comprised of good quality wiits and Lot B is known 
to be comprised of poor quality units, bidders can impose a market-deter-
mined quality price differential by bidding a lower price on Lot B. 
Arguably, much of the price differential between that bid for Lot A and 
Lot B would reflect the lower quality of the units in Lot B. 
The reader should make a distinction between the market-·deter-
mined quality price differentials made between lots sold on successive pro-
gressive auctions, and market-determined quality price differential sched-
ules established for each lot sold on the ESPSCA. Because only one price 
is de termined for each lot sold on the successive progressive auctions, the 
only price differentials are those between the one price determined for 
each lot. By contrast, the market-determined quality price differential 
schedule determined for each lot sold under the carcass grade and weight 
basis on the ESPSCA is comprised of two or more different prices, each rep-
resenting units of different qualities. 
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8. Feeders may not refuse packer bids ,. without incurring excessive costs 
a. Problem The required incurrence of excessive costs in refusing 
packer bids causes an imbalance in producer-packer bargaining power which 
may deter producers from refusing extremely low bids, and thus allow packers 
to force prices down. 
b. Criterion Producers should have the option of refusing bids 
without incurring excessive costs . 
c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfac tion and evaluation 
When cattle are shipped to a central or regional assembly yard prior to sale, 
a producer who refuses to sell his cattle due to unacceptably low packer 
bids will be forced to either pay extra yardage fees for maintaining his 
cattle at the assembly yard until the next scheduled sale session or haul 
the animals back to his feedlot. By contrast, when cattle are sold while 
still in the feedlot, the producer will incur only the cost of feeding the 
animals until the next auction session. Accordingly, the guidelines, eval-
uation, and ratings for this criterion are the same as those for the "re-
dundant transportation" criterion, discussed on pages 199 to 201 of this 
thesis. 
9. Inadequate market information 
a. Problem Restrictions on the coverage or accessibili ty of com-
modity market news promotes an inequitable distribution of market informa-
tion which results in inefficient exchange . This inefficiency arises in 
part from the fact that to make optimal trading decisions participants need 
to know what marketing alternatives are available. Insufficient information 
precludes those alternatives of which the participant is unaware. 
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b. Criterion A marketing sys tem should be able to provide all 
traders with a comprehensive report of the pertinent market news needed to 
help them make trading decisions. 
c . Evaluation Better market price information is usually a by-
product of centralized price determination. However, not all centralized 
price determining electronic marketing systems provide adequate dissemina-
tion of market price information . For example, the computerized exchanges 
which utilize the bid·.offer matching transaction system, including proposals 
by Schrader, Holder, and Henderson, fail to satisfy this criterion because 
they do not provide adequate market information . Each of these computer-
ized exchange proposals would allow a trader or media personnel to access 
the exchange through his touch-tone telephone and request market informa-
tion for a designated trading zone and conunodity grade , In response, the 
proposed exchanges would have the exchange computer give an audio report 
which consists of the following prices (all prices adjusted to allow for 
transportation costs from the producer's location): 1) the lowest seller 
offer on file; 2) the highest buyer bid on file; 3) the price at which the 
last transaction was consummated; and 4) the average exchange price during 
the current trading session based on a stated number of head or lots sold, 
(11, p. 13) The weaknesses in this market information disclosure are as 
follows: 1) it gives traders little idea of how representative the prices 
are of the day's pricing trend or the stre nth of these pricing positions ; 
2) it makes no disclosure of how many head of cattle have been offered for 
sale during the trading session at any price because no printed sale bill 
is compiled and disseminated to potential traders; 3) by giving only the 
highest bid and lowest offering price for a designated zone and grade, any 
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pricing trend can be covered up, especially due to the fact that these 
price quotations represent price extremes as opposed to the mean or median 
bid price and the mean or median offered price; and 4) price comparisons 
between grades are hampered, but not necessarily barred, because each dis~ 
closure is for only one grade, and thus the bidder will have to make a 
separate price report request for each grade with which he wishes to com-
pare prices. These disclosure problems could be substantially eliminated 
by disclosing to each seller all of the outstanding bids, the number of 
head represented by each bid, all of the outstanding offers, the number of 
head represented by each offer, and the exchange prices for all sale trans-
actions consummated so far during the trading session, Even if it is not 
technologically feasible to transmit all of thts data over the telephone, 
the availability of market information could be greatly improved by disclos-
ing the mean and median bids, the mean and median offer, the range of bids, 
and the range of offers. 
By contrast, the telephone auction, teleytpe auction, and ESPSCA pro, 
posals, which avoid many of the weaknesses inherent in the computerized ex-
change proposals, satisfy this criterion. Each of the proposals in these 
three exchange categories provide for the dissemination of a comprehensive 
sale bill to each bidder prior t o commencement of the daily auction session. 
The sale bills list and describe each consignment. In addition, buyers 
participating in telephone auctions hear each of the incremental bids as 
entered and are told the exchange price on each lot when sold. Similarly, 
buyers participating in teletype auctions are told the exchange price for 
each lot as it is sold (which is the one bid entered on each lot sold on the 
teletype auctions). Buyers participating in the ESPSCA can observe the 
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presently bid prices for any or all lots being auctioned simultaneously 
during an auction session. Furthermore, the ESPSCA bidders can obtain a 
continually updated statistical summary of market information through the 
use of several programmed market information subroutines. Producers con-
templating consignments through the ESPSCA will be provided with a more 
complete statistical sunnnary of pertinent market information than that pro-
vided producers by the comput erized exchange proposals. For example, the 
information the ESPSCA would make available through the producer's touch-
tone telephone would include: the highest, the lowest, and the mean bid 
price on each lot component under the designated trading bases; and the 
number of cattle consigned under a designated trading basis. 
10. Competing bids not rapidly disclosed 
a. Problem The inability of a marketing system to rapidly reveal 
all competing bids on each lot offered for sale before the exchange price 
on any lot is determined reduces the flow of pricing information and thereby 
inhibits price comparisons between two or more lots. This reduc tion yields 
inefficient exchange outcomes because when traders are not aware of all the 
alternative cattle price bids on other lots, they are unable to make trading 
decisions which maximize their collective gains (i.e. optimal marketing de-
cisions). 
b . Criterion Prior to the final determination of the exchange 
price(s) for any lot, a marketing system should permit disclosure to all 
potential bidders of all price bids on each lot offered for sale. 
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c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction Exchange 
systems which permit disclosure to all potential bidders of all price bids 
on each lot before the exchange price on any lot is determined, substan-
tially satisfy this criterion because they allow interlot (lot-to~lot) 
price comparisons. Exchange systems which permit disclosure of only the 
competing bids on each lot before that lot's exchange price is determined, 
satisfy this criterion to some extent. This partial bid disclosure arrange~ 
ment permits bidders to react to competing bidders' bids on a particular 
lot, and accordingly participate in the lot's price determination. Exchange 
systems which do not disclose the price bids on any lot before the exchange 
price of any lot is determined, fail to satisfy the criterion because no 
interlot price comparison or interactive participation in a lot's price 
determination is possible, 
d. Evaluation The three computerized exchange proposals which 
utilize the bid-of fer matching transaction system and the five teletype 
auctions fail to satisfy this criterion. 
The computerized exchanges fail to satisfy the criterion because the 
only bids which are ever revealed to a potential bidder are the highest 
bids on file for any of the lots offered in a particular grade category. 
Admittedly this minimal bid disclosure may be sufficient to inform a bidder 
of the current trend in prices if there is a rising price trend in bids 
entered such that each time a bidder inquires about the highest bid, a 
higher bid is disclosed. However, this bid disclosure arrangement could be 
very misleading when the first bid entered during a session is the highest 
bid entered during the session on the particular grade category and all 
successive bids are less than the highest bid. In this instance, the com-
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puterized exchanges would continue to report the first bid as the highest 
bid and would fail to indicate whether subsequent bids had been entered 
and how far below the highest bid the subsequent bids were entered, or 
what was the price trend represented by the subsequent bids. Furthermore. 
these computerized exchanges do not disc lose the exchange prices at wh~ch 
all trades are consummated. Rather, only the most recent exchange price 
and the average exchange price for the particular grade category during the 
exchange session, are disclosed. Accordingly , lot~to-lot price comparisons 
are not possible. 
The teletype auctions, which utilize the successive regressive auction 
transaction s ystem, fail to satisfy this criterion because the "regress ive" 
attribute allows the first bid entered on each lot to determine the lot' s 
exchange price. Subsequent disclosure of this first bid is inadequate 
because i t is revealed after the lot's exchange price is determined. Accord-
ingly, other bidders are prevented from reacting to the disclosed bid and 
participating in the lot's exchange price determination . The auction t rans-
act ion system's "successive" attribute further hinders interlot price com-
parisons because the exchange price on one lot is determined before that of 
other lots. 
Because the flaws in the computerized exchanges and the teletype 
auctions arise from the inherent nature of the transaction systems they 
utilize , the flaws can not be eliminated without substantial modification 
of the proposals . 
The telephone auctions, which utilize the successive progressive auc-
tion transaction system, satisfy this criterion to some extent because the 
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"progr essive" attribute allows disclosure of all bids entered on a lot be~ 
fore that lot ' s exchange price is determined, However, the pricing disclo-
sure of the telephone auctions is limited by the "successive" attribute 
which, as i n the teletype auctions, hinders interlot price comparison. 
By contrast, the ESPSCA, which uses the simultaneous progressive auc•· 
tion transaction system , substantially satisfies this criterion. The rea-
son for the ESPSCA ' s satisfaction of this criterion is twofold. First, as 
with the t elephone auctions, the "progressive" auction transaction system 
attribute allows disclosure of all bids entered on a lot before the lot 's 
exchange price is determined . Second , the ESPSCA's "simultaneous" attr i-
bute, which allows competing bids on a number of lots to be entered con-
currently before any lot's exchange price is determined, enables lot-to-lot 
price compar isons. 
Although the ESPSCA substantially satisfies this criterion, ther e is 
one problem caused by the simultaneous progressive auction transaction sys-
tem which is worth noting. Because the simultaneous progressive auction 
transaction system allows competing bids on a number of lots to be entered 
concurrently , the individual bidder's mental registry of each bid may be 
impossible. This ESPSCA bid monitoring problem is further compounded by 
the use of market-determined quality price differential schedules and com-
bination trading bases which permit the receipt of bids on more than one lot 
component for each lot. This men tal barrier may in part be reduced by the 
use of sophis ticated computer programs which assist the bidder in monitor-
ing the bidding on specified lots and surmnarize the data on one of the 
bidder ' s cathode~ray tube display stations. By contrast, the telephone 
auctions are free of this bid monitoring problem because the "successive" 
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attribute of the s uccessive progressive auction transaction system permits 
receipt of bids on only one lot at a time. Accordingly, all bidders are 
able to hear each incr emental bid as entered over the amplified telephone 
network . 
11. 5 Not allowing all bidders to bid on every lo,t 
a. Problem If price is t o play its proper role in the coordina-
tion of the cattle industry, it must be based on the pricing input of all 
possible bidders. Any pricing mechanism which imposes physical or spatial 
barriers that prevent all possible bidders from en t ering bids on each lot 
offer ed for sale will potentially distort the pricing s i gnals and hinder 
price coordination in the industry. Failure to allow all potential bidders 
to bid on ever y l ot may be indicated by reduced competition and interreg~ 
ional price discrepancies in excess of transportation costs. 
b. Criterion All potential bidders s hould be allowed to bid on 
every lot offer ed for sale . 
c . Evaluation All three computerized exchanges which utilize the 
bid-offer matching transaction system fail t o satisfy this criterion. 
Specifically , these exchanges are Shrader' s electronic egg exchange , 
Holder ' s computerized slaughter hog contract market, and Henderson's elec-
tronic feede r calf exchange. The flaw in these exchanges arises from an 
informational barrier inherent in the design of the computerized bid-of fer 
5 
The primary focus of this criterion and the accompanying evaluation 
is on whether the electronic hardware a nd transaction sys tem utilized allow 
all bidders to bid on every lot. Consideration of whether the exchanges 
have been proposed for deployment in a state or regional area rather than 
nationwide (which is ano ther factor that may bar some bidders from bidding 
on ever y lot) has thus been excluded form this discussion . 
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matching transaction system, As proposed, these exchanges would permit 
potential bidders to learn for any grade classification only the lowest 
producer offer on file, the highest packer bid on file, the price at which 
the last Lran s ac tion took place, and the average transaction price during 
the present exchange session. Accordingly, the bidder would not know how 
many head or lots are offered in any grade category . Therefore, a bidder 
participating in one of these computerized exchanges enters his bid on any 
lot presently offered in the designated grade category 1 rather than on one 
selected lot. Because this flaw arises from the inherent nature of the 
bid-offer matching transaction system utilized by these three computerized 
exchanges, this flaw can not be eliminated by merely making minor modifica-
tions such as the release of a master sale bill prior to each exchange 
session . 
All exchange proposals falling into the telephone auction, teletype 
auction, or ESPSCA categories satisfy this criterion. Not only do these 
proposed exchanges inform potential bidders of the identity and description 
of each lot offered for sale, but they also permit each bidder to designate 
on which lot(s) his bid(s) is (are) to be entered. 
The ESPSCA may be criticized as not allowing a bidder to effectively 
bid on all lots offered for sale because so many lots are being auctioned 
simultaneously that it is physically impossible for a bidder to monitor and 
bid on all lots. However, the severity of this problem is minimal. Seem-
ingly the important factor is that the ESPSCA permits a bidder to bid on 
any lot. Furthermore, it would be possible to reduce the number of lots 
being auctioned simultaneously by scheduling several subsessions during 
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which a portion of all the consigned lots would be auctioned simultaneously . 
I n addition, it may be possible to program computerized equipment t o assist 
a bidder in monitoring the bidding on each lot being auctioned simultane-
ously . 
12. Disclosur e of bidder's identi t y r equired 
a . Problem The possibility of collaboration among bidders is in-
dicated when exchange regulations or mechanics require or permi t the dis-
closure of any bidde r' s identity. 
b . Criterion Exchange regulations or mechanics should not permit 
or r equir e disclosure of any bidder 1 s identity to competing bidders either 
befor e or after a transac tion is consummated . 
c . Evaluation Only two proposed e l ec tronic exchanges, the Maine 
egg auction and the MFA feeder pig t e l ephone auctiont fail t o satisfy this 
criterion. The Maine egg auction c learly is defec tive under this criterion 
because each bidder was r equi r ed to identify himself by name when he en-
tered an incremental bid . Apparently no at tempt was made to utilize secret 
identification code number s whic h would have e liminated this flaw. 
Although the MFA feeder pig t e l ephone auction did not cause a bidder' s 
identity to be reveal ed to those bidder s assembled at all bidder assembly 
points, this exchange nevertheless fai l s t o satisfy the cri t erion because 
when a bidder assembled at one of the bidder assembly points entered a bid, 
his identity may have been readily apparent to all other bidders assembled 
at the same point . I t should be noted tha t this flaw will be present in 
any telephone auction which requires bidders to assemble in mass, and can 
not be e liminated unless each bidder is assigned a private bidding booth 
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which makes it impossible for other bidders t o see when a particular bidder 
enters a bid. 
All of the other electronic exchange proposals, including proposals 
from each of the four exchange categories (i.e. telephone auctions, tele~ 
type auctions, computerized exchanges, and ESPSCA) satisfy this criterion, 
Generally, these proposals satisfy the criterion through the utilization 
of secret bidder identification codes and/or electronic bidding machines 
located at the bidder ' s office which permit couununication with the central-
ized exchange headquarters while preserving bidder anonymity, 
13. Disclosure of seller's identity not optional 
; t~ 
a. Problem Exchange regulations which bar disclosure of a seller's 
identity denies him of the opportunity t o differentiate his cattle on the 
basis of his favorable production reputation. Coversely, exchange require-
ments that the identity of all sellers be disclosed to bidders p~rmit pack-
er-buyer discrimination against producers having unfavorable production 
reputations , while at the same time disfavoring those packers without knowl-
edge of certain producers' production reputations. 
b. Criterion Exchange rules should allow producer-sellers the 
option of having their ident i ty disclosed to all bidders pr ior t o commence-
ment of the pr ice determination process. 
c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction Exchanges 
which have rules requiring compulsory disclosure or anonymity fail to 
satisfy this criterion. 
d. Evaluation All of the previously proposed telephone auctions 
and computerized bid-offer matching exchanges, as well as the Ontario Hog 
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Producers ' slaughter hog teletype auction and Johnson ' s slaughter cat tle 
teletype auction , fail to satisfy this criterion because they do not allow 
disclosure of any producer's name prior to sale of his consigned livestock. 
In addition , the I .D.A. fails to satisfy this criterion because its rules 
require the disclosure of each consignor ' s identity prior to the sale of 
his lot(s) . The I . D.A. requires producer name disclosure i n order to allow 
packers the option of inspecting any consigned lot in the producer' s feed~ 
lot prior to the auction. Almost all of t hese exchanges could satisfy the 
criterion if exchange rules wer e modified t o make seller identity disclo-
sure optional . 
Three electronic exchange proposals, the Manitoba slaughter hog tele-
type auction, the Alberta slaughter hog teletype auction, and the ESPSCA, 
satisfy this criterion because they allow producer-consignors the option 
of having their names broadcast along with their lot descr iptions t o all 
po tential bidders prior to connnencement of the price determination pr ocess . 
14. Accurate grading system not optional 
a . Pr oblem Failure to allow the utilization of accur ate grading 
sys tems leads to an imprecise valuation of cattle and t hus prevents opti-
mization of traders ' collective gains . However, required use of any partic-
ular grading system is undesirable because the cost of grading may exceed 
the value t o the traders of the informat ion provided by grading. 
b. Criterion Trader should be allowed the opt i on of utilizing 
grading systems that accurately r eflect the relative quality of beef car-
casses, live animal grading systems , or no grading system at a l l . 
c . Evaluation 
' 
Two exchange proposals , the Iowa Sheep Producers 
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telephone auction and the "M,FA ~l~ughter hog telephone &uctio~, fail to sat-
isfy this criterion because they require that slaughter livestock be sold 
on the basis of live grading. Had these two proposals allowed traders the 
option of utilizing a carcass grading system, or even no grading system at 
all, they would have satisfied the criterion. 
The Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta slaughter hog teletype auctions, 
Johnson's slaughter cattle teletype auction, and Holder's slaughter hog 
forward contract exchange fail to satisfy this criterion because they re-
quire that livestock be evaluated on a carcass merit basis . While arguably 
the accuracy attained from carcass grading greatly exceeds the accuracy of 
live animal grading, the exchanges requiring carcass grading impose a bur-
den on those traders for whom the cost of carcass grading exceeds its value . 
If these exchanges were slightly modified to allow traders the option of 
utilizing live animal grading or no grading at all, they would satisfy this 
criterion. 
Although the MFA feeder pig telephone auction, Henderson ' s electronic 
feeder calf exchange, and the Maine egg auction involve commodities for 
which carcass grading is inappropriate, these exchanges fail to satisfy the 
criterion because they each require that one grading system be utilized 
and thereby fail to allow traders the option of not having the commodity 
graded. 
By contrast, the ESPSCA and Schrader's electronic egg exchange sub-
stantially sat~sfy this criterion. The ESPSCA satisfies the criterion be-
cause it allows traders the option of utilizing one or more carcass grad-
ing systems, a live animal grading system, or no grading system at all . 
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Although carcass grading of shell eggs is not possible, Schrader's exchange 
satisfies the criterion because it allows buyers the option of deciding 
whether or not eggs will be graded. 
The I.D. A. satisfies this criterion to some extent because it allows 
producers the option of having their cattle graded while still in the feed-
lot (live grading system) or selling their cattle without any grading. The 
I.D.A . would have more substantially satisfied the criterion had traders 
also had the option of using a carcass merit grading system. 
15. Undesirable packer collaboration is allowed 
a . Problem Undesirable packer collaboration occurs when some 
packers enter one of several types of mutual agreements to cooperate which 
gives them greater bargaining power than producers or competing packers ex-
cluded from the agreement . The essence of an agreement to limit bidder 
competition may be that no party to the agreement will raise the bid on a 
lot on which another party to the agreement is presently the last bidder. 
Similarly, a collaborative agreement to restrict a certain packer's supply 
of cattle may provide that certain packers, not members to the agreement, 
shall always be outbid. The potential for such undesirable collaboration 
ar ises whenever exchange rules fail to preserve each bidder's anonymity. 
Whenever the undesirable collaboration occurs, the resultant imbalance in 
bargaining power acts as an impediment to effective competition because it 
allows artificial manipulation of commodity demand. 
b . Criterion The design of the exchange, the exchange regulations, 
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6 
and the enforcement of the exchange regulations should deter or prevent 
bidder collaboration . 
c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction Exchanges 
which attempt to preserve bidder anonymity both before and after sales 
transactions are consummated substantially satisfy this criterion . Because 
knowledge of bidder identity conceivably could provide a basis for bidder 
collaboration, those exchanges which do not preserve bidder anonymity prob-
ably fail to satisfy the criterion. 
d . Evaluation The evaluation and ratings for this criterion are 
the same as those for the "disclosure of bidder identity required" cri ter-
ion, discussed on pages 218-19 of this thesis. 
16. Unwarranted price fluctuation 
a. Problem Random fluctuation in the exchange price determined 
for successive lots (i . e. interlot price fluctuation) sold during one ex-
change session which does not reflect quality differences and/or buyers' 
diminishing interest in procuring more cattle, yields inequitable treatment 
of sellers, inefficient exchange outcomes, and an adverse division of gains . 
In addition, interlot price fluctuation complicates the formulation of bid-
ding strategies and makes pricing differences associated with quality, 
location, and time, more difficult to perceive . The degree of random price 
6
Whether sufficient anticollaboration regulations are enacted and en-
forced may depend in part upon the nature of the market agency which is 
organized or selected to operate the particular electronic exchange. Thus, 
for my evaluative purposes, I will presume that a market agency would be 
selected to operate the exchange which would rigorously enforce anticollus-
ion regulations and pursue violators. 
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fluctuation is measured by the variance in prices o~ lots sold during one 
exchange session. 
b. Criterion Less interlot price variation is pr eferr ed to more. 
c . Guidelines for determining criter ion satisfaction Interlot 
price variation is likely to be lessened when a bidder knows how much he 
will have to pay to purchase a particular lot and how much he will have to 
pay to purchase other lots to be sold dur ing the exchange session, prior 
to the time the exchange price for any of t hese lots is determined. If a 
bidder knows both types of price information, he will be able to compare 
the prices needed to purchase various lots, develop bidding strategies, and 
adjust subsequent bids accordingly . Therefore, when the transaction system 
ut i lized by an exchange makes both types of price information available to 
a bidder prior to t he time the exchange price is determined , t he exchange 
may substantially satisfy this criterion . However , if the exchange ' s trans-
action system does not make both types of information available to bidders, 
the exchange probably fails to satisfy the criterion . 
d. Evaluation All of the previously proposed teletype auctions , 
telephone auctions, and computerized exchanges fail to satisfy this criter-
ion . 
Although the "progressive" attribute of the successive progr essive 
auction transaction system utilized by the telephone auctions enables bid-
de r s to know the price they would have to pay for one lot before the ex-
change price for that lot is finally determined, the telephone auctions 
fail to satisfy the criter ion because the "successive" attribute prevents 
the bidders from learning the price they will have to pay for lots to be 
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auctioned later in the session. 
The teletype auctions, which use the successive regressive auction 
transaction system, fail to satisfy this criterion for two reasons. first, 
the "regressive" attribute, which means that the first bid entered on the 
lot determines the exchange price, prevents bidders from knowing how much 
they will have to pay to buy the lot until after the exchange price is de-
termined. Second, the "successive" attribute, which means that the ex-
change price on lots is determined sequentially, prevents bidders from 
knowing the price they will have to pay for lots other than the one on 
which bids are presently being received. 
Because the computerized exchanges reveal to each bidder the lowest 
producer offer for his delivery point, each bidder knows he may have to 
bid at least as high as the lowest producer offer in order to buy one lot. 
However, the computerized exchanges fail to satisfy this criterion because 
they do not reveal to bidders the price they will have to pay for other 
lots prior to the time the exchange price for the first lot is determined. 
That is, the bidder does not know whether another lot has been offered at 
the same price or how much higher the next lowest producer offer is . 
By contrast, the ESPSCA, which utilizes the simultaneous progressive 
auction transaction system, substantially satisfies the criterion because 
the progressive attribute enables a bidder to know how much he has to pay in 
order to buy one lot before the exchange price on that lot is determined. 
In addition, the "simultaneous" attribute means that hecause other lots are 
being bid on concurrently, a bidder knows how much he has to pay in order 
to buy these other lots before the exchange price on any of these lots is 
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determined . 
17 . Persistent maintenance of interregional price differentials in excess 
of transportation costs 
a. Problem Unit exchange prices at spatially separated assembly 
points or production s ites which persistently differ by more than the unit 
transportation cost between the points are evidence of inefficient exchange 
out comes . 
b . Criterion Unit exchange prices at spatially separated 
assembly points or production sites should not persistently differ by more 
than the unit transportation cost between the points . 
c. Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction A reliable 
indicator of whether an exchange will satisfy this crite rion is the amount 
and type of price information available to bidders prior to the time the 
exchange price of any unit is determined during an exchange session. For 
maximization of exchange efficiency a bidder needs to know the price he 
will have to pay for a similar quality commodity at different commodity 
assembl y points or production sites and the cost of transportation between 
each of the commodity locations . The availability of this information is 
dependent upon the type of transaction system utilized by an exchange. 
When the transaction system utilized by an exchange makes both types 
of information available (i. e. prices bidder would have to pay at various 
assemhJ.y points and the transportation cost between the various points) 
to a bidder prior to the time the exchange price is determined, the ex-
change may substantiall y satisfy this criterion. However , if the exchange ' s 
transaction system does not make both types of information available to 
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bidders, the exchange probably ,fails to satisfy the crite rion. 
d. Evaluation The evaluation and ratings for this criterion are 
the same as those for the "unwarranted price fluctuation" criterion, dis-
cussed on pages 223-25 of this thesis . 
18. Enabling legislation required 
a. Problem Electronic exchange proposals dependent upon the en-
actment of enabling legislation suffer from the inherent constraints in 
the legislative process which may delay, dilute, modify, or totally refute 
needed legislation and accordingly burden the proposed system's implemen-
tation. When enacted, enabling legislation frequently includes provisions 
for government regulation, monitoring, and control. Such regulations, con-
trols, or mandatory requirements arising from legislation may restrict 
participants' freedom of choice in selecting among exchange alternatives. 
b. Criterion The implementation of a marketing system should not 
depend upon the enactment of enabling legislation. 
c . Evaluation Only three electronic exchanges, the Ontario , Alber-
ta, and Manitoba slaughter hog teletype auctions, fail to satisfy this 
criterion because their implementation depended on the passage of enabling 
legislation. These Canadian teletype auctions rely on two pieces of leg-
islation. One piece of legislation requires that all hogs be sold on a 
carcass grade and weight basis and that quality price differentials be 
those legislated by the Canadian government. The second piece of Canadian 
legislation gf.ves provincial producer boards the authority to make market-
ing through the board's commodity exchange compulsory . 
All of the telephone auctions and computerized exchanges, as well as 
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the I.D.A., Johnson•s slaughter cattle teletype auction, and the ESPSCA, 
satisfy this criterion because their implementation would not depend on the 
enactment of legislation. Furtftermore, it should be noted that the tele-
phone auctions have been able to operate successfully wi,thout enabling or 
regulatory legislation. 
19. Establishment of a uniform commodity grading system required 
a. Problem Exchange proposals which require the establishment and 
utilization of a uniform commodity grading system deny participants the 
opportunity to utilize alternative grading systems more appropriately suit-
ed to their individualized needs. Furthermore, the cost of retraining 
connnodity graders to implement the new grading system may exceed the cost 
savings arising from the convenience and value of the increased grading 
accuracy attained through use of the uniform system. 
b. Criterion Traders should have the option of utilizing one or 
more grading systems or no grading system. 
c . Guidelines _f..9~ftetermining criterion satisfaction Exchanges 
7This "establishment of a uniform commodity grading system required" 
criterion is similar to the "accurate grading system not optional" cr i ter-
ion to the extent they both require that alternative grading systems be 
available. However, the intended focus 0£ these two criteria is differ-
ent. The primary focus of the "establishment of a uniform commodity grad-
ing system required" problem and criterion centers on exchange requirements 
that exchange participants utilize one particular uniform grading system. 
If the uniform grading system is new, these requirements force participants 
to retrain in order to effectively utilize i t, rather than allow then the 
option of using alternative grading systems with which they are already 
familiar. The uniform grading system criterion poses no requirement that 
any of the grading system alternatives be accurate or precision methods. 
By contrast, the "accurate grading system not optional" problem and criter-
ion focuses on the availability of a grading system with the degree of 
accuracy appropriate for the bidder's needs. 
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which r e quire that one and only one uniform grading sys tem be established 
and utilized, fail to satisfy this criterion. 
For the purpose of evaluation, two distin ctions should be made. First, 
a distinction should be made be tween circumstances wherein a uniform com-
modity grading system is imposed on all producers within the production 
area, from those ci rcumstances where a wiiform system is imposed only on 
all volwitary participants. The former circumstances fail to satis fy the 
cr i terion because they deny traders the option of selecting among one or 
mor e , o r no grading sys tern. The latter circumstances fail t o satisfy the 
crite rion not because they deny traders the op tion of using alternative 
grading systems, but because they deny participants the opportunity to 
utilize the exchange if they elect to utilize an alternative grading sys-
t em. 
A second distinction should be made between e xchanges which would 
impose a new gr ading syt em with which no graders are familiar, and exchanges 
which would impose a uniform grading system which is presently used or 
known by a numbe r of graders and trader s . While the latter exchange s 
may result in l ess grader retraining costs, required use of either grad-
ing system would seve rely restrict trader alternatives and therefore both 
types of exchanges would fail to satisfy this criterion . 
d . Evaluation All of the telephone auctions , as well as the 
Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta slaughter hog teletype auctions, Johnson's 
slaughter cattle teletype auction , Holder's computerized slaughter hog 
contract exchange, and Henderson ' s electronic fee der calf exchange fail to 
satisfy this criterion . More specifically , the MFA slaughter hog telephone 
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auction, the Maine egg auction, the Iowa Sheep Producers' telephone auc-
tion, and Johnson's slaughter cattle teletype auction fail to satisfy the 
criterion because they each require that all voluntary participants util-
ize a well-known grading system. The MFA feeder pig telephone auction, 
Holder's computerized slaughter hog contract exchange , and Henderson's 
electronic feeder calf exchange fail to satisfy this criterion because 
they each require that all voluntary participants utilize a new or specially 
developed grading system. The three slaughter hog teletype auctions in 
the Canadian provinces of Ontario, Manitoba, and Alberta fail to satisfy 
this criterion because they require that the carcasses of all hogs sold 
in each of the provinces be graded by use of a well-known grading system. 
It is conceivable that all these exchange proposals could be modified to 
allow the use of alternative grading systems. However, it should be noted 
that before the Canadian exchanges could be modified, the compulsory 
Canadian hog grading law would have to be amended or repealed. 
Only three exchange proposals, the I .D. A., the ESPSCA, and Schrader's 
electronic egg exchange , satisfy this criterion . Schrader's exchange sat-
isfies the criterion because it would allow buyers the option of deciding 
whether or not grading is to be required. However, Schrader's proposal 
would restrict any buyer electing to have his eggs graded to the use of 
only one shell egg grading system. 123, p. 21] 
The I . D.A. satisfies this criterion because it would allow producers 
the option of having their cattle graded with a live grading system or sold 
without any grading. 
The ESPSCA clearly satisfies this criterion because it permits traders 
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to elect the use of no grading system, the use of a live animal gradin g 
system, or the use of one or more carcass grading systems. 
20 . Sophisticated trading rul es 
a. Problem Excessive costs incurred in training market partic-
ipants and developing bidding strategies tend to exclude potential partic-
ipants, lower exchange volume, and worsen the free-rider problem. 
b . Criterion Lower participant training and bidding strategy de-
velopment costs are preferred to higher costs. 
c . Guidelines for determining criterion satisfaction Without 
actual cost and expected return data it is almost impossible to precisely 
determine whether or not a particular electronic exchange proposal would 
satisfy this criterion. However, by considering several indicators it 
should be possible to predict the likelihood of an exchange satisfying the 
criterion and degree of criterion satisfaction . One of the indicators of 
the cost of training or retraining parti cipants is the degr ee of change in 
the method of entering bids from that pr esently utilized in existing market-
ing methods. The degree of change may itself be indicated by the required 
use of sophisticated electronic equipment for bidding. 
The second indicator is the difficulty of developing bidding strategies 
for bidders utilizing an exchange. In developing bidding strategies a bid-
der needs to know the willingness of other bidders to huy a particular lot 
and their willingness to b.uy other lots prior to the time he bids on the 
one particular lot. The availability of this pricing information and thus 
the difficulty of developing bidding strategies appear to be r elated to 
the type of transaction system an exchange utilizes. Successive regressive 
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auction transaction systems make development of bidding strategies extreme-
ly difficult because they require that bidders enter bids without knowing 
either the willingness of competing bidders to buy the particular lot or 
other lots which will be auctioned later in the session. Successive pro-
gressive auction transaction systems alleviate part of the strategy devel-
opment problems incurred by the successive regressive auction because the 
"progressive" attribute permits more than one bid to be entered on a lot 
before exchange price is determined. Accordingly, a bidder has some in-
dication of the willingness of other bidders to buy this lot before its 
exchange price is finally determined. However, due to the "successive" 
attribute, bid strategy development with successive progressive auctions 
is still hampered by the lack of knowledge as to the willingness of other 
bidders to buy lots to be auctioned later in the auction session. The 
simultaneous progressive auction transaction system alleviates both of 
these informational deficiencies. The "simultaneous" attribute means that 
because bids are being received concurrently on other lots a bidder can de-
termine the willingness of other bidders to buy the other lots. In addition, 
the progressive attribute of the simultaneous progressive auction allows a 
bidder to determine the will i ngness of other bidders to buy a particular 
lot, just as is the case with the successive progressive auctions. 
The bid~offer matching transaction system also makes the development 
of bidding strategies difficult because bidders are only told the present-
ly highest p~cker bid and the lowest producer offer. This information is 
sufficient to tell a bidder the willingness of one competing bidder to buy 
one lot. However , oecause the transaction system does not reveal the amount 
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of other bids entered on the same grade category, there is no indication 
of the willingness of other bidders to buy lots. 
Exchanges for which the amount of participant training and difficulty 
of developing bidding strategies are minimal may substantially satisfy this 
criterion. If only the cost of training or the cost of developing bid 
strategies is minimal, the exchange may still satisfy the criterion to 
some extent. If an exchange appears unlikely to minimize either the re-
training cost or the cost of developing bidding strategies, the exchange 
likely will fail to satisfy the criterion. 
d. Evaluation All of the previous telephone auction proposals may 
satisfy this criterion to some extent because due to the similarity of the 
conduct of telphone auctions and auctions held at sale barns, the necess ary 
ret r aining of bidders may be minimal. However, due t o the telephone auc-
tion ' s use of the successive progressive auction transaction system, tele-
phone auctions cause some difficulty in developing bid strategies. 
All of the previously proposed teletype auctions also may satisfy this 
criterion to some extent . Because the entry of a bid requires the depres-
sion of merely one button, only a brief orientation may be necessary to 
acquaint bidders with the successive regressive auction transaction system 
and the teletype bidding machines . However, the teletype auction's degree 
of criterion satisfaction is limited because utilization of the successive 
regressive auction transaction system 100.ans that the development of bidding 
strategies will he very difficult. 
The ESPSCA satisfies the criterion to some extent because its utili-
zation of the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system alleviates 
many of the problems in developing bidding strategies. However, the ESPSCA's 
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use of sophisticated electronic bidding equipment means that hidders will 
need a suostantial amount of training to be able to operate the bidding 
machinery. 
The computerized exchanges may satisfy the criterion to some extent 
because the training required to teach bidders how to enter b.ids via the 
touch-tone telephone will be minimal. However, the computerized exchanges' 
use of the bid-offer matching tvansaction system means that the development 
of bidding strategies may be difficult. 
C. Summary and Interpretation of the 
Comparative Evaluation 
The purpose of this section is to attempt to obtain an overall rating 
of the exchange proposals examined in this chapter, to interpret t he 
evaluative ratings derived in this chapter, and to identify some of the 
inherent weaknesses in this electronic exchange evaluation. 
The foregoing evaluation of electronic exchange proposal s on the basis 
of the twenty individual market criteria can perhaps best be summarized 
by the tabulation of ratings presented in Figure 5 . 1 . However, these rat-
ings alone give no indication as to the overall desirability of the indi-
vidual exchange proposals. Accordingly, several approaches may be under-
taken in order to convert the individual criterion ratings into a meaning-
ful overall ranking of the thirteen electronic exchange proposals. One 
such ranking approach would be to sum the twenty-one ratings for each ex-
change (Figure 5.1) and rank the proposals on the basis of the rat ing to-
8 
tal. Under this approach, the lowest possible total, indicating the most 
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desirable excha nge proposal, would be " 21". Accordingly, exchanges having 
rating totals increasingly in excess of "21" would receive lower, less 
desirable rankings. If this approach is lllldertaken, the rankings would be 
as follows: 
Ranking Exchange Pro2osal Sum of Ratings 
1 ESP SCA 23 
2 Manitoba 40 
2 Alberta 40 
3 I.D.A. 41 
4 Schrader 42 
5 Johnson 43 
6 Iowa Sheep Prod. 44 
7 Henderson 4 7 
8 Holder 48 
9 MFA Slaughter Hog 49 
10 MFA Feeder Pig 50 
11 Maine Egg 51 
12 Ontario 52 
Another attempt to use the ratings in Figure 5 . 1 might rank the ex-
change proposals on the basis of the number of "111 , "2", and "3", ratings 
earned by each proposal. Accordingly, the most desirable exchange will 
have the greatest number of "l" ratings and the fewest number of " 2" and 
"3" ratings. Less desirable exchange proposals will have fewer "111 rat-
ings and more " 2" and "3" ratings. If this approach were used, the rank-
/ 
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ings would be as follows: 
Rank;ing 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Exchange Proposal 
ESP SCA 
Manitoba 
Alberta 
I.D.A. 
Schrader 
Johnson 
Iowa Sheep Prod. 
Henderson 
Holder 
MFA Slaughter Hog 
MFA Feeder Pig 
Maine Egg 
Ontario 
Frequency of Ratings : 
1 2 3 
19 2 0 
10 3 8 
10 
7 
7 
6 
6 
5 
4 
6 
5 
5 
4 
3 
8 
7 
8 
7 
6 
7 
2 
3 
2 
3 
8 
6 
7 
7 
8 
10 
10 
13 
13 
14 
14 
After r eviewing the ratings derived under these two ranking approaches, 
two general observations can initially be made . The first observation is 
that rankings for the thirteen exchange proposals under the two approaches 
are identical. Some question may be raised about the correctness of this 
observation due to the apparent inconsistency in my seventh, eight, ninth , 
tenth, and eleventh place rankings .. under the second ranking approach. 
However , I believe these rankings can be justified by the following exp la-
nation. It was necessar y to place the MFA slaughter hog telephone auction 
with six 11 111 ratings helow Henderson's computeri.zed slaughter hog exchange 
with four "l" ratings b.ecause the MFA. slaughrer hog auction has' thirteen 
"3" ratings, whereas Henderson '·s and Holder's exchanges each have only t en 
" 3" ratings . Similarly, Holder's exchange was ranked ahead of the MFA 
feeder pig telephone auction and Maine egg telephone auction , each with five 
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"l" ratings, because Holder's exchange earned three fewer "3" ratings 
than the MFA feeder pig auction and the Maine egg auction. 
The second observation, based on the ranking of the thirteen exchange 
proposals, is that the four types of exchange proposals may be ranked for 
desirability as follows: first {most desirable): ESPSCA; second: teletype 
auctions; third: computerized exchanges; and fourth (least desirable): 
telephone auctions. More specifically, the ESPSCA, which is ranked in 
first place 1.mder both approaches, is clearly the most desirable type of 
electronic exchange. The teletype auctions, with the exception of the 
Ontario slaughter hog teletype auction, received the next highest desirabil-
ity rankings. That is, the Manitoba and Alberta slaughter hog teletype 
auction were ranked in second place, the I.D.A. was ranked in third place, 
and Johnson's slaughter cattle teletype auction was ranked in fifth place. 
The computerized bid-offer matching exchanges generally received lower 
rankings than the teletype auctions. Specifically, Schrader's electronic 
egg exchange was ranked in fourth place, Henderson's computerized feeder 
calf exchange was ranked in seventh place, and Holder's computerized 
slaughter hog exchange was ranked in eighth place. And finally, the tele-
phone auctions, which generally received the lowest rankings, were deter-
mined to be the least desirable type of electronic exchange. That is, the 
Iowa Sheep Producers' telephone auction was ranked in sixth place, the MFA 
slaughter hog telephone auction was ranked in ninth place, the MFA feeder 
pig telephone auction was ranked in tentn place, and the Maine egg auction 
was ranked in eleventh place. 
The reason for the ESPSCA' s superior overall rating under either 
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approach may be attributed to three main features of the exchange: 1) rules 
that eliminate the requirement of centralized cattle and bidder assembly; 
2) the selected simultaneous progressive auction transaction system which 
makes possible interlot price comparisons: and 3) rules that permit multiple-
price determination. 
First, the ESPSCA's adoption of rules allowing cattle to be sold 
while still in the feedlot and optional in-feedlot grading eliminate the 
unnecessary costs associated with exchanges requiring centralized assembly 
of cattle . Accordingly, t he "redundant transportation," "nonproductive fa-
cilities," "unnecessary handling," "uneven delivery of cattle at plants," 
and "feeders not allowed to refuse packer bids without incurring excessive 
cos ts" criteria were substantially satisfied. Although previous exchange 
proposals have utilized electronic bidding networks to eliminate the need for 
centralized bidder assembly, several of these exchanges have maintained 
rules requiring regionalized livestock assembly. 
Second, the ESPSCA 's utilization of the simultaneous progressive auc-
tion transaction system, which enables the disclosure of competing bids on 
each lot and thus interlot price comparisons before the exchange price for 
any lot is finally determined, has been attributable for the ESPSCA's sub-
stantial satisfaction of the "unwarranted price fluctuation," "persistent 
maintenance of interregional price differential," "competing bids not rap-
idly disclosed," and "not allowing all bidde;rs to bid on every lot" cri-
teria. These criteria are satisfied in part because this disclosure facil-
itates interlot price comparisons and thus formulation of bidding strate-
gies. 
Third, the modifications in the basic simultaneous progressive auction 
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transaction system rules allowi,ng for multiple-price determination ha s 
made possible the use of market-determined quality price differential 
schedules and combination trading bases. Together, these features allow 
the ESPSCA to satisfy the "traders not allowed to select price basist' 
criterion. 
The two 11 211 ratings received by the ESPSCA are for the "costly search 
for cattle" and "sophisticated trading rules" criteria. The ESPSCA' s fail-
ure to substantially satisfy the "costly search for cattle" criterion is 
primarily due to the exchange rules that deny traders the option of util-
izing a more expedient price determination system than the simultaneous 
progressive auction transaction system. The ESPSCA's failure to substan-
tially satisfy the "sophisticated trading rules" criterion is mainly at-
tributable to its utilization of complex electronic equipment . This so-
phisticated electronic hardware will likely require substantial bidder 
and consignor retraining in order for them to effectively use these devices . 
It should be noted, however, that none of the other electronic exchanges 
under consideration received a higher rating for either of these criteria. 
Caution in the use of these overall ratings is advisable for a least 
two reasons. First, no attempt has been made to assign relative weights 
indicating the relative importance of satisfying the various criteria. 
Thus, these overall ratings give equal weight to factors which may be of 
lesser importance. Second, the use of only three gradations of ratings 
may be misleading. For example, exchange proposals which fail to satisfy 
a particular criterion are merely given a "3" rating. Accordingly, no 
attempt is made to distinguish. between degrees of nonsatisfaction. That 
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is, the same "3" rating is given to exchanges which barely ,fail to satisfy 
a criterion and those which grossly fail to satisfy a criterion. This 
latter criticism might be partially- remedied through the use of a rating 
system with more than three gradations. However, this remedial step was 
not taken in the present evaluation due to the imprecise measures of cri-
terion satisfaction . If attempts are made in later research to empirically 
estimate these measures, a more accurate system of rating the degree of 
criterion satisfaction may then become feasible. 
In examining the credibility of these ratings, one may further question 
why it is that my own proposal almost always received a superior rating as 
compared to its predecessor exchange proposals and whether I could objec-
tively evaluate my own proposal. In Chapter III's initial development of 
the exchange criteria, I pledged my willingness to comply with Sosnick ' s 
principles for establishing market criteria. [26, p. 828] That is, I agreed 
to be specific, definite, explicit, realistic, discriminating, comprehen-
sive, and stringent . [26, p. 828] However, in assessing the resultant 
market ratings one should perhaps consider the difficulty of fully complying 
with several of his own market criteria principles . [26, p. 841] For ex-
ample, my list of criteria is quite likely not "comprehensive." The "com-
prehensive" principle requires that I anti cipate and mention every market 
characteristic that I might regard as undesirable. My failure to cite one 
such criterion would cause users o~ this study to think that my proposed 
exchange is des~rable, when it actually has characteristics which I regard 
as heing serious deficiencies . I26, pp. 835-36J ~urthermore, the users of 
this study should consider tne likelihood that I have identified only cri-
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teria which my ESPSCA proposal can satisfy . 
In addition, it is likely that I have not been "str ingent" in my 
establishment of the necessary conditions for criterion satisfaction. 
According to Sosnick, a market evaluator "should refuse to moder ate hi s 
necessary conditions" in order to claim that a particular market is effec-
tively competitive. (26, p. 839J However, in evaluating my own ESPSCA pro-
posal relative to prior electronic exchanges it is likely t hat I am, and 
resultantly my evaluation is, biased in favor of my own pr oposal . In fact, 
if I were to precisely follow Sosnick ' s "explicit" principle and state that 
to be effectively competitive (i.e. socially desirable) an elect ronic ex-
change must satisfy each and every criterion , it is likely that none of the 
proposed exchanges is effectively competitive. That is, my use of the "2" 
rating, indicating that an exchange "satisfies a criterion t o some extent", 
may be an indication in itself that I have moderated my necessary conditions 
for effective competition in order to claim that may proposed exchange is 
effectively competitive. Furthermore, my use of the inconclusive " l" rating, 
indicating that an exchange "substantially satisfies the cr iterion," indi-
cates a less than "stringent" requirement that a market " satisfy" a market 
criterion . 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter is fivefold: 1) to summarize the devel-
opment and evaluation of the ESPSCA; 2) to enumerate the advantages of the 
proposed ESPSCA over previous electronic exchange proposals; 3) to identi-
fy and acknowledge the weaknesses in the ESPSCA; 4) to suggest practical 
and theoretical topics regarding the ESPSCA which warrant further investi-
gation; and 5) to consider the future of electronic commodity price deter-
mination. 
A. Summary of the ESPSCA Development and Evaluation 
In Chapter I, the following two objectives for this study were form-
ulated: 
1. To design an electronic slaughter cattle exchange for marketing 
cattle fed in Iowa which eliminates the deficiencies existent in 
previous electronic exchange proposals; and 
2. To develop a method for conducting a comparative evaluation of 
the proposed exchange relative to previous electronic exchange 
proposals. 
In Chapter II, three types of electronic exchanges which have previ-
ously been proposed, were r eviewed. The purpose of this review was to iden-
tify the imperfections in these proposals. Once identified, these defic-
iencies were to provide guidance in the design of an improved exchange. 
In Chapter III, twenty flaws, each of which inhibits the attainment 
of effective competi tion by electronic livestock marketing systems, were 
identified. These flaws were used in Chapter V to develop a set of cri-
teria for conduc ting a comparative evaluation of the ESPSCA relative to 
the three previous types of electronic exchange proposals. 
In Chapter IV, the ESPSCA was progressively developed. The developr 
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ment conunenced with the selection of the simultaneous progr essive auction 
transaction system. Thereafter, fundamental rules of the simul t aneous pr o-
•gressive auction transaction system were modified t o allow fo r multiple-
price determination . This rule modification made combination trading bases 
and market-determined quality price differential schedules possible , Sub-
sequently, the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system was used 
as the basis of a Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle 
Auction (NESPSCA) which utilizes a chalk bidding board. After noting the 
deficiencies in the NESPSCA and the consequential need to conduct the auc-
tion electronically, a search was begun for electronic components to build 
an electronic marketing system. The search resulted in the selection of an 
electronic marketing system which utilizes cathode-ray tube display sta-
tions as remote bidding terminals, an electronic digital computer as the 
central processing unit, and touch-tone telephones as remote consignment 
terminals. After selection of the electronic components, a series of com-
puterized subroutines were proposed which would enable the bidders to spec-
ify and view from one to eight lot bid arrays on their cathode-ray tube 
screens . These subroutines would also allow packers to enter bids from 
their remote bidding stations through the use of their fiber-optic light 
pens, alphameric keyboards, and progranuned-funct ion keyboards. 
In Chapter V, the twenty potential flaws in e l ectronic marketing 
systems were used to develop twenty criteria to be used in the comparative 
evaluation of the three previously proposed types of electr onic exchanges 
and the ESPSCA . The overall r esults of this evaluation show that the 
ESPSCA is gener ally superior to the telephone, teletype, and computerized 
exchange proposals. The primary features attributing to the ESPSCA's favor-
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able r ating are: 1) the ESPSCA's rules permitting multiple-price deter-
mination; 2) the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system 
which allows disclosure of competing bids prior to the time the exchange 
price on any lot is determined; and 3) the ESPSCA rules which permit 
cattle to be sold while still in the producer's feedlot, 
B. Advantages of the Proposed Electronic 
Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter 
Cattle Auction 
The primary advantages of the proposed ESPSCA over prior electronic 
exchange proposals are described below. 
A number of the ESPSCA advantages result from the auction rules which 
permit ca ttle to be sold while still in the feedlot. For example, sale of 
cattle while still in the feedlot eliminates the cost of maintaining facil-
ities for centralized cattle assembly. In addition, the sale of cattle 
while still in the feedlot eliminates unproduct ive cross~hauling and 
lessens a producer ' s cost of refusing an unacceptably low packer bid . 
Furthermore, the fact that cattle may be sold while still in the feedlot 
allows packers to plan a daily cattle delivery and kill schedule which 
will best utilize their manpower and plant resources, 
In addition, three ESPSCA advantages are attributable to the selection 
of the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system. First, because 
the simultaneous progressive auction transaction system allows bids to be 
received concurrently on a number of lots, interlot price comparisons before 
the exchange price on any lot is finally determined, is possible. Second, 
due to the interlot price comparison capability the simultaneous progressive 
auction transaction system reduces the amount of lot-to-lot random price 
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fluctuation. This random price fluctuation had been characteristic of 
previous electronic exchange proposals utilizing the successive regressive 
auction transaction system. Third, as a further result of the interlot 
price comparison, bidding strategies under the ESPSCA are expected to be 
more easily formulated. 
A number of other rule modifications have also yielded advantageous 
ESPSCA features. For example, the modification of the simultaneous pro~ 
gressive auction transaction system to permit multiple .·price determination 
has yielded market-determined quality price differential schedules, as well 
as provided producers with the option of having their cattle priced under 
several different trading bases. In addition, the rule modification provid-
ing for the Name Disclosure Option allows producers to differentiate their 
cattle on the basis of producer reputation. This option encourages the 
production of quality cattle and acts as a partial substitute for presale 
visual cattle inspection. 
C. Weaknesses of · the Proposed Electronic 
Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter 
Cattle Auction 
While the advantages offered by the ESPSCA appear to be substantial, 
this proposed electronic cattle exchange is not withou t its limitations. 
A ntmber of these weaknesse s are described below. 
VlrHt, il must he recognized that the anticipated financial cost of 
procuring and programming the needed electronic computer components will be 
extremely high. Without further empirical proof of the economic gain to be 
attained by adoption of the ESPSCA, this high cost of electronic components 
may make implementation of the auction an unrealistic proposition. 
247 
A second problem which is related to the start-up cost limitation 
involves t he r ecruitment of packer and producer participation in o r der to 
ob t ain a s uf f i c i ent trading volume . 
A third weakness which has been present in previous electronic ex-
changes , as well as in the ESPSCA , is the "free-ride r" problem . The 
essence of this pr obl em is that if compulsor y utilization of an electr onic 
exchange is no t required, producers and packers will mar ket cattle directly 
and use an aver age of pr ices deter mined by the electr onic exchange , with-
out actually consigning the cat t le on the auction a nd paying an auction fee . 
To date , the only proposed solution fo r the free- rider pr oblem has been com-
pulsor y marke t i ng through the electronic auct i on , or a required per head 
assessment for all ca ttle a producer markets , regardless of whether or not 
they were sold through the elec tronic exchange . Naturally, packers and 
producers in the United States will be r eluctant to adopt a compulsory 
marketing system. Unfortunately, no be tter solution fo r the f r ee-rider 
problem has been presented in this ESPSCA proposal . 
Another weakness of this ESPSCA proposal a r ises from what may be con-
sider ed to be sophisticat ed trading rules . Sophisticated trading rules, 
along with the drastic change in cattle marketing a nd price determination 
inherent in the use of the ESPSCA, may requi re extensive training of market 
par ticipants . No t only must the participants be trained in the oper at i on of 
t he e l ect r onic hardware , but they mus t also learn how to make intelligent 
ESPSCA trading decisions. Furthermore, due t o the utilization of the 
simultaneous pr ogressive auction transaction sys t em , participants i n the 
ESPSCA will be for ced into r eformulating their bidding strategies . 
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Considerable packer objection may be aimed at the uncertainty assoc-
iated with ESPSCA lot withdrawal procedures. Pursuant to these proposed 
procedures a packer will not know the number of cattle he has purchased 
until after an auction session's bidding has ceased. Packers may argue 
that this procurement uncertainty may make it difficult for them to schedule 
a uniform daily kill. However, the end result of this uncertainty may be 
to encourage forward pricing of cattle for future delivery. 
A final weakness in the proposed ESPSCA arises from my use of "at-
feedlot" and "at-assembly yard" prices. Because all bids viewed by bidders 
will be on an at-feedlot or at- assembly yard basis, interlot price compar-
ison will be hampered. This hinderance arises from the fact that each 
bidder will have to subtract his own transportation cost estimate from the 
bid prices for each lot before making "net price" or "delivered price" com-
parisons. This price comparison limitation could be reduced if all bids 
were on a delivered basis. However, the use of delivered basis bids would 
require a complex transportation cost adjustment procedure after bidding 
has ceased in order to determine whether withdrawal was necessary. 
D. Suggested Topics for Additional Research 
To assist the reader in utilizing this s tudy, I shall now suggest sev-
eral topics worthy of further investigation. These topics fall roughly into 
two categories. The first category is comprised of practical topics and 
operational problems which producers and packers should investigate before 
attempting to actually implement an ESPSCA (Subsection 1). The second cat-
egory is comprised of theoretical topics involving electronic simultaneous 
progressive commodity auctions which merit further research and empirical 
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analysis (Subsection 2). 
1. rractical research topics 
Before manpower and capital are i nvested in an a ttempt to actually 
establish and operate an operational ESPSCA, several practical topics merit 
further investigation . These topics are briefly described below. 
First, an investigation into the exact cost of purchasing or leasing 
the electronic hardware components of the ESPSCA should be conducted. 
Although in designing the ESPSCA I realized that this cost would be substan-
tial and that it perhaps is the primary disadvantage of my proposal, I 
have made no effort to estimate this cos t in my study . It was decided to 
omit the electronic hardware cost estimates because within a few years 
after this thesis is written the estimates would undoubtedly become out-
dated and unrealistic. In addition, the cost of procuring electronic hard-
ware would be substantially reduced if the host market agency selected al-
ready has its own electronic computer. 
Second, consideration might be given to comparing the cost of estab-
lishing a Nonelectronic Simultaneous Progressive Slaughter Cattle Auction, 
which utilizes a chalk bidding board, with the cost of the ESPSCA. In ad-
dition, it may be desirable to determine the annual volume of trading at 
which implementation of the electronic auction system is economically jus-
tified. 
Third, prudent promoters of an ESPSCA might be well advised to survey 
the cattle industry in an attempt to determine what portion of the producers 
and packers would be willing to utilize the ESPSCA, and the annual trading 
volume which could be expected. The results of this statistical survey 
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should indicate whether an attempt to establish an ESPSCA would likely be 
succe ssful. 
Fourth, much promoter consideration should be given to the practical 
problems of establishing an ESPSCA. These problems include the following: 
1) selection of an organization to operate the ESPSCA; 2) obtaining the 
necessary financial backing to undertake the establishment of the ESPSCA; 
3) promotion of the ESPSCA in order to get initial packer and producer 
support for the ESPSCA; 4) legal issues regarding the drafting of producer 
marketing agreements, the law of auctions, incorporation of the market 
agency, and antitrust law compliance; and 5) determination of the amount 
and source of fees for usage of the ESPSCA. 
Fifth, before selecting electronic hardware components to implement 
the ESPSCA, further investigation of the exact capabilities of the avail-
able components will be necessary. Because I have proposed the ESPSCA 
design from the standpoint of an economist rather than a computer scientist, 
this examination may require consultation with a systems analyst . 
And finally, prior to implementation of the ESPSCA it will be neces-
sary to employ a computer programmer to develop programs and subroutines 
necessary for conduction of the ESPSCA. Conceivably, the description of 
programmed-function subroutines in Chapter IV would provide guidelines for 
the programmeer as to purpose and results desired. 
2. Theoretical research topics 
< ' 
From a theoretical standpoint several topics regarding the concept of 
simultaneous progressive counnodity auctions merit further research. 
First, with regard to the comparative evaluation of electronic ex-
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change proposals , it may be possible to undertake a quantitative compar-
ison which attempts to empirically estimate the measures of c r i t erion sat~ 
isfaction . 
Second 1 it may be possible to quantitatively estimate the actual econ-
omic gain which would arise from implementation of an ESPSCA. This es-
timate would desirably take into consideration the cost savings from the 
reduction of cross-hauling inherent in centralized cattle assembly, the 
value of the increased opportunity for competitive bidding on cattle lots, 
the packer savings in cattle procurement costs, the value of impr oved 
pricing accuracy arising from market-determined quality price differential 
schedules, the cost savings from enabling a planned delivery of cattle at 
slaughtering plants, and the increased exchange efficiency , more equitable 
division of gains, and the reduction in interlot price fluctuation arising 
from utilization of the simultaneous progressive auction transaction sys-
tem . 
Third, further consideration should be given to resolving the free-
rider problem by methods other than compulsory marketing or compulsory 
payment of marketing fees . 
Fourth, an attempt should be made to rank or assign a pr iori t y or 
relative weight to the twenty exchange criteria developed in Chapter V. 
By assigning relative weights to these criteria, the overall evaluation of 
each electronic exchange proposal will become more meaningful . 
Fifth, one might explore the feasibility of using the ESPSCA systems 
design f or pricing other agricultural commodities, or the development of 
an elec tr onic multi-commodit y exchange . 
252 
In addition 1 further refinement in the design of the proposed ESPSCA 
may be undertaken. For example, it may be possible to replace the human 
operator at each bidding station with the packer's computer . That is, it 
may be possible for each packer to program his computer to enter the de~ 
sired bids on the simultaneous auction . Accordingly, a packer could give 
his computer the variables for specific exchange terms such as the allow-
able high bid on each lot component, the desired price differential between 
lot components, and the volume of cattle needed during each delivery inter-
val. Thereafter, the packer's computer would utilize these parameters as 
guidelines in entering bids on the auction. This advancement would not 
only accelerate the speed of the auction and increase the lot trading ca-
pacity of the ESPSCA session, but it would also readily facilitate int erlot 
price comparisons. 
E. What Is the Future of Electronic Commodity 
Price Determination? 
I began this thesis by citing Wilcox's conclusion [31, p . 115] that 
present market structure and institution developments represent only one 
point on the continuum of marketing change, and that technological innova-
tions would provide the impetus for further change during the remainder of 
the Twentieth Century. After a thorough investigation of recent electron-
ic exchange proposals and my own examination of present electronic capabil-
ities, I concur in Wilcox's opinion that further change in marketing 
institutions is inevitable. My conclusion is premised on the following 
beliefs. First, I think that the energy conscious society of the mid-1970 1s 
and the rising cost of transportation fuels will force the livestock and 
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meat industry into consider ing marketing systems which eliminate unproduc-
tive cross~hauling . Second , I believe that t oday ' s livestock feede r s are 
better informed and educated as to their marketing alternatives and the 
weaknesses in the pr esent marketing systems . And third, I think that 
several successful efforts have recently been made to organize producers 
and packers into groups dedicated to further industrywide advancements . 
Several of these or ganizations may have t he capability t o promote and/or 
operate an electronic livestock marketing system. 
While I do not necessarily think that the f utur e t rend in cattle 
mar keting institutions will be towards implementation of the ESPSCA , I do 
believe that there are substantial advanta ges which favor the future of 
computer i zed electr onic exchanges. Furthermore, I r ealize that the ESPSCA 
is just one electronic exchange design, and that other impr oved ver sions 
are likely to follow . Neve r theless, I believe that the compar a t ive eval-
ualation and evaluative criteria utilized in this thesis present an ana-
l y tical tool which can contribute significantly to the pl anning and de-
sign of these future electronic exchanges . 
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